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WEDNESDAY MORNING SESSION

November 3, 1971
The Study on Establishment of Accounting

Principles, sponsored by the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants,, convened on Wednesday morning, November 3^
1971, in the meeting room of the Institute at 1700 Broadway,

New York, New York, at ten-ten o'clock, Francis M. Wheat, Esq.,

Chairman.
Committee members present were:
Mr. John C. Biegler, CPA, senior partner of Price

Waterhouse & Co.;

Mr. Arnold I. Levine, CPA, national executive partner,
management of J. K. Lasser & Co.;
Mr. Wallace E. Olson, CPA, executive partner of

Alexander Grant & Company;
Mr. Thomas C. Pryor, CFA, partner and chairman of the
investment committee of White Weld & Co.;

Mr. Roger B. Smith, vice president-finance, General
Motors Corporation;

Dr. David Solomons, FCA, professor and chairman of
the accounting department, Wharton School of Finance and
Commerce, University of Pennsylvania;
Francis M. Wheat, Esq., Attorney-at-law, Chairman
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

The only thing I have to say at the

outset this morning is a word of appreciation from myself and
my colleagues, for the time and trouble you have all taken to
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I hope we can keep these proceedings

come and meet with us.

relatively informal;
that way.

I think we will gain more from them

We're most

grateful

to every one of you, in

case we don’t have a chance to repeat that comment each

time you come to the microphone to talk with us.
So thank you on behalf of all of us; I hope that
you will feel ultimately that your participation, and the time

and effort you have put in will have been worthwhile.
You all know why we’re here.

I don’t think that

any further remarks on my part are necessary, unless any of

my colleagues have anything to say at the outset.
They stand mute, for the moment, but look out

later.
Our first witness in the box this morning is our

eminent colleague, Mr. Robert Trueblood, who is chairman

of the parallel study which some people think, quite correctly,
is a seminal study and we're the technical one.

He is, as you all know, the chairman of the study
on the objectives of financial reporting, and in addition

to that he's the managing partner, I believe, of Touche Ross,
and I think he brings us a message from Touche Ross.

Perhaps

he’ll say something, too, about the progress of his own study,
which I’m sure will be of interest to all of you.

MR. ROBERT TRUEBLOOD:

Bob!

I will be glad, Chairman

Wheat, to answer any questions about the progress of our own

group, of the objectives study group, but I think it should be
abundantly clear that I do state this morning only for Touche

Ross of which I am chairman of the board.
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The first official statement Touche Ross made on the

matter of the contribution of the APB was a speech over my name
made two years ago, "Ten Years with the APB.” This has been

supplied to the Commission, but is not today a matter of our

formal submission.
Touche Ross representatives met with the Wheat

Commission in Chicago on June 25, and issued a formal
statement which is available in printed form today.

We do

not intend to enlarge upon that rather brief statement, but

I would summarize it for you so that you, if you wish, may
let me stand questioning.

Very briefly, Touche Ross believes that the best
solution to the problem of establishing accounting principles
holds with the creation of a small, full-time accounting

principles board.

Such a group would be chartered to deal

with new developments involving accounting and accountability
as they emerge; to conduct a significant level of research,
and development of an underlying conceptual framework of

the accounting discipline; and to anticipate future accounting
needs that will be imposed upon the profession by the public.

First in terms of the board itself, we contemplate

a small group of five to seven fully-paid members, members

that would be without regard to firm affiliation or membership
in the Institute, but with considerable appreciation of

practice considerations.
Each member would be required to dissociate himself
from his prior affiliation; a business firm, a practicing
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firm, or a university.
Most importantly, we think that a small, top-level
board should be supported heavily by competent staff, and
would require significant involvement with its peers in the

financial, business and academic communities.
The scope of its activities would be broad,

ranging from the formulation of objectives to the enunciation
of principles, to consideration of practice pronouncements.
As sort of a peripheral idea we feel that the
historic separation of accounting and auditing within the

framework of the American Institute is not supportable

logically and should not be maintained.

So that the forward

work of the board would also have some influence on direct
auditing matters.
We concur with the current practice and procedure
of involving the business community in early discussions

and projected opinions.
As to levels of performance, we might describe
our position this way:

we presently conceive the board as

a kind of inverse pyramid, with a lot of effort at the top;
with a very small underpinning of research either in the
purchase sense or in the activity sense.
We like to think that ideally the structure of the

board would really be pyramidal, in the sense that there
would be a small group of top people, heavily supported by

competent staff, and heavily supported by formal research.
We have made rough estimates that this procedure

could cost as much as eight or ten million dollars, but I
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will have a few comments on that later.

Most importantly,

on the cost side, we feel that at least 50 per cent of the
total effort should be devoted to research.

This statement we make constructively, in the spirit
and vigor of youth and growth, without any institutional or

proprietary bias.

We put it forth as a suggestion for the

consideration of the Commission; we do not take the position
that any single one of our proposals should be inviolate.

I would like to talk very briefly about two aspects

of this.

There has been some criticism already that we do not

put enough score on the requirements of practice involvement

on the part of members of the board.

I feel very strongly that

given a reasonable term, a reasonable cycling of terms, that
day-to-day involvement with client matters is not necessary,
and even could be a positive aspect of our proposal.

And just one word about relative cost as between the

present situation and our proposal.

I think if one really does

cost out what we're presently doing, including the contribution
of time, imputed implied costs, that there is really not that
much difference between our present proposal and our present

experience.

But enough for that.

One comment

relating to the profession which

is not covered in our official submission is the matter of

discipline and enforcement.

We regard this whole subject as

somewhat outside the direct concern of the Wheat Commission;

we do feel very strongly, however, that particularly
in its professional interplay with the SEC the matter
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of discipline and enforcement
critical forward problem.

is a very

It’s a past problem as well,

but it must be handled in the future.

Our firm, Touche Ross, has large disappointment

in the outcome of the so-called "Seidman Resolution" which
has not yet been worked into canons.

We think it should.

But most importantly, we simply feel that it is imperative
that the profession undertake a higher level of interest,

a higher level of concern, a more timely effectiveness in
the enforcement of its technical conclusions in the entire

discipline of accounting.

Mr. Chairman, that’s all I have to say at the
moment.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Let me propose a procedure,

which will involve all of us, to the extent that we have

time.

The panel will have some questions for Mr. Trueblood,

and then if we have time before we move on, I would like to

invite any of you who are present to pose a question or two
which Mr. Trueblood, I'm sure, would be glad to try to

answer.

If none of you have any specific objections we will

try to follow that procedure throughout the hearing.

On the other hand, if any of you do have any specific

objections, I would ask you to let me know and we will, of course,
accommodate your wishes.
Let me ask a question of you.

As you know if you

have looked at any of the papers we have received in
advance of this hearing, there are a number of eminent

commentators who have drawn a sharp distinction between
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so-called accounting principles, basic, fundamental matters

of a higher nature, and what you refer to as practice pronounce
ments.

They recommend that there be two entirely separate
bodies; body number one (perhaps even under separate auspices),
which would deal with matters of accounting principles; and a

separate body--of a somewhat lesser stature, I take it--which
would be charged with dealing with practice pronouncements and,

if you will, what some people call detailed standards.

In view of your comment that you envisage your board
dealing with both of these, and particularly in view of the

fact that you have had the benefit of the experience of chairing
the committee which is trying to search for basic principles,

I wonder if you would give us your comments on that proposition

and your reactions to those proposals?
MR. TRUEBLOOD:

I regard, and the Touche proposal

regards, the subject matter at three levels--broad objectives,
principles and procedures.
a difficult question.

How each of them is dealt with is

I think the Touche position is that we

must have a compatible and consistent set of broad objectives
which, I believe, our paper presumes to ultimately come from
the board, as a sort of companion piece to the work of our

present objective committee.

The principles are the broad statements of
applicability to accounting as it is done; the practice

statements are the more or less procedural aspects of the
situation.
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First I would point out that the Board in its

present method of operation tends to make some distinction

between what they call the principle level and the practice
levels in that frequently,
if not always, an opinion is
followed by a series of interpretations at the detail level.
So the present Board has already made some such distinctions.

In our own proposal, we suggest that the board
confine itself to objectives and principles, and that these
procedural implementations and interpretation kind of things
come either or both from practicing firms or from the staff

itself.
I think the distinction which was made in one
paper I read is quite appropriate.

I have only recently

read that paper; I do not care to comment on the structure
or the organization, which it explicitly proposes, but the

distinction between the two matters is completely appropriate
and completely consistent with the Touche position.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:
little bit.

Let me follow that up just a

You address yourself primarily to the

distinction, possibly semantical and otherwise, between
these different kinds of pronouncements.

What concerns me

more than that is the question as to whether or not in your
Judgment it would be a desirable form of organization to have
a separate body dealing with the one under different auspices,

as in one proposal, and another body attempting to deal with the
other; whether or not a distinction can be made so sharp that

there will be no problem in having two separate bodies trying

to coordinate between each other.
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That concerns me and I wonder if you could give us
your reaction?

MR. TRUEBLOOD:

That is my explicitly withheld

judgment as a result of my brief exposure to that

proposal on the organizational structure.

I think

there is a distinction; I think they should, however, be
blended together; they have to work hand-in-hand, and I
would be somewhat disturbed if one didn’t have to report to

the other or they didn't have to coordinate together, and

so on.
But the distinction is completely appropriate;

I can't conceive that the organizational framework could not

be worked out.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Let me just ask one more question.

You draw this explicit distinction between the principles

and the procedures or practice pronouncements.

I have been

puzzled by that distinction from the beginning, but that's

understandable since I am not a professional accountant.
On the other hands I would like to give you one
example and ask your opinion.

You indicated that the present

Board does draw a distinction between what you refer to as
principle and what is referred to as procedure in relation

to its process for interpretation.
Let me give you an example of an opinion; I believe
it's 18, which deals with the equity method.

Would you regard

that opinion as dealing with a matter of principles or a
matter of practice pronouncement?

10

MR. TRUEBLOOD:

I would say that that portion

of the opinion which deals with the conceptual correctness

of picking up equity in an associated company is a
principle.

All the detailed rules and procedures about

percentages and circumstances and caveats, ought to come
out as a practice bulletin.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Do you really think it's

feasible to have one organization announce the principle

and then a totally separate organization attempt, without

having had the benefit of the debate, concern and
philosophical discussion that goes into the formulation
of a principle, to take that as a given affair and fill

out these details.

Do you visualize that some lack

of coordination might creep into that?

MR. TRUEBLOOD:
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

You're pressing me on this.

I am.

I don't have an answer

which is quite satisfactory.

MR. TRUEBLOOD:

I have taken the position that

there must be, by one arrangement or another, a high degree

of coordination, cooperation and collaboration.

After all,

it's the profession that has responsibility for all three
levels of pronouncement, and one way or the other, the

profession must find a way for them to hang together.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

moment.

Let me just follow that for a

You would prefer to see Opinion No. 18, instead

of being contained in one single integrated pronouncement,
separated out into various and sundry parts which
would be issued separately at separate times?
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MR. TRUEBLOOD:

I think the substance of 18 could

be stated in at most a paragraph or two.

The interpretations

and detailed rules sort of follow on naturally in most cases.

I submit that in Opinion 11 there is a very long series of

interpretations and questions and analytical decisions about

details,
many of which were not even on the table for
discussion; they came up later.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Mr. Trueblood, is it really possible

for a group of men to sit on high and pronounce on matters of

principle without considering and being enmeshed in the
problem of how they would be applied--whether or not the

principle really works in practice?

In other words, can you

really separate these things and say, "We're going to announce

this principle, but it's up to somebody else to worry about all
the details?"
MR. TRUEBLOOD:

You cannot sit in this room and talk

about principles without thinking about impact.

You cannot

sit in this room and draw up 125 detailed applications without

considering what went on in relation to principles.

But my point is really that one follows from the
other.

And I want to go back one step further and say that

it is the Touche position that objectives are fundamental;

principles follow from objectives, and practice implementation
details follow from principles.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

My questions, as you understand,

are not designed to press you too much.

But as a layman and
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a practical lawyer trying to figure out whether or not it’s

feasible for somebody to pronounce on matters of principle

without having to have his nose rubbed in the problem of
practice and whether or not these principles will. work, I

am concerned about separating the two,

MR. TRUEBLOOD:

There is no question that a high

degree of coordination is required.

In the Touche proposal

we do not make that separation as between bodies, but we
contemplate a separation as between responsibilities for
these two issues.

The principle, as between the Touche

proposal and the one you’re talking about is not inconsistent.

The organizational framework is different from what we

contemplate.

PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

There’s one point, Mr.

Trueblood, that doesn’t come out quite clearly in your
You say that your reconstituted board would

statement.

consist of the best professional accountants in the country;
you say that the practicing profession can neither share
nor delegate the main responsibility for this matter.

It

isn’t quite clear from your statement whether you envisage
your new board as continuing to be an arm of the AICPA or

whether members of the board will have to be members of
Also, how do you respond to the view that

the AICPA.

because accounting is so important to the whole economy,
the board should not be composed exclusively of professional

accountants ?

MR. TRUEBLOOD:

I think the intention of that

statement, and I believe I submitted a clarification of
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that statement, is that we regard the board as properly

consisting of accountants, but not necessarily CPAs.

And

in my own personal view, not necessarily members of the

American Institute, because that’s an interlocking problem.
As distinguished from a proposal which might include men
from other disciplines such as the behavioral sciences, I

think the Touche proposal contemplates that that kind of
input would best be secured from two sources: either purchased

consulting or membership of other disciplinary people on
active project advisory committees, support committees, etc.
The second part of your question had to do with

public sector versus the private.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

I think I was concerned about

bringing onto the board disciplines other than accounting.

MR. TRUEBLOOD:

PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:
MR. PRYOR:

Did I answer that satisfactorily?

Yes.

Yes, thank you.

I have two questions.

First, would the

accounting profession support the opinions rendered by a small
board of the size you described?

Secondly, could you describe

a little more specifically what you visualize in terms of

these broad objectives?
MR. TRUEBLOOD:

In response to your first question,

I think I would say categorically that the practicing profession,
as I know it, would support the opinions of the smaller board,

even though it means that certain firms would not always have
representation on that board, or might never have representation

on the board.
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I think this goes back to one of the reasons

we’re here.

The profession wants a strong, viable, accepted

group which will establish opinions for use of the profession

I have no concern on that score.

Your second question, about the distinction
between objectives and principles is a little bit more
complex and one which the objectives study group is reviewing
every day and finding difficult.

One can say simply,
that

the objective of financial accounting or financial statements
shall be that they shall give all necessary and useful

information to all users.

That’s a broad statement of

philosophy about which we could have no problem.
Then one runs into a series of what we might

call institutional constraints, one of which is independence,
for example.

Then you go to a third level or characteristics

such as causality, comparability, consistency.

Next, I

think one goes down one step further to prescriptive char

acteristics, such as fair-value accounting versus historical
cost.

This is the philosophical, conceptual underlay
for methods of accounting, as distinguished from rules

and regulations.
MR. OLSON:

Do you regard the appearance of

independence to be an important factor in suggesting a
smaller, full-time board?
MR. TRUEBLOOD:
about a full-time board.

It’s not critical to my thinking

As far as I'm concerned, and

Touche is concerned, we know enough about the workings of
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the Board and have been so heavily involved that dependency in

fact is not a valid criticism.

I do feel that the automatic

seats, the automatic representation of certain firms does

create a problem which relates to the appearance of independence
from the public point of view.

That is not a significant or

major reason underlying the Touche proposal.
MR. LEVINE:

Mr. Trueblood, carrying that a step

further, how do you anticipate that this board will be appointed?
Have you given this any consideration?

MR. TRUEBLOOD:
sense.

Not in the detailed organizational

Presently, Board appointments are made, I believe, on

recommendation of the Board of Directors with approval of

Council--am I correct, Mr. Savoie?

MR. SAVOIE:

Is that how it is?

The President appoints with the approval

of the Board of Directors.

MR. LEVINE:

Are you suggesting that the selection

would be under the auspices of the Institute?

MR. TRUEBLOOD:

Yes, I presume that the selection

would be under the auspices of the Institute.

I presume that

recommendation would come from other professional groups, such
as Financial Executives Institute.
MR. BIEGLER:

absolutely clear to me.

Mr. Trueblood, one point is not

What fundamental

feature is involved

in your proposal that would suggest that the end product of the
effort of this board will be any better or any more acceptable

than the end product of the present Board, which is strictly a
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voluntary operation.

This Board has out of its eighteen

members the equivalent, certainly, of more than seven
full-time persons.

MR. TRUEBLOOD:
threefold:

My concerns on that point are

First, given a part-time, volunteer boards in

most cases, if not in all, the individual members of the
board are devoting a great deal of time and attention to

the affairs of the board in a very dedicated, thorough and

admirable way.

But, at the same time they do have clients

to take care of; they do have telephone calls, and the like.
This is a distractive process, and it tends to take away

from their total involvement with the board.
Also, I really think that as an organizational
matter, as a psychological principle, total involvement

with any procedure, is significantly different than casual
or part-time involvement with that same project, no matter
how sincere the effort.

I can further attest that in our own experiences

on our objectives group, where we are presently working with

total full-time staff as distinguished from a part-time

staff, the difference in the production and attitude is very
apparent and the result is very apparent already.

May I make one more point:

Although you

may regard the main thrust of the Touche proposal to be the

smaller board, an equivalent thrust is enlarging the face
of this parameter in terms of staff, competent, expensive,
and full-time, and research, purchased from or contracted

with the best people in the world who can do that piece of
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research.

And that, in terms of the ultimate output of the

board, is equally important to Touche as the reconstitution
of the physical body.

PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

That part of your proposal is

not inconsistent with the present Board, which could have a

broader staff base.

MR. TRUEBLOOD:

But they do not.

PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:
MR. TRUEBLOOD:

But they could have.

Yes, they could have.

our conversation got started.

This is how

It is our view that many

opinions go out without any empirical research; any fundamental
research; sometimes with relatively little conversational

research.

This is one of the things we are urging you to

consider seriously and to make whatever suggestions you wish

regarding it.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Mr. Trueblood; almost all of the

discussion we have had has had to do with the mechanics of the
process of arriving at principles and pronouncements on practice.

In 1964 the Institute adopted a Council resolution indicating;
generally, that the objective was to narrow the range of

alternatives in generally accepted practices; and thus to
narrow all the choices that were then present in preparing
financial statements.

Do you still regard that objective as a primary one,

and is it your general observation; and the basis upon which

you make your proposal, that this work should proceed more
rapidly and effectively in the future than it has in the past?
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MR. TRUEBLOOD:

When you tied in 1964, were you

speaking explicitly of the Seidman resolution and the
discipline part of it, or were you speaking of the broader

question?
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:
MR. TRUEBLOOD:

The broader part.

There is no question in my mind

that we must proceed further and faster in making like

things look alike and making unlike things look different;

narrowing the differences, or however you want to put it.

We have made some progress, but not enough.

We must

proceed.

Along with that we should have enforcement

procedures, too.

It’s not your business, but an important

part of the issue.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Let me comment on that.

It is

our business, in a sense, because we have had eminent and
experienced people advise us that in their judgment the

task of establishing these principles and practice
pronouncements ought to reside in the Government.

It is

not the business of the accounting profession to do this;

it is a public matter which should be handled by an inter

disciplinary group such as the Securities Exchange Commission.
The SEC has this responsibility under statute and ought to

pick up the ball and do the job.

They say we ought to put

an end to this business of trying to do the job in the
private sector.

A part of that proposal, of course, is that

this would bring together the organization which is doing the

enforcing and the organization which is doing the pronouncing.
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It would, therefore, ensure better enforcement than we
have today.

I wonder if you would comment on that?
MR. TRUEBLOOD:

The constrasuggestion--the Government

suggestion--is certainly logical and viable.

In our 1969 paper

we took the position that the profession had two alternatives.
One was to withdraw completely and let the Government do it.

The other was to get with it and do it creditably ourselves

and work along in the historic manner with Government agencies.
I have two comments.

The first is somewhat trivial,

I suppose, but it has certainly been our experience in accounting
areas that where certain agencies have taken over the rule

making process completely, the experience has tended to be bad

in the sense that there is a lag, an inflexibility about detail
governmental rules and regulations.
More importantly, I think the transfer of the function

from the private sector to the government sector raises some
very broad philosophical questions which you must consider.

The best source material on this I have ever found is the late
Flexner, who did the study on the medical profession and

education in 1912,

'14 and '16.

He has an explicit article,

which I think runs from about 1920, in which he attempts to

define a profession.

And one of the five or six cardinal

characteristics he sets forth is that if the subject matter be
professional, and if the discipline is properly handled in the
private sector, one of the principal characteristics is self
discipline.
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So if accounting is truly a profession^ then

self-discipline must come from us.
that is going to be the test.

It seems to me that

We get with the self

discipline or we lose a lot of other things.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

I wonder if anybody in the

audience has a question for Mr. Trueblood?

welcome to ask him.
MR. GIBBS:

You are

Mr. Gibbs has a question.
How long a term would your men serve?

MR. TRUEBLOOD:
mechanical implementation.

We did not go to that level of
There have been several

suggestions of three-year or five-year terms, with no more

than one repetition; and seven-year terms with no repetition.

There are quite reasonable parameters which would be

acceptable to us.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Any other questions?

We thank you very much.

MR. TRUEBLOOD:

Thank you very much for hearing

us again.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Next on the program was

Mr. Bernard Maas of the American Stock Exchange, but unfortunately

he found it impossible to be here.
we would proceed with him.

So if Mr. Etra is here,

I hope he’s here.

Mr. Donald Etra of the Corporate Accountability
Research Group, Washington, D. C.

MR. DONALD ETRA:

Thank you, Mr. Wheat.

It certainly is a privilege to be here this
morning because the accounting profession holds a high

responsibility to the public.

Both the courts and the
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profession itself have come to recognize that the accountant's

primary responsibility is to the public as opposed to the
management group which hires him and pays his fee.

I myself am a public interest lawyer from a firm
of four public interest lawyers.

This last year we organized

what is known as The Company to Solicit Questions on Professional
Responsibility.

As a result we've received letters from the

professions--law, medicine and accounting--from individuals who
have expressed criticism of their own profession.
I would like to bring you, this mornings in touch

with some of the ideas that individual accountants have brought
forth to us.

I would also like to present four challenges to

the accounting profession:

Firstly, the challenge to strive for greater
uniformity in accounting procedures;

Secondly, to reassert the independence of the

accounting profession;
Thirdly,
to accept liability--a better word might

be responsibility-- for the work of each individual accountant;
And fourthly, perhaps the most exciting challenge,

to accept a leadership role in innovating for the public good.
Firstly, on this question of uniformity.

What the

accounting profession has strived for over the past couple of

years is a conceptual framework.

work that they do?

Why do accountants do the

What use is made of financial statements

to which accountants certify?

Investors make use of these

statements , creditors, labor groups look at the statements to
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see if they're getting a fair share of the profits;

consumers look at the results of the corporation to see if
the prices which are charged are just prices, and government

regulators make use of these financial statements to compile
aggregate data to evaluate performance of the economy.
Are financial statements comparable?
moment, unfortunately, no!

At the

And this is where the problem

lies, because if financial statements are to be useful to
the above-mentioned groups, an investor must be able to

compare the performance of one company against another.

The availability of alternate procedures makes
it a hard task to compare the financial statement of

Company A to the financial statement of Company B.
In short, perhaps what is needed is an "esperanto,"

a common language for the accounting profession.

If

uniformity is not possible on an across-the-board basis,
then I suggest that the AICPA take a leadership role in

suggesting uniform accounting standards within industry
groupings.

Industry groupings can be based on the Standard

Industrial Classifications.

If that doesn't work, refine

these classifications.
The Small Business Administration finds it very

difficult to analyze the performance of companies when they
can't compare financial statements of one company or

another.
As you know, the Government last year conducted

a feasibility study on the establishment of uniform cost

accounting standards, and Congress felt that cost accounting
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standards and uniformity in that area were feasible.

In fact,

it was estimated that out of the $70 billion of business the

Government does in contracting with defense contractors,
perhaps $2 billion could be saved if the Government were able
to compare the statements and compare the cost estimates of
those companies with whom it contracted.

Should not similar savings be available to the
private sector?

Comparability and usefulness would be one way

of ensuring that financial statements would again become

relevant to those who rely on them.
My second challenge is one to reassert independence.

This challenge is related to the question of uniformity.

If

an accountant can choose among alternate accounting procedures,

then management can say, "Paint me a picture which will show

that I have done a good job," and management will tell the
accountants"You can do it because you’ve got the alternate
procedures available."

We’ve got to create uniformity, restrict the

alternative procedures available, and that will be one way
for the profession to reassert its independence.

I’d like now to present to you a hypothetical
situation.

For instance, I propose a suggestion, you follow

my suggestion and then you come to me and say, "How did I do
by following your suggestion?"

I've got a proprietary interest

in my answer, because I made the suggestion which you

subsequently followed.
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This, Gentlemen, is the situation which exists

in the accounting profession when accounting firms also do
management consulting work.
Professional. Ethics Opinion No. 12 is entitled,

Independence—Auditors’ responsibility to avoid relationships
which to a reasonable observer might suggest a conflict of

interest.

The opinion concludes that

an accountant can

give management advice as long as in doing so he does not

impair his objectivity.
The crucial question is, does the giving of

management advice impair an accountant’s objectivity?

I

know that the AICPA has taken the position that playing a
dual role does not impair a CPA firm’s objectivity.

But

how does the public view an accountant who plays a dual

role?

Professor Abraham Briloff conducted a study on
this issue.

The conclusions of his study, after polling

investment analysts and other men in the financial field,
was that 58 per cent of those polled felt that objectivity
was incompatible with accountants’ giving both accounting

advice and management consulting advice.

A potential conflict of interest exists with any
group that’s on two sides of an issue.

I make no charges that a real conflict of interest
exists.

I do assert, however, that we should at least have

the opportunity to see what are the results of an accounting

firm playing a dual role.

Therefore, I suggest to this body today that you
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require disclosure of those clients of accounting firms, to
whom the accounting firms give management advice.

At least

let the public see that the accounting firm is playing a dual
role; let the public judge whether the accounting firm can be
as objective and independent as it asserts that it is.

I also suggest to this body that it examine the

financial statements of those companies who use the same
accounting firm that certifies the statement as the accounting
firm which gives management consulting advice.
The Corporate Accountability Research Group is

disturbed by the trend over the past few years--and this
brings me to my third point--that the AICPA has sought to

restrict the liability of accountants.

The AICPA, in its

amicus curiae brief in the Continental Vending suit, stated
that as long as an accountant adheres to generally accepted

accounting principles, he should be free from liability.
On one hand, one can see from the accountant’s
point of view it is perhaps wise for him to cover himself and

say, "As long as I'm within the purvue of GAAP I’m okay; no

one can assert that I'm breaching any fiduciary rules.”

However, I'd like to suggest to the AICPA at this
hearing today that a policy of strict liability be imposed.

It is not enough to say that you simply follow generally
accepted accounting principles, if those principles themselves

do not provide a reasonably prudent investor with that which

he wants to know.
In short, there is a credibility gap in generally
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accepted accounting principles, and this credibility gap

does not reflect honor on a profession which has been
known throughout history as an honorable profession; as a
profession with a high degree of integrity; a profession
that accepts responsibility for its work.

My fourth challenge to this body today is the

most exciting one.

I ask the American Institute of

Certified Public Accountants, and I ask each individual

accounting firm here today, to take a leadership role in
innovating for the public good; to try to expand the

interpretive indices available to accountants; to analyze
the social consequences of some of the corporate actions

that we see in the world today.

Gentlemen, I ask you to analyze the costs of
producing an unsafe car.

life?

What is the cost in terms of

What is the cost to society and communities in

terms of failing to put pollution-restricting devices on
chimneys and after-burners?

The true costs of these if

reflected in accounting statements would heighten the

public interest.

to corporations

Investors and stockholders would then say

"All right, men, we see that there’s more

to profit than money.

We also want a better environment;

we also want better cars; we also want safer streets for
our children.”

Yes, General Motors can make more money by putting
a fancy hood ornament on a car.

But consider the brain

damage to little children when their brains are penetrated
by these dashboards and the hood ornaments which run into them.
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There is more to analyzing costs than mere profit and money;
pollution, safety, environmental factors.

This profession can innovate and develop these new

interpretive indices.

I ask the AICPA to take a stand on the disclosure
hearings,

on the issue of product-line reporting.

The

Small Business Administration, small businesses, the Government,
would like to know the specific areas where large conglomerates

are doing business and making profits.

This is important to the financial data the Government
assembles; this is important to the small businessman; and this

is important to the consumer and the public, because corporations
today do not exist within a vacuum; they have a tremendous impact
on the public and on the communities in which they exist.

I ask the profession to assume an attitude of

preventive medicine.

It does not reflect credit on the

accounting profession when so many brokerage firms went under

during the past two years.
on in corporations.

decisions.

Accountants are privy to the goings

They are aware of many of the financial

Why shouldn’t the accountant step in and say, "Stop!”

Eight months from now the public is going to find out what’s

going on, we can halt the situation now before innocent consumers
are hurt.

Therefore, Gentlemen, I present to you four challenges:

One, to strive for greater uniformity; two, to reassert your
independence; three, to accept responsibility for the work of
individual accountants, and four, to take an exciting leadership

role in developing new interpretive indices in working for the
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public good.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

I might comment on two points.

One of them has to do with this business of accounting for

social costs and things of that kind.

I’m sure you. are

aware of the fact that Mr. Trueblood’s committee is in the
very process of considering that aspect of the objectives

of accounting.

I am sure, therefore, that you will want to

deliver your views to that committee, which is just starting

its interviewing process.

That really is probably more in the area of their
effort than it is of our task.

The second comment is on the subject of line of

business reporting--breaking out the separate segments
of the business conglomerate.

I believe that it’s

appropriate for me to comment on the fact that the Accounting

Principles Board has that subject on its very active agenda,
and is in the process of studying the question.

I think the question boils down to this:

The

Securities and Exchange Commission today has certain

rules requiring the breaking down of the financial
statements of a conglomerate into its various segments.

However, the disclosure requirements of the SEC do not
require that the product-line information be certified by

independent accountants.

And the basic question, I think,

is whether or not that process can be regularized to the
extent that it can be covered by the auditor’s opinion and

standards developed to a greater extent than they are today.
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MR. ETRA:

I would hope so.

I would hope that even

before the Trueblood Committee does come to its conclusion that
we in this room today would exert an influence on management in

terms of asking them to analyze more carefully the true cost of
what they’re doing on the product-line issue.

Unfortunately, as

the situation exists today management can decide what product
lines it feels it has, and perhaps this vitiates somewhat the
progress made along these lines.

I think the AICPA could at

least take an unofficial or an official stand for greater
disclosure as a whole, this being merely one aspect of the
disclosure issue.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

I would like to ask you one question

as a matter of clarification.

I’m sure that you're aware of

the fact that the word "uniformity" is kind of a pejorative

word in accounting circles.

One of the reasons is that uniformity

is associated historically with so-called uniform systems of

accounts.

I’m sure you’re familiar with the recent report of
the staff of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce relative to the Penn Central situation, and the
Interstate Commerce Commission and its jurisdiction over the

accounting of railroads and railroad subsidiaries.

If not,

you will want to look at it.
The Interstate Commerce Commission busies itself

with uniform systems of accounts, which don't always produce,
in terms of financial reporting, the kind of results one

might wish.
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There have been other examples in Government

of pinning everything down to a certain rigid formulation
and then putting numbers into slots.

Too often, that is

the vision that is conjured up by the term "uniformity”

Whereas, I believe that you had in mind

in accounting.

as you explained the matter--and I just want to be sure--

a reduction in the number of alternatives that can be used
in the same situation covering the same circumstances.

This

would reduce the number of choices that can be utilized to

flavor the accounts in a different direction--is that what

you had in mind?

MR. ETRA:
alternatives.

Exactly--the reduction in the number of

What I was getting at was that the former

mentor of the SEC, Mr. Carey, explained that there were many

areas where there were alternative procedures to produce

materially different results.
He listed some of them back in 1964 and some of

these alternate methods still exist--depreciation , income

tax allocation and inventories.

This lack of uniformity

seems to be a frustration that the SEC and many of the

observers of the accounting profession have.

There is no

comparability, and, therefore, the usefulness of the
accounting statement to the layman is somewhat vitiated.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

My only suggestion is that the

word "uniformity” is unfortunately not a very specific word
and doesn't really mean, I don’t think, what you have in
mind.

I think clarification here is important, because we

want to be sure we’re all talking about the same thing.
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Gentlemen of the panel?
MR. LEVINE:

I’d like to ask one question about

independence in management services.

Could it not be equally

said that the fee itself influences the independence?

To

what extent do you go in trying to evaluate independence?

Isn’t

independence in essence a state of mind and a condition that

exists in a profession; something that has to be upheld regardless
of the other influences upon it?

MR. ETRA:

The idea of receiving a fee is inevitable.

It's hardly likely that people will work for nothing, but the
idea of——

MR. LEVINE:

But could it not influence the

independence?
MR. ETRA:

I think that question would have to be

thrown open to the floor, to those people who receive fees.

Do the accountants here today feel that the mere receiving
of a fee influences their decision; influences their professional

judgment?
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

It seems to me that everything

you've said, or very much of it, is slightly tangential to the
main thrust of this group.

You have addressed yourself to

certain questions of professional ethics which fall into the

area of the Institute's Ethics Division; you are dissatisfied

with what we presently regard as generally accepted accounting
principles, and that is very much the concern of the Trueblood
group.
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We’re principally concerned here with the method by
which those principles are formulated.

I didn’t see anything

in the paper which you distributed at the beginning of the
meeting, that could be described as suggestions for improving

those methods.
Do you have anything to say in response to that
specific point?

What kind of machinery would you like to see

replace the present machinery for the formulation of accounting
principles?
MR, ETRA:

I would concur with those proposals that

have to do with a full-time board.

I would add to those

proposals that representation on that board not be restricted
to accountants and a few academicians, and that investors,

creditors, labor, consumers and Government regulators be on

that board itself.
The gist of my comments is not necessarily the
composition of that board, but what the board comes up with.

Is the board capitulating to management by encouraging a

great deal of alternative accounting procedures?

Mr. Solomons, you talk about the tangentiality of

my remarks.

I think what’s wrong is that accounting standards

lack a conceptual framework.

What I’m trying to do this

morning is to point out certain philosophical underpinnings
which are vital to the accounting profession-independence;
restricting available alternatives; accepting liability and

accepting a role in developing new social cost accounting.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

I was going to comment that you

heard my last question to Mr. Trueblood regarding his reaction
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to the basic task of whatever body we have--the body which he
recommends or the Accounting Principles Board--to continue to

narrow these differences and eliminate alternatives.
I take it you don’t have any exception to his comments?
They would be similar to yours.

MR. ETRA:

My comment would be similar regarding the

SEC's acceptance of its jurisdiction as given by the Securities
Act.

The history of it seems to be that each SEC chairman

speaks at an accounting meeting and says, "You fellows do it,
and we'll go along.”

That's all very well, but accept the

challenge and do the job of serving the public.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

What you're saying, in effect, is

that you do regard the accounting profession as a profession,
and that you would ask that the accounting profession and its

institutions get with it and do the job.
MR. ETRA:

Exactly, with respect to expertise.

And

I would hope independence could be added to the expertise.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:
point that you raised.

Let me comment on one very interesting

I happen to have with me a summary of

Mr. Carey's testimony before the Subcommittee on Commerce and

Finance of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce in
1964 to which you referred.

You will recall that Mr. Staggers,

chairman of the committee, instructed Mr. Carey to submit a
report on what were the alternatives and which ones the SEC

considered to be significant.
of them.

You correctly referred to some
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But there is another point that it will be

interesting to touch on; there were eight areas that were

specifically referred to by the SEC in its submission.
The first area was the valuation of inventories,

which I think you mentioned, an area which I don’t believe
has been fully dealt with yet.

The second area was depreciation and depletion,
which is another area that remains on the agenda of the

Accounting Principles Board.
The third area, income tax allocation, was

essentially dealt with in APB Opinion No. 11, as I recall.
This rather full and detailed analysis and opinion has been

followed by the profession, I understand, almost without
exception.

The fourth area was pensions, where business had
much leeway in deciding what amount they wished to put into

their pension fund.

This area was studied extensively and

dealt with by the Board in Opinion No. 8 which narrowed
significantly, I believe, the areas of alternatives in

pension plan accounting.

The fifth was research and development costs.

This remains on the agenda of the Board, with a research
study under way.
The sixth was goodwill, which was, as you know,

dealt with in Opinion No. 17, which requires amortization

over a maximum period of forty years, I believe.
The seventh was a broad question:

realized?

When is income

This subject has been dealt with in a number of
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areas by the Board.

I refer particularly to a recent Opinion,

especially applicable to

real estate matters, on accounting

for receivables and payables.

Some people refer to this as

the imputed interest Opinion.

It's a technical Opinion, yet

very controversial and deals explicitly with the subject.

The eighth is the all-inclusive versus the current
operating performance income statement.

I believe that was

dealt with in an Opinion several years ago.

Mr. Barr perhaps

can refer to the name of it--

MR. BARR:

Number 9.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Opinion No. 9.

This was a basic

objective which was largely realized in Opinion No. 9.

That is the list of principal matters which was
referred to by the SEC and the Congress in 1964.

I leave it to

you and the audience to judge whether or not there has been
some marked progress, but in addition some important areas not

yet dealt with.
MR. ETRA:

If fifty per cent of the task remains to

be done, and you can accomplish it in the next few years, I
would hope that the purpose of our meeting here today would be
served.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Now let me ask the audience if they

have any questions for Mr. Etra.

Would anybody like to comment

on what he said or ask him a question.
(There was no response.)
I guess we have a relatively silent audience today.

Mr. Etra, thank you very, very much.
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MR. ETRA:

Thank you, sir.
I'm glad to see that we're

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

We will try to stay that way,

running ahead of schedule.

but we want to allow maximum time for those who are on our
program and for anyone here to ask his fill of questions.
Our next speaker is Mr. John Rapp of Louis Sternbach &
Company.

I hope he is here because he was scheduled at

eleven forty-five.

MR. JOHN RAPP:

In dealing with the questions

that have been suggested for this meeting, we construed

our brief, rather narrowly.

We have attempted to follow

rather closely the group of questions arranged under five
main subdivisions as a primary responsibility, rather than

to go into the more abstract and philosophical fields.
I do want to remark, in reply to the question
concerning use of principles of financial accounting or

reporting standards, that we side rather strongly with the
use of financial accounting and reporting standards.

To us, principles while absolutely essential

conjure up something rather abstract and we are concerned
with the workability of What comes out of the deliberations

of the Accounting Principles Board.

Principles and procedures must be researched and
explored.

But if we deal with principles from the purely

academic point of view, we may possibly not be as much help

to the users of financial statements as we would like to be.
To the extent that we are practicing accountants, we might be
a little out of our depth as compared with the academicians.
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I don't want to downgrade the fact that there are

broad fundamental principles underlying any kind of procedures.

I think, however, that we must strive for the development of
workable standards within the overall philosophical thinking

that is probably common to most of us in the profession--the

basic fundamental of what financial statements should be.
Procedures should point to the most desirable way of implementation
but not prescribe them.

I am rather taken back when at times we

verge on the rule-making process.

It may sometimes be inevitable to veer a little bit
that way, but I think we have to be very careful that we do
not prescribe operating procedures in such detail that we tend

to put out cookbooks.

We must leave plenty of scope within

well defined parameters for the profession to exert its fullest
professional Judgment.
I draw attention to the uniformity that was described,
for instance, by certain regulatory agencies or the uniformity

that prevails in countries other than ours.

I believe the

public is ill-served when there is such a situation.

In

certain countries in Europe there is in force at present a

system of forcing things into prescribed bases.
I believe in at least one of the countries the socalled opinions read in accordance with the law, or in
accordance with such-and-such regulations.

We have something

to protect.
Now, I may sound like a one-man cheering section

when I

come to who should have the primary responsibility of performing
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the task.

I think the task should remain in the Accounting

Principles Board, possibly with slight revisions and additions.
I think the responsibility should be that of a professional body

rather than that of a governmental agency or governmentally

appointed body.
I do not want in any way to downgrade or belittle
the mission given to the Securities and Exchange Commission.

I am concerned that when responsibility for accounting
principles is taken out of the private sector, it becomes

colored by political considerations, consciously or unconsciously.

It might swing this way or that, according to the

prevalent views of the philosophy of the government of the day.
I’d like to see standards formulated to stand for a long time
by people who know what they are about and who will do so

without fear or favor and not be swayed by political or semi
political considerations; by people who, besides their expertise
in accounting techniques, should bring additionally the expertise
of the surrounding disciplines, such as economics and finance

and various others that contribute to making this meaningful.

I certainly would want to continue a very close and
harmonious working relationship between the Accounting Principles
Board and the SEC, because I think there has been a wonderful

amount of professional understanding and give and take.
believe this is something not likely to be superseded.

would like to see that relationship extended.

I
I

Those people

that have problems with the SEC should more readily ask for

consultations, rather than inviting a letter of deficiency at

some later date.
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As to the composition of the nongovernmental standards

boards we would like to see representation from accountants other

than CPAs, maybe one or two of those who have demonstrated
leadership and imagination in working towards more adequate

reporting.
As to the CPA composition, I think there should be

a good cross-section in the sense of public practice, non

governmental practice, and industrial practice.

And within the

public practice sector, I would like to see some representation
from the local or regional firms in addition to people from the

very large firms.

While the affairs of large corporations are

influenced by large firms, ninety or ninety-five per cent of the
businesses that are not that large are guided by the smaller

professional firms.

I think they should have a voice in the

deliberations .

In some of these smaller regional or local firms the
spirit or alertness and inquisitiveness is just as great as some

of the larger firms.
As to whether this should be a paid or unpaid board,
we would like to see the present volunteer board continue,

because we think the very distinction of serving on such a
volunteer board would be sufficient compensation to the person
serving.
One way in which this could be made practical would be

that partners of firms could be sent to the board for a certain

term, so that they could be free from distractions.
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I would like to see a lot more support from
people just below full board stature.

They could come in

and help the Accounting Principles Board on research, maybe
on a share basis--where their firm pays half and the AICPA

pays half.

In that way you could, over a period of time,
find material for succession to the Board.
I would like to see the entire profession finance

the Board.

If it means a large increase in dues, I think

that's the way it should be, because the profession has a
stake in the financial support of the Board and its activity.

While we would not discourage contributions from
a research foundation, we would like to see the financial
support as broadly based as possible.

In this way the smaller

man has a very great awareness of his stake in what is going
on.
The procedure of the hearings, I think, is desirable

and adequate.

One thing occurred to me when I saw an opinion

passing by a vote of 12 out of 18; would it be possible to

review such opinions after a lapse of two or three years, to

see whether they would have achieved something like a 75 or

80 per cent majority.

Or, to see whether the application of

these rather touchy, controversial opinions have sort of
proved or disproved themselves in the first year of practice.

It was asked in the questions, I recall, if there
should be provision for an appeal procedure from opinions.
I do not think that anything smacking of an accounting court

would be advisable because it would introduce too much rigidity.
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I think the appeal should come from good communications from
and to the board.
To me accounting has a dual character:

it is in

part a science; but also an art and thus nearer
to the essence of reality.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Thank you, Mr. Rapp.

At the very outset you touched on a matter which is

of great interest to us.

It is the matter of elusive analysis,

and it came up very briefly when we were talking with Mr.
Trueblood.

It is this business of drawing fine distinctions

between principles, standards and practices.

This causes me

some concern, and I was particularly interested in the comment

that in your judgment the primary job of the Board is to

develop workable accounting standards.

And that by and large,

these high principles are matters which accountants pretty well
know and recognize.

There seems to be a bit of disagreement over these
matters, and I am not sure that they are all matters of semantics.

But I know that some part of this confusion may have been
engendered by the name which this organization has always had--

the Accounting Principles Board.

In fact much of what it has

dealt with has not been one-sentence or one-paragraph principles,
but more detailed matters such as the illustration I gave
Mr. Trueblood, Opinion No. 18.

I just read--and I hope I’m not anticipating-- the
comments of the National Association of Accountants.

On page 6

of those comments this Association makes the following comment:
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"We recommend that a new name be created for this
body to make clear that there is a complete change in, and

departure from its current procedures."

Suggested designations

included, The Council, on Financial Reporting Standards, and
The Financial Reporting Standards Authority.

The name

"Financial Accounting and Standards Board" has also been
suggested by at least one other person.

What is your reaction to the question of confusion
which I raise?

Would there be any merit in making a change

of name, here, under these circumstances?

MR. RAPP:

My reaction to the change of name would

be favorable, because it would more clearly indicate what in
our view this board sets out to do:

narrow the areas of

differences in accounting and reporting treatments, and,

therefore, arrive at something more workable, more informative,
and more in the public interest.

To me it would correspond much better to what I
perceive the role of the board to be.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

We had some questions earlier in

our discussion about whether or not it is feasible or desirable

to allocate to this same body the task of setting forth a

conceptual framework, i.e. a set of basic principles, if that
can be done.

Or should that task be wholly separated from

the body which has the basic task to do.

I would appreciate

it if you would let us know your reaction to that.

There is a rather sizable number of people who are
concerned and who believe that the job of setting forth the

conceptual framework is important.

As you know, it is a task
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the existing Board has been struggling with since it was formed.
It has not yet successfully produced a set of basic principles to
which everybody on the Board could adhere.

What is your comment on whether this should be a
continuing responsibility of this board, or should be wholly

separate?

It would depend on whether we see this

MR. RAPP:

board as purely a reporting or accounting standards board.

The question of the underlying framework is something that goes

deeper than that.

It might possibly be the province of some

other bodies, or drawn from the representative membership--

a parallel study similar to the one put out by Mr. Grady a

good many years back.

This study was very informative and

illuminating, but not really an APB pronouncement.

It was done

by another part of the Institute.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:
for the moment.

Let me ask you just one more question,

You indicated that you wanted a professional

body and that you felt a volunteer board would continue to be

desirable.

There has been, as you know, serious question raised

with us about the appearance of independence.

Some say that when you have a volunteer board, it

appears that members of the board may be subservient to strong
client pressures.

They say this appearance is unsatisfactory

and the whole process may break down as a result.

I take it from your conclusion that you would not
regard that as necessarily true, and that in any event you would

regard the volunteer board as the better solution.
correct?

Is that
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What is your comment on this independence problem

we have to face?

MR. RAPP:

I would regard independence as a state of

mind which is very difficult for the outsider to evaluate.
I would consider that people of sufficient leadership caliber

to serve on this board, would have enough independence not
to be subservient; not to be pressured.

To the extent that

continued firm affiliation during tenure on the board might
cause an appearance of lack of independence, perhaps some
mechanism could be found for these people, during their tenure
on the board, to take a leave of absence from their firm.

could return once their term is over.

They

This would make it

clear to the public that they are dissociated from the operating

decisions of their firms.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

That suggestion might conflict,

might it not, with your desire to be sure that important and
experienced accountants from local and small firms are
adequately represented on the board.

It would be extremely

difficult for such gentlemen to sever their relationship

from their firm.
MR. RAPP:

It might be difficult but not impossible.

It would all depend upon the degree of public spirit that the
particular person had and the extent to which he would be

willing to work for the improvement of principles and standards.

I can see where certain persons might be glad of a chance to

spend time away from operating decisions in the interest of
improving the profession.
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MR. BIEGLER:

Mr. Rapp, in response to one of the

questions, you agreed with the thought that perhaps some
clarification would result from renaming the body to something
like, the Financial Accounting Standards Board.
Proceeding from there, would it be your thought that
a similar clarification would follow if the reference in the

accountant’s opinion was changed from generally accepted
accounting principles,
which tracks the Accounting Principles

Board, to some other reference?
MR. RAPP:

I think that would be quite necessary.

That would lead me to some other areas of unhappiness I have
with the present wording, namely accepted by whom.

We may possibly think now of revising the short form
opinion; some clarification might be in order.

MR. BIEGLER:

a different area:

I'll ask one other question in quite

In your paper you refer to the possibility

of the board having approximately twenty-five people.

The

present board is eighteen; we heard earlier from Mr. Trueblood
a suggestion for a board of seven.

Do you think it is practical

for twenty-five board members to reach a decision or decisions on

a timely basis; or don't you consider that a problem?

MR. RAPP:

I would like to see within that somewhat

larger board; constant work on the part of smaller subcommittees
with frequent meetings of the full board to evaluate, praise,

criticize, and reject.
If it calls for more frequent meetings, then so be it.
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Maybe it would be good public relations to know that this

board is now meeting every month, so that the people that
complain about nothing being done know that something is
being done and somebody is regarding this as a matter of

urgency.
For this to be workable they would have to have
very good staff.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

As a point of clarification, I

think it might be worth noting that the Study Group has
examined into the history of the Board, including the time

consumed on projects and the frequency of its meetings.

As

you point out, Mr. Rapp, there has been an evolution here.
In the first year of its existence the Board met

three or four full days in the year.

This current year

meetings which have been held or scheduled will consume

about thirty full days of work.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

It's not quite clear, Mr.

Rapp, why you think a board of twenty-five men would be more
effective than one of the present size or even smaller.
MR. RAPP:

I suggest the possible enlargement of

the board to accommodate representation from non-CPA

accountants in industry who have shown leadership in
financial reporting, and representation from the smaller
regional firms.

I do not want the board to be too heavily weighted
by these additional elements.

Otherwise, there may be a

possible injustice in the composition of the board.
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PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

In your written statement you

spoke of having an increase in the membership so that the public

interest is served.

Mr. Etra also wanted to see the public

interest served, but for him those words meant something very
different than I think they mean to you.

In your statement,

the public will be served by having only accountants on the

board; not necessarily CPAs.

You’re somewhat contradictory,

because you say in one place it should be composed of CPAs,
and you say elsewhere that there should be one or two executives

who are not CPAs.
MR. RAPP:

be invited.

Non-CPAs who have shown leadership should

What I really meant was that the balance should be

CPAs.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

What do you have to say about the

public interest being served by a board of this kind?

MR. RAPP:

To me the matter of financial reporting is

a matter for accountants, provided that they are sufficiently

broad in outlook and training, and have support from related
disciplines.

I think they are the ones who would be able to

police and regulate, instead of having people with other
interests come in from the outside, whether they be attorneys
or financial executives.

I think it is a case of accountants

putting their house in order to lead the profession strongly.
It should be a continuing self-policing, self-disciplining
effort.
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PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

About members of the board

being on leave of absence from their firms, in universities
we make important distinctions between paid leave and
unpaid leave.(Laughter)

MR. RAPP:

I was hoping that it might be a paid

leave of absence from the firms.

I did not fully investigate

this, but I would hope that firms willing to have members
work in the general interest of the profession would not
cut off the money.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

That also raises the point

that the Chairman mentioned before--if a man is on paid

leave, is he, in the eyes of the world, really any more
independent of his firm that he was before?

MR. RAPP:

Maybe each situation would have to be

judged on a case-by-case basis.

If the person concerned

would be in a position to render the service without being
paid by the firm, maybe that might be done.

The firm would

support him only as necessary.

But again, I am mainly concerned with the actual

presence of independence.

While I don't believe in

concealing things, it does not have to be publicly announced
that a member of the board is on a paid leave of absence

from his firm.

MR. PRYOR:
little more clearly.

I’d like to understand one thing a
As I understand what you were saying,

in order to improve the quality of the decisions by enlarging
the group and broadening its base, you would be willing to

accept such greater inefficiencies as might develop from the
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expanded size.

Or don't you think that would be the result?

MR. RAPP:

I don’t think the additional number of

people would necessarily cause more inefficiency.

But, it

might be desirable to study what’s going on within the Board

as it has been performing, in order that it become as

efficient as possible.
We think of a twenty-five-member board, for

instance, as one that could have five or six working sub
committees at the same time.
MR. PRYOR:

MR. RAPP:

Of course, they use subcommittees now.
I know, but with a larger board they

could have more subcommittees, and could go into details of

structure and timetables.

And even though it would have

greater and more comprehensive representation, that in itself
would not necessarily cause added inefficiencies; it could

work the other way.

MR. OLSON:

Mr. Rapp, while you’ve made a number of

suggestions in your paper, I get the impression that you don’t
characterize yourself as a severe critic of the present APB

operations.

If that impression is wrong, I wonder if you might

focus on the prime area that causes you concern with the
present setup.
MR. RAPP:

I am indeed not a severe critic; I

think the APB has made great strides towards narrowing
differences in accounting practices.

I know there’s a lot

to be done in many areas, and I think rather than trying to
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toss out what the past has brought us, we should capitalize
on what we have.

Possibly by fairly mild and not so mild

reforms, we could go on with what we have.
I am afraid of a lot of complications and

unwieldiness in the case of restructuring, and also afraid
of a lot of confusion on the part of the public.

I think

the public has gotten used to the fact that there is

something called the APB.

If that existing body can be

made into a sharper more precise instrument than it is,

I would prefer that.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Mr. Rapp, you may recall

Mr. Trueblood's comment that he does not think it is any

longer feasible to separate the formulation of accounting
standards from auditing standards.

He would like to see

the auditing standards and financial accounting standards,
under one roof, so to speak.

There is an intermediate position which has been

suggested to us, and I think it might be particularly important
to get your views on this, in view of your comment about the
auditor's short form opinion.

Some say that although auditing

standards should remain under the jurisdiction of the

Committee on Auditing Procedure, the language used by the

certified public accountant in rendering his opinion upon the
financial statements ought to be a matter of concern to the
standards board; it should be placed under its jurisdiction,
for such reform or revision as might be indicated.

What is your view on this?
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MR. RAPP:

one.

My view of this is a strictly personal

I would like to see the responsibility for the auditor's

opinion remain where it is.

However, I would want to see the

Committee on Auditing Procedure have its thinking affected by

whatever goes on at the APB, or however we name it.
In other words, there should be continued cross

fertilization of ideas and probably exchange of views from
one to the other.

I don’t think much will be gained by putting

things under different hats.

Maybe I'm too much of a gradualist,

but I believe in judiciously pushing evolution.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Your comment about the opinion of

the auditor was of great interest to me.

There have been a

number of suggestions, and I would particularly comment on the

paper submitted to this Study Group by Mr. Carl Tietjen.
The general thrust of his comments, and others of

similar character, is that the certifying accountant should
state, in his opinion, that he has approved, in essence, the
presentation as being a fair presentation, rather than stating
that the financial statements are fairly presented in accordance

with generally accepted accounting principles.

This is not

quite the same as saying fairly presented, but a somewhat

ambiguous mixture of the two.

Mr. Tietjen and others have

suggested that what we need in the accountant's opinion is a

statement that the principles and practices used are the
appropriate ones for this situation.

This places the responsibility

on the certifying accountant; what is your reaction to that?
MR. RAPP:

My reaction is quite positive.

To the
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extent that it makes the certified public accountant live up

to the standards of his profession, so be it.

When rendering

his opinion, he should be expressing it on fairness.

The opinion could be cross-referenced to the work

of the APB or the standards board, by stating that there
has been no significant departure from the reporting

standards prescribed by the profession.
necessary:

Maybe two things are

approval as a certified practitioner, and a

statement that there has been no material departure from

reporting standards.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

I take it that your comment

recognizes that there may be cases in which a departure

from a particular opinion or standard might be justified
because of peculiar circumstances, with the departure

giving a better presentation and avoiding some misleading
point.
MR. RAPP:

That is really why I phrased it the way

I did.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

So that the departure would be

disclosed?
MR. RAPP:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

I want to see if I understand

perfectly what you're saying.

What you are saying is that

the accountant's opinion might state two things:

one, that

standards announced by the standards board have been followed,

unless a departure is justified; and that he approves, as being
a fair presentation, the standards which have been applied in

areas not yet covered by standards.
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MR. RAPP:

The language must be polished up considerably,

but basically I think these two ideas should be included.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Now, are there any questions from the

We have two; would you identify yourself for our

audience?

reporter, please?
QUESTION:

My name is Don Zima from Daytona Beach,

Florida.
Would you explain why you feel that a separation of
the principles board from the practice and procedure section

wouldn’t be feasible and of ultimate benefit?

Might it not

be a limit on interpretations or representations of these

procedures?
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

I regret that I have given the

impression that I feel very strongly about that, because I
don’t.

I am seeking information and sometimes lawyers seek

information, as you well know, by propounding a view and
asking what the reaction is to it.

I did not intend to indicate that I felt strongly
about that.
Do you? (Laughter)

MR. ZIMA:

I believe as you do.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

(Laughter)

I haven’t indicated how I feel.

I'm not doing very well.

MR. ZIMA:

I think there should be a separation.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

gentlemen how I believe.

It’s not my job to indicate to you
I'm hopefully going to conceal that

for the time being, because I have not made up my mind, nor have
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We are here to gain enlightenment rather than to

any of us.

project our individual viewpoints as they might be.

I would

hope that our minds are open; we are here to learn the views

of those who are appearing at this hearing.

So I would

repeat again, this is a matter in which I am interested in
viewpoints.

QUESTION:

I am Luke Patrick, President of

Continental Gas Pipeline Corporation, Houston, Texas.
Mr. Rapp, I understood you to say that you felt

generally that independent accountants should continue to

establish accounting principles, and that they should put
their house in order.

I'm interested in knowing why you

conclude that the business of establishing accounting

principles is their province exclusively.
MR. RAPP:

Accounting standards should be

established by those primarily concerned with the task of
accounting reporting.

They gain an insight into what is

fairest in accounting practices among widely different
industries, occupations and circumstances.

I believe that independent accountants might

be better placed to formulate such standards than highly
skilled accountants in a particular industry or group of
industries.

They might possibly take on the color of their

particular industry or industries.

I think the range of the professional accountant
permits him to make and formulate standards that can be generally

applied.
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MR. PATRICK:

Speaking of the responsibilities of

however, for properly reporting and

the business accountant

recording the results of his business,
wouldn't you grant him
some equal expertise and knowledge in the area of accounting

principles?
MR. RAPP:

I am in favor of having on the standards

board representation from non-CPA accountants in industry

who have shown leadership in that particular area.

And by that

to make the weight of their leadership, their insight, and their
acumen felt.

MR. PATRICK:

Then I understand.

your answer to the previous question.

I misunderstood

You didn't intend it to

be entirely the province of independent accountants; it's the
house of all accountants.

Thank you.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

QUESTION:

Yes?

George Sorter from Chicago.

Mr. Rapp, I'm interested in your proposal of a fulltime, twenty-five-man board.
MR. RAPP:

I didn't advocate a full-time board.

I was advocating a volunteer boards heavily part-time; not
a full-time board.
MR. SORTER:

One of the criticisms of a part-time

board is that it does not permit the interaction, the total

involvement,, this sort of symbiotic relationship toward a
joint product.

earlier today.

This is the position that Mr. Trueblood took
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You tend to get fragmented and sort of non
cohesive positions.

Don't you feel that would be accentuated,

if you enlarged the board to twenty-five?
MR. RAPP:

I can see the dangers you outline, but

as I said before, it doesn't have to be that way.

It all

depends on how much imagination and effort you put into it.
If people living in different parts of the country want to
get together, what is to prevent them from catching a plane

and having a meeting face to face?

MR. PRYOR:

With your volunteer board would you

want a full-time paid chairman?

MR. RAPP:

You didn't mention that.

I did not address myself to that question

and have an open mind on it.

under the circumstances.

It might possibly be necessary

I have not specifically suggested

an answer because my thinking has not yet crystallized.
MR. PRYOR:

MR. RAPP:

But you don't rule it out?
I do not by any means rule out a full-

time, paid chairman.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Ladies and Gentlemen, let's

break for lunch and plan to reconvene promptly at one-

thirty, or a little earlier if possible.
(The morning session ended at twelve-ten o'clock.)

57

WEDNESDAY AFTERNOON SESSION
November 3, 1971

The afternoon session of the meeting of the Study
on Establishment

of Accounting Principles convened on Wednesday,

November 3, 1971, at one-thirty o'clock, Chairman Wheat presiding.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Next we will hear from Arthur Andersen

& Co., represented by Harvey Kapnick and George Catlett, who is

an experienced member of the Accounting Principles Board.

We’re

delighted to have you both.
MR. HARVEY KAPNICK:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would

like to identify the fact that our brief, which has been presented

to you, represents the firm's viewpoint on the matters before your

Study Group, as well as my personal viewpoint, as chief executive,
and George Catlett's as Chairman of our Policy Committee.
I would like, if I could, to take just a little

different tack from some of the presentations this morning.

In

opening I'd like to identify why we are here and why we have
taken the position that we have in our brief.

First of all, I think we should all recognize that
we're here for one basic purpose:

In most respects we are the

ones that are responsible to the public for proper financial
reporting.

There is a public interest involved in this subject;

one of the most sincere public interests that I think exists

anywhere in the world today.
The second reason we're here is because we have

elected to have self-regulation.

In any type of self-regulation
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problems can become more severe, and accountability for

responsiveness to this public interest can become much
greater.

There are four points I would like to cover with

you this afternoon.

The first is that in any type of self-regulation,
in any type of public interest, the need for criteria for
decision-making is almost overwhelming.

They should be

identified and published so that everyone can understand
what the decision-making criteria are.
to be part of the record.

I strongly want this

Obviously this is not part of

your study, but is part of the entire problem.

Unless the

criteria can be determined, I feel strongly that the issue
of self-regulation may well be academic.

If we were to go

to the public sector--in other words to the SEC--these

criteria, would not, I believe, be as important because a

regulatory body, under laws of the country, can do what they
decide without relating to the logic of a decision.

In self-regulation, however, every decision we make
must be logical, and must be tied to the type of criteria

that was previously developed.
I go from there to the next point:

in self-regulation

we must have three additional points other than the criteria.
First, we are not self-appointed arbitrators; we are responsible
for the determination of sound accounting.

But all interested

parties should have a right to be heard and have their views

considered by whatever body is determining what principles
should be.
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I can relate that to the SEC if we were to go into the
public sector.

Obviously they do have a procedure whereby all

interested parties can be heard, and differing viewpoints reconciled.
A second point that I would like to make in this area

is that a record of the views and the pertinent background and

reasoning for the decision are absolutely necessary in any type

of self-regulation.

It is an understanding of the reasoning

and background, and the reconciliation of viewpoints which gain

their acceptance or non-acceptance.

There is a third point, about which we talked a little

bit today, that is the need for the appearance of complete

independence.

I would say that the further we go into self-

regulation, the greater the need for appearance of independence.

The key issue in the entire deliberations may well rise or fall

on the issue of independence.

There are many areas of this question of independence.

Many years ago--and I think you can talk about many of these
ramifications for some of you may have questions--when the
profession was discussing ownership of securities by independent

auditors, the same questions and considerations were discussed.
We elected as a profession to self-regulate our independence.

I think this is the same issue we have today.
I want to make sure that the record is clear.

I am not

in any way saying that members of the APB today or in the past
have not been independent per se.

I think that anyone who has

read the newspapers and participated in discussions, however,
must recognize that there have been questions raised with regard
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to the appearance of independence.

That is the context in

which I would like to leave it.
The question of whether or not the present APB

or the past APBs have been independent will only be answered

by history.

It is not necessarily a subject that we should

explore further unless, of course, you want to.
With those remarks, Mr. Chairman, I would be
happy to answer any questions you might have with regard to

our proposal, and my comments.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Thank you very much, Mr. Kapnick.

Mr. Catlett, do you have any comments you want to

add?

MR. CATLETT:

I think I'll wait for the question

period.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Mr. Kapnick, you referred at the

outset of your comments to the fact that the accounting
profession is responsible to the public for proper financial

reporting.

Your emphasis was on two things:

one, that the

independent accountant has the basic responsibility to assure
that the public receives the very best financial reporting;

and two, this responsibility lies very heavily upon the indepen

dent accountant in the function that he has to perform.
At a later time you made a comment that I'm not

certain is entirely consistent with that.
not the self-appointed arbiters.”

You said, "We are

I would certainly second

that comment, and add that it appears to me that the Securities

Acts of 1933 and 193^^ particularly the latter, indicate a
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a conscious choice by Congress to interpose the independent public

accountant into the process of disclosure to investors, rather
than having Government send out auditors as was originally

proposed.

The choice was made in the Congress, after the

eloquent intervention of some leading members of the accounting

profession, to delegate to the profession the task of protecting
the public and making certain that the financial statements meet
the highest standards of disclosure and fairness.

I would take it, therefore, that the accounting

profession--and I would ask you if you agree with this--is not
a self-appointed arbiter at all.

Rather, it has been designated

by a special Congressional philosophy and by the intent of

Congress to play a very significant role in making sure that
financial statements are in accordance with the highest standards

of disclosure.

It was determined at the very outset that this essential
function did not have to reside in a group of governmental

accountants.
Would you comment on whether or not that is a fair

analysis of your statement?
MR. KAPNICK:

like to make on that.

There are three observations I would

First of all, we’ve got to separate the

attestation function from the development of accounting principles.

In that regard, the attest function under the law clearly
belongs to the public accountant.

It is my recollection that

the law does not identify the accounting profession as the one

responsible for the determination of the principles that are
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I think that we have to clearly establish that

followed.

as a point of fact.

If we are going to determine accounting principles,
which, as indicated in our brief, we think we should, then
we have to assume and execute that delegated responsibility
with the very highest degree of professionalism available to

us .
Therefore, when I indicated we weren't the self-

appointed arbiters, it was in the context of needing as much
input from everybody as possible.
Any new organization must have that as a criterion
and as a part of the program, or we are going to fail in this

role.

It was in that context that I wanted to make that

remark.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

I think I understand your position

more clearly, but, let me see if I can clarify it a little
more in my mind.
On page 21 of your brief, you say that during the
past forty years "...the accounting profession has borne a

significant responsibility in the development of accounting

principles.

We believe that the basic responsibility for

developing accounting principles should continue to rest
within the accounting profession as represented by the AICPA."
You go on to point out the need for a restructuring which

emphasizes independence.

I take it that your view is a twofold one; first,

that the basic responsibility, although you recognize that it

is heavily upon the profession, should remain with the
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profession.

However, you would want to make sure that better and

more constructive arrangements be developed for input between the

business community and those who are particularly affected by

these matters.

In this way, there would be no question about

complete due process and the coverage of all viewpoints.

In addition to that, you emphasized the need for a

relatively public record of steps that are taken and whatever
influences there are.

MR. KAPNICK:

Absolutely.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

I have a question that relates to

pages 23 and 24 of your brief, where you discuss the suggestion

that there be a full-time group of top quality people who would
be members of this restructured APB.

I wonder if you have given

some thought to the question of how these people would be
obtained; from what segments of the profession; what compensation

ought to be paid to them in order to get the type of people you
want.
MR. KAPNICK:

I think in one section of our brief we

do explain how we would go about obtaining or nominating in
the selection process.

The selection process that we visualize

would have the American Institute, the Board of Directors through
its President, appoint a fifteen-man commission.

The commission would be made up of leading authorities,

partially from the AICPA and partially from industry, Government
and others.

This commission would select the men that would be

on the fully-paid board.

After they were nominated by the

commission, they would be ratified by Council.

If there has
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been great dissension over a person, it can be expressed by
this means.

Council does represent a broad spectrum of the

profession and the academic world and business accountants.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

What I am particularly concerned

about is the question of what level of salary would or
should be paid in order to meet your criteria.

MR. KAPNICK:

I think the real question is what

level of salary is required to obtain the top guy?

I think

you’re talking in terms of a minimum of $75,000 to $100,000
a year for this man.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

In other words, this would be a

level substantially below the level of compensation of
important partners of major firms, isn’t that correct?

MR. KAPNICK:

I can’t speak for the other firms--

(Laughter).
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Wouldn't it be a fair statement to

say that $75,000 to $100,000 would be substantially below?

MR. KAPNICK:

If you're going to get into this line

of reasoning, you have to put it in context with a time frame;
with the reputation that the position carries with it; with
a man's motivation and career.

I'm not so sure that those

who have discussed behavioral sciences relate everything to
dollars and cents.

I think an income of $100,000 in the most

prestigious part of the profession could well be compatible
with many people within the profession, if you put it within

a time frame.
The time frame I'd put it in would probably be past

the age of fifty.

First of all, I would

like to see a wealth

65

of experience in this person.

I would like to see his maturity

of judgment and other personal attributes at a mature level.

I

would also like to see a time frame of five to ten years, which

would almost be the final position a man would carry.
So I personally see this being completely consistent

with a professional career, and I think that many judges do the
same thing.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Take, for example, the gentleman in

the accounting profession who has reached the age of fifty.

At

that point he is very close to the top of his firm, let’s say,

or he has reached the point where during the next ten years he
is going to be at the peak of his profession, and presumably at

the highest earning point of his lifetime.

Do you think you can get this man to leave his
profession at that point in his career, at a substantially

reduced compensation and essentially no opportunity to return
to his firm?

MR. KAPNICK:

Why do you say he can't go back?

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:
long period of time.
MR. KAPNICK:

also.

You're talking about a relatively

Wouldn't it be difficult for him?
I'm concerned about the practicality,

I think, however, that we have to ask ourselves the

same question as it relates to Government.

People who go to

the SEC resign from very substantial positions and take even
a bigger decline in income than probably I am suggesting.

So that we have the experience in other sectors of
our life where people, because of various motivating reasons,
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have given up positions for less income.

I think this is

obviously a key question in any full-time, paid board.

But

I don't know that it is necessarily a controlling factor,
because we can look at Government and see what is happening
in the selection of SEC Commissioners, and so forth.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

That raises two questions:

SEC

Commissioners, as you know, are paid at about the level of
$36,000 or $37,000 a year and they do have massive public

responsibilities cutting across the area of accounting.

Suppose you established a five-man commission
in the private sector, with each of the five men being paid

$100,000 and give them responsibility for establishment of
accounting principles.

Do you visualize any problem at all in

that men in Government who have basic responsibility will
note that they are being paid $36,000 or $37,000 a year,
whereas these gentlemen in the private sector are being

paid $100,000 a year for a small slice of that responsibility?
Does that give you any concern or pause at all, about the

likelihood that such a structure might rather swiftly move
the whole task into Government?

MR. KAPNICK:

Mr. Chairman, I think there are

several ramifications to your questions.

I think first of

all, we've got to recognize that the SEC has the responsibility
and the authority for what we have been discussing.

Therefore,, it is to their best interests to make
sure that the accounting profession does this as well as it
can be done, or else they will have to take it over themselves.

If salary is the issue, then I think, as I said earlier, it’s
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probably there already.

We are going to need some type of a

salary, and there’s no way that I can see of going to $36,000

on this.

It becomes completely incompatible with the type of

situation we’re looking at.

If we don't move in the direction

of as much independence as the people in the public sector have
for this, then we are going to move it into that sector anyway,
and it’s only a matter of when,

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Of course, when we’re talking about

self-regulation, to which you key this task of the accounting

profession, we have certain analogies; the New York Stock
Exchange and other stock exchanges, for example; the integrated
Bar Association in some of the states; the National Association

of Securities Dealers.

In none of those instances are the responsible boards
and groups paid at salaries which would command the top leaders

of their respective industries or professions.

You would have to

pay roughly the same or more than you have suggested--in the
neighborhood of $100,000 to get somebody full-time.
What we have had to date in the field of self

regulation has been essentially volunteers of higher education
and experience who have been willing to take substantial time

off from their professions or occupations but who might or might

not have been willing to divest themselves and serve full-

time .

I wonder if past experience doesn't suggest that
the volunteer arrangement comports a little better with the

question of self-regulation.

I'd like your reaction to this.
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MR. CATLETT:

I might comment on this briefly.

There are advantages and disadvantages to all the
different ways of going about this.
recognize that.

I think we all

The question we’re really addressing

ourselves to is what on balance will give us the best

approach.

I think in the long run it is likely to rise
or fall on how good a job has been done.

I recognize

very well the point you are making; I suppose there is
a little danger there, but I feel there is a greater

danger in not doing the job well enough.

In my thinking

the number one consideration is the organizational
structure that will do the very best job.

To me, as

between the two, a full-time group has a much better
chance of doing a much better job.
As you know I've been on the Board for about

six years and will shortly be going off.
may have certain biases.

Therefore, I

It would be my observation that

the present organizational structure is not efficient
enough.

This group--as others have said--works harder

than anybody has a right to expect them to,

A great

effort is going into this work--but the very organizational

structure and the way in which it operates are terribly
inefficient.
A great deal of time is wasted; the time lag

between starting something and finishing it can be shown

by the record to be too long.

I think more and more
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Government agencies and many professional and public organ

The reaction period is a very

izations wait this long.

present problem; it’s a year before the Board can even get

something on the agenda.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

We’ve made a study which would

tend to indicate that after the completion of a research

study the reaction time of the Board has not been terribly
long.

The great delay has been caused by the enormous time it

takes to get research studies completed.
Would it be your view that at least a substantial

part of the problem of efficiency has been that of getting
research done effectively and quickly so that the Board could
then have the benefit of it?

MR. CATLETT:

That is certainly part of the problem.

But even beyond that are the subjects the Board should have

taken up and never did.

Right now there are a number of subjects the Board
should react to; people need guidance from the Board and we
can’t give it to them.

It’s not because people don't want to,

but it’s the cumbersomeness of the entire mechanism.

There are

things that possibly could be handled in three or four days if
they were handled properly.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Mr. Catlett, you’ve been stressing

the question of efficiency and the ability to get things done,

which was also stressed by Mr. Trueblood this morning.

However,

Mr. Trueblood said that he did not consider this question of
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independence--the appearance of independence--as critical

in his judgment.

He did not think that lack of independence

was a valid criticism of the present Board.
I take it that you are in total disagreement

with Mr. Trueblood on that point.

MR. CATLETT:

I wasn’t comparing the efficiency--

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

I didn't mean to put it quite

You had indicated that you had no question

that way.

about individuals on the present Board.

But I take it that

there's a fundamental disagreement between you and Mr.
Trueblood on this question of independence.

MR. CATLETT:
emphasis on it.

independent.

I think we put a slightly different

We're not saying that Board members aren't

I think what we're saying is that the public

interest in this area is very high, probably higher than

most areas of the American Institute, and that everything
should be done to achieve maximum independence, both in

effect and in appearance.

That ought to be one of the

major considerations.
MR. BIEGLER:

Mr. Kapnick, in your comments you

made a statement, if I heard it correctly, that said we—

and I assume that is the accounting profession--are
responsible for the determination of sound accounting

principles.
On page 36 of your brief you say almost the same

thing:

that an accounting profession which retains, on a

merit basis, the right to develop accounting principles in
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a professional manner is desirable.

This suggests that the

right could be taken away and put in somebody else’s hands.
I’d like to speculate with you for just a moment,
and ask what you think might happen if,
for example, this
Study Group were to conclude that everything should go on as

it is now.

What do you see down the road?
MR. KAPNICK:

I think that the accounting profession

will not solve its problems by merely continuing with what it is
now doing; I have to start with that premise.

Secondly, I think that the press and users of financial
information have become aware, in the last decade, of the public

interest in accounting.

I can go back not so many years ago

when there was very, very little interest in accounting or the
differences between the various alternatives.

People accepted

a balance sheet or an income statement because it was footed
properly.

That day is over.
I think the user groups are now questioning the need

for more and more disclosure and better and more information
for their own purposes.

Therefore, I think that you’re going

to see more public interest.
Where is that public interest coming from?

I think

we have seen in recent months what ten years ago would have

been debated as hotly as anything we had in the profession-Congress stepping in and saying that uniform cost accounting

standards should be developed not only for Government contracts
but essentially for all of industry to follow.

You have that in the record.

You have further in the
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record, I think, the fact that Commissioners of the SEC have

been questioned on this; and even Congressmen are becoming
interested in knowing why the FPC is doing this and the SEC
is doing that.

They all relate to Penn Central, and say,

"Hey, there must be something in accounting that we don’t

understand."
I think you're going to see a greater assertion

on the part of the Congress as to what has happened in the

profession.

Unfortunately, I think if the economy does

continue to have its problems and more and more bankruptcies
occur, there has to be an acceleration of this type of

questioning.
There was something in The New York Times this

morning and as I read it I thought,
"I hope that doesn't
happen to us."

I think the headline went something like

this:
"Congress Questions SEC About Why It Took Two
Years to Do Certain Things in the Securities Industry."

At what point is Congress going to question the
SEC as to why it took so long for the accounting profession

to do its Job.

There is no question in my mind that even

though the SEC has always maintained that they wanted this

Job in the profession, and I think they're sincere in this,

there is a point in time when they must look to their own

authority and responsibility as outlined in the Securities
Acts.

I think at that time you're going to see the SEC start

moving in on an issue-by-issue basis and setting good accounting.
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This is nothing startling; they can do it this

afternoon and they have done it, on occasion, when the profession

hasn’t acted.

So that would he where I would say it would go.

MR. BIEGLER:

Thank you.

PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

That New York Times headline

is another straw in the wind to what you’re saying, Mr.
Kapnick.

The SEC is a rather small, full-time body with

substantial staff.

Yet it really doesn’t guarantee a timely

and speedy response to the public needs in the field of

securities regulations if the Congressional criticism is
justified.

What guarantee is there, therefore, that a small,
full-time APB would be more timely in its response than the
present one?

MR. KAPNICK:

You never have the assurance of

timeliness with any group.

I think, however, that a full-

time group dedicated to achieving progress in a specific area
is a lot different from the SEC where they have a multitude

of responsibilities--for the securities industry, for the
accounting profession, for registrants, and many other things.

Further, I would like to make it very clear that
the number of people involved in the determination of good
financial reporting under my concept would probably be

broader than it is today.

I do not look at whatever group

would be agreed upon, whether it’s five, seven, nine, as being

the ones that would do all the research and do all the back
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ground development.
involved.

I look to other people being deeply

The main group would do the motivating, handling of

priorities, and the final decision-making.

I don’t know that there's a conflict, here, when
we’re talking about one area.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

What other aspects are there--

you’ve referred to the efficiency of full-time versus parttime board; you have referred to the problem of independence.

There is a third dimension, of course, which is of concern,

and that’s the degree of support the opinions of these bodies
would command in the profession.
Are you at all concerned that a small, full-time

board would by its very nature have a smaller, narrower base
of support than a larger, part-time board would have?
MR. KAPNICK:

I made the statement before and I

make it again, that if people think the acceptability of
present opinions rests upon the fact that the various firms
are represented on the Board, then I think they are going

under a misapprehension.
That is not the basis for acceptability.

Speaking

for my own firm, we would much prefer to follow a well

developed and reasoned opinion, supported by solid research,
than to follow a set of rules that might come out just

because we happen to sit on the Board.

I'd like also to point out for the record that
firms that have dissented on opinions of the APB, have

followed them.

Therefore, I'm not sure that the question

of acceptability is important as it relates to whether or
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not you have a volunteer or a full-time group.
MR. PRYOR:

to ask.

I have two or three questions I'd like

You mentioned independence as an important consideration

in speaking about self-regulation.

In your opinion is the problem of management services
by accounting firms an important element of the problem of
independence?
MR. KAPNICK:

I think that the question of independence

on management or consulting work has gotten out of context from

time to time.

If you like, I will try to summarize what I

think this whole thing leads you to.

First of all I don't think that the question of
whether or not we do management consulting type of work, which

we prefer to call administrative services, is really the key

issue.

If we are helping to improve accounting controls, if

we are helping to develop management information systems which
produce a better product in the accounting field, this is part

of our role and a proper role for an independent public

accountant.

There are certain areas, which I don't think we need

to talk about at this point, where we feel that management
services do lose the independence.

However, this is a firm

philosophy rather than a professional position, so I'll leave
that alone.

If you open up this question, then you have to raise
the question of fees and their relation to an engagement.
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I would not zero in on management consulting
per se.

If you receive a $50,000 audit fee and $500,000

for installation of a management information system, it
might look as though you've lost your independence.

But

I have to look at it in perspective, because if you say
that, then you are saying a $550,000 audit fee robs you

of your independence just as quickly.
I get around to the point that the whole issue of
management accounting is not one of the things that bothers
me or affects the appearance of independence on the part of

our profession, so long as we stay out of the decision
making role.
This is the way in which I analyze that particular

problem.
There is one problem that has been talked about

from time to time within the profession, and that is that an
investment banker, for example, doesn't know the relationship

of management consulting fees to our total income.

Therefore,

there is no basis to say whether $50,000 or $1 million dollars

is important in relation to a total firm.
All of this still has to be resolved, but I do not
consider it as important to the appearance of independence as

others might.
MR. PRYOR:

You mentioned the problem of conflicts

within Government agencies that have responsibility for

accounting.

Do you think this problem is getting better or

worse, and how might you suggest that it be resolved if it

is getting to be more serious?
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MR. KAPNICK:

I don't think it's getting any worse.

I think there are conflicts, and I think that the present

structure is acceptable, so long as the SEC is the sole one

to determine what is sent to the investor.
When other agencies regulate it, there can be serious

conflicts between two agencies which at some point in time
must be resolved.

All of us know that the SEC and some of the

other agencies can insist that certain things be done.

But I

think that over a long period of time a whole new procedure will

be developed to appeal these conflicts.

I’m not sure we need

to discuss or develop that area at this point, but over a long
period of time I am satisfied that that issue must be solved.

MR. PRYOR:

this is for you:

One last question, and George, I think

What staff size do you envisage being

necessary to support the smaller board that you've recommended?

MR. CATLETT:

I don't know that we've given any

particular thought to the exact size of staff.

It’s certainly

important to have a very effective staff, both on the research
side and the administrative side.
The organization and quality of the staff and

management, and the manner in which subcommittees or task

forces are used, are very important to the success of any such
organization.

With a smaller number you still have a lot of

work to do, and the staff would have to do certain things.

would prefer the concept of task forces.

I

The Board has used

subcommittees,
but these teams have been limited way too much

to Board members.
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Originally all the subcommittee members were
Board members; there are a few subcommittees now that

have non-Board members on them., but it’s still a minority.

We’re all on four or five committees.

It would be better

to pick people who are particularly knowledgeable in the

areas under study.
Present Board members are not experts in all
areas eithers so that the work would have to be spread.
A great deal depends on the type of management--

MR. PRYOR:

Do you think you could still get

volunteer help to work on these new task forces?
MR. CATLETT:

That’s being done now.

I would

in this way bring the knowledge of the profession to bear^
by having a hand-picked task force on every subject.

These

people do not need to be CPAs^ they can be whatever you

need for a particular subject.

Much of the work would be

done by these task forces.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Is it a fair statement that in

your judgment you would include on these task forces

representatives of business and industry who have particular
experience in the area under study?

MR. CATLETT:

It certainly would.

Some problems

involve some industries more than others.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

In other words, you wouldn’t

limit it to lawyers and actuaries and so forth?
MR. CATLETT:

I wouldn’t limit it at all.

have anyone who would make an important contribution.

I’d
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That has never been done under our present setup.

You could

have 100 or 120 people working on 15 or 20 task forces; and
I don’t think it would be difficult at all to get people on

a volunteer basis.

This leads me to one other thing mentioned this
morning on which I would like to comment:

the question of

whether practices and procedures should be separated from

statements of principles.

I feel strongly that these are so

interrelated that it almost has to be an organizational setup.

That doesn't mean that the Board has to issue all these thingss
but certainly you can't draw a very precise line between

principles, procedures and practices.
I think opinions ought to be limited somewhat more

to principles than they have.

forth very clearly.

The principles ought to be set

You can look through most Board opinions

and not even find the principles; they're all mixed up with
a lot of rules and practices.

Perhaps a principle is buried

someplace, but you certainly have to hunt to find it.

I believe

opinions ought to be backed up some with a statement saying,

"This is the principle; this is the; reason we've done this,"
and have another document, or a second section of the document

with the application aspect.

Some of this could be done by the staff; you could
have two or three levels of documents.

Some interpretations

are now being sent out, but I think that procedure could be
improved, too.

They should be sorted out and treated on

different levels, and not combined.
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I would certainly hate to see the thing split
apart organizationally.

You might have two different groups,

but they would be part of the same organizational setup

and responsible to the chairman of the board.

Once you

work with this, you realize that the application is all

intertwined.

MR. LEVINE:

I would like to ask two questions

in regard to the desirability of appeal procedures which
you apparently are favoring in your brief.

Assuming that the body that formulates accounting

principles is a properly constituted operating body,
working with the close cooperation of the SEC, why do you

feel that appeal procedures are necessary?

Secondly,

what type of appeals do you envision being brought forth--

specific or general?
MR. KAPNICK:

I think the appeals procedure is

one of the most delicate that you have to deal with.

As

a profession we are giving to the general public our opinion
on financial figures.

I can find in that responsibility the

corresponding responsibility to determine what is good
accounting.
But you go to the next question:

the application

of accounting is not by public accountants.

Rather, it is

by management and by financial officers in management, and

by boards of directors of companies.
So there is an interest on their part in having
good financial information presented to them.

of them get into

lawsuits

And as more

involving these areas, I think
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this is going to become even more important.

Therefore you have to think of it more in the thrust

of giving industry a way of appealing what we decide is good,

fair accounting.

And if a public accountant disagrees with

what we are saying, shouldn't he have a way of appealing?

If you get it into that context, then the only way

to make management follow a rule is to make it the law of the
land.
rule.”

We, as accountants, can't say, "You must follow this

Therefore the whole purpose of an appeal procedure

would be to give the right of dissent, the right to be heard,

and reviewed.

We have already concluded that most people

already have this; you could take a problem to the SEC.

Then

you would be outside the permissive power that we have and
into the actual rule-making powers of the SEC.

Quite often you do not get a proper review, if a
review at all, in these regulatory bodies.

That's when you

should be able to go to the courts to determine whether or

not a specific procedure or a specific principle was followed.

As you get into more and more of the sensitive
areas that need attention in the accounting profession, there
can be significant dangers in financial reporting.

How does an industry go about challenging that?

I don't think they should challenge it by threatening to

change from Firm A to Firm Y.
MR. LEVINE:

They must have a way to appeal.

I don't understand whether you're

confining that appeal to a specific set of facts under a given
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set of circumstances, or you're talking about a general

appeal from the principle as it is formulated.
MR. KAPNICK:
MR. LEVINE:

I would say both.
If that's available, it would leave

something to be desired in the entire system.

MR. KAPNICK:
MR. LEVINE:

Why?
You appear to be making a case for

legislation, if, in the long run, principles formulated in
the private sector are subject to--and I'll use the words

lightly perhaps--willy-nilly appeal, which is what it
could amount to.

MR. KAPNICK:

If you get a willy-nilly appeal,

then the whole profession has lost its ability to determine

good accounting.

Then you go back to George's earlier

statement that it's going to rise or fall on whatever comes

out of this group.
On the other hand, the alternate to an appeal

procedure is to say that all industry must follow what we
decide on, and I'm not so sure that I can buy that.

I

think that you have to allow industry--and let's leave the
public accountants out, because if we have this as part of

membership in the profession, then everybody that's a
member would have to follow that, some way of appealing,

either on a specific case or general basis.
MR. CATLETT:

I'd like to make one comment.

When you get into the appeal area, you must consider that

people have the legal rights; it's not up to us to grant them
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or withhold them.

Any company subject to the SEC can ask for

a hearing either on specific applications or on a broad
principle.

They have that right, whether we like it or not,

and I think we've got to operate with that in mind.
There are undoubtedly going to be court tests of

some of these things over the next few years.

The rights of

people and the real legal procedures may be determined for us.

MR. LEVINE:

I think your brief in essence suggests

that the type of procedure be altered in some way; that it
is not a satisfactory procedure as far as you're concerned.

MR. CATLETT:
MR. LEVINE:
MR. CATLETT:

MR. LEVINE:

I don't believe we think that.
That's what I'm asking.

No, we do not.

Is the present appeal mechanism

satisfactory, under the circumstances?
MR. CATLETT:

The context in which we wrote this

brief was that for the present, and as far as the scope of

your Study Group is concerned, we would suggest that you just
leave that alone because the right of appeal to the agencies
exists anyhow.

I think the only thing you have to think about

is how that relates to the legal basis of the operations of
the board.

MR. SMITH:

On page 26 of your brief you say,

"...we believe that acceptance results more from the quality

of the pronouncements than from who are the members of the APB."

With that as background, on pages 20 and 21 you say, "Suggestions
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have also been made for an APB outside the AICPA... However,
a group so constituted would not be responsible to any

organization or entity, and we believe that an approach

of that type would not be effective.”

I wonder if you

could expand on that a little?

MR. CATLETT:

What we’re trying to say is that

in the present context, the American Institute is probably

the best organization in which to place this entity.

But

the people who serve on it should be the very best people
we can find, and that the members of this group need not

necessarily be members of the Institute.

Structurally it

has to fit into some organization, and the American

Institute is probably--at the moment, anyhow--the best place
for it.

We’ve been concentrating very much

MR. OLSON:

on the machinery for setting principles, which of course is

our prime concern.

But Mr. Trueblood this morning seemed to

give great emphasis to the self-discipline of the profession.
You touch lightly on this on page 31 when you talk
about the legal aspects of enforcement.

But you really

don’t get into talking about the legal aspects.

I wonder

if you might expand on that a little bit?
MR. KAPNICK:

I think the need for self-discipline,

as Mr. Trueblood mentioned this morning when he quoted from
an excellent legal authority, is in my mind one of the

overwhelming criterion for any professional organization.
I think that is a beginning and you go then to the

question of the individual’s ability for self-discipline.
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When you get into the accounting principles area, there is a
conflict between the self-discipline that’s needed for a

profession on the one hand, and the lack of self-discipline
in the development of accounting principles.

I think you get into even more of that in the legal
basis.

If the laws of the country are such that you are going

to follow the writing off of receivables, then. I have no
alternative.

But if you ask me as a professional accountant

what is good in. this area, I have to decide whether it’s good
from a professional standpoint without the legal basis.

If

we can't get to that, then we're going to have to go back to

having a legal basis for accounting.
MR. CATLETT:

It's certainly our position that the

Institute, in connection with whatever is done, has to develop

a disciplinary enforcement procedure to go along with it or it

will not be effective.

We have no quarrel with that.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

This has been a valuable discussion.

Thank you very, very much.

We have held up Mr. Wayne Keller of the National

Association of Accountants.

I hope you'll forgive us.

MR. I. WAYNE KELLER:

You're forgiven.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Commission, Ladles and
Gentlemen:

Let me say first that I am substituting today for

Frank Meyers who is chairman of the special committee of the
National Association of Accountants appointed to draft this

report.

Mr. Meyers could not be here because of business
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commitments.

I would also like to state that we are deeply
cognizant of the work of the present Accounting Principles
Boards and the progress that they have made.

And if I may

interject a personal comment, since I have been chairman

of the NAA’s Committee on Management Accounting Practices,
I have developed a much deeper appreciation of the problems

of the Accounting Principles Board.

I will take time only to emphasize certain points
which have been made in the report which has been presented

to you.

We think that we should refer to financial accounting

and reporting standards.

In our discussion today we are not

going into all the ramifications of accounting principles,

as for example, they may pertain to accounting for internal
control, pricing and other matters.

We’re talking only of

reporting.
There has been a fair amount of discussion this

morning as to different levels, if we want to call them that,

of principles

and

different bodies.

These subjects consumed

quite a bit of discussion during the early deliberations of
the NAA Committee.

We finally settled on three terms:

concepts, principles and rules.
Maybe these to a degree parallel what are referred

to in Statement 4 as pervasive principles, operating principles,
and detail principles.

In my personal opinion, I agree with

Mr. Catlett that our definitions have been confusing.
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What are we talking about?

Firsts a level of basic

concepts, and maybe understandability-verifiability,
neutrality, timeliness, this sort of thing.

Then we move down to principles.

These may relate

to obsolescence, to prices, to the accounting entity, to

residual interest} to exchanges.

Next comes a set of rules

by which these principles are applied.
Concepts would be almost like Holy Writ.

wouldn’t change very often.
often, but not every day.

They

Principles would change more

Rules would have flexibility to

adapt to the changing social and economic circumstances.

With one dissenting vote in the committee, we favor
a non-governmental body, supported by private funds,
sponsored by the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants.

We feel that it is important that this body,

however it's constituted, be closely associated with the

Institute as the principal body of the profession.
As to composition, we recommend a full-time, paid

chairman who would be selected as much or maybe more for his
executive ability as his accounting ability.

And then a

volunteer body, with three-year rotating terms.

We have no

strong feeling as to three or five year terms, but we
recommend three.

Not more than fifty per cent of this group should

be practicing public accountants; and not less than twentyfive per cent should be drawn from industry or commercial
organizations--men who are qualified and are intimately
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associated with the preparation of financial reports.

The

remainder should be selected from the academic field, the

financial community,
and so on.
Of course, we have placed full emphasis on

adequate and capable staffs and we also feel that this
body must operate with a number of committees.

In this connection we believe that there should
be, at least initially,
a committee on concepts, a
committee on principles--there may be several committees on

principles, and then committees relating to rules.

These

committees need not be appointed from within the body, but
might be chaired by a member of the body.

The composition

of the committees should parallel the composition of the
body that we are recommending.
We think we need a new name to indicate to the

public that this is a complete change.

We have outlined certain steps, and in these we
want to emphasize empirical research.

We feel that before

an exposure draft is submitted there should be empirical
research through simulation, with actual testing in the

field to determine what the effect of that opinion would

have been had it been in existence.
This we feel is a most important part of research.
That is a summary of our report.

I'll try to

answer questions from the committee.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Mr. Keller, I have just one

question on your excellent report.

On page iii, at the
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very bottom, you mention, as a criticism of the Accounting

Principles Board, that it has reversed itself on several
occasions.
One might argue, as one gentleman did this morning,

that it's desirable for the Accounting Principles Board to

review after a few years, a controversial opinion on which
there was considerable dissent, to see whether or not it’s

really working in practice.

And if it isn’t, to have the

courage to reverse it in the light of that experience.
Do you regard that as a bad practice?

No.

MR. KELLER:
reverse yourself.

It’s a matter of how quickly you

But again, it’s the opinion of our

committee that had there been empirical research in some of

these areas, there wouldn't have been the reversal; the first

opinion would have been better.

They would have had more

unanimity of agreement.
MR. PRYOR:

I don’t think you mentioned whether

you wanted a majority vote or two-thirds vote?
MR. KELLER:

We have not.

That’s sort of a house

keeping thing that we didn't address ourselves to.

1 think

it would be the opinion of our committee that we would
certainly have to have a majority and probably a two-thirds

vote.

I might mention that the Management Accounting
Practices Committee of NAA requires a three-quarters vote.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

On page 8 we observe that you
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believe that the new body does not require an appeal
procedure.
MR. KELLER:

That is correct.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

I take it that you would

generally agree with the representatives of Arthur

Andersen who prefer to leave the situation as it is.
MR. KELLER:

That is correct.

We feel that

there would be no need for a courts because the very
people who make up the body would carry sufficient
weight, and because of existing procedures--the SEC and

so on.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

question:

Let me just ask one last

I take it that despite the fact that there are

different levels of activity, concepts, principles and
rules, you believe that they should be under one sponsor-

ship-MR. KELLER:

That is correct.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:
MR. KELLER:

(Continuing) --who--

We had considerable discussion within

our committee on that and finally agreed that it should

be one group.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

be a separation.

Some have suggested that there

You do not favor that?

MR. KELLER:
MR. OLSON:

We do not.
Mr. Keller, I assume it's fair to

conclude that your group is substantially dissatisfied

with the way things are now.
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MR. KELLER:

Maybe substantially is a bit too strong;

we feel that there is definite need for improvement.

MR. OLSON:

You cited a number of areas in which you

feel there are deficiencies in the operation of the present

machinery.
If you were confined to a single observation, what

would you cite as your major concern?
MR. KELLER:

I don’t know if I can cite any single

one as being the major concern of our committee.

We did

discuss the fact that pressures make fire-fighting necessary,
and that the way in which the Board has been operating has

kept it from fire prevention work.

Probably our basic objection would be that underlying

objectives or concepts have not been developed as a test for
rules.

MR. BIEGLER:

Mr. Keller, on pages 7 and 8 of the

document you filed with us, you lay out nine essential

steps that seem to be designed to guarantee very effective
input from all interested parties.

And on page 5 in

discussing the composition of the board, you recommend that

not more than fifty per cent of the membership be practicing
CPAs.
Would you care to amplify on your reasoning for

this restriction?

MR. KELLER:
too large.

We don’t think the board should be

We latched onto eighteen because that's the

present size.

We have no strong feeling about a somewhat
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larger or smaller boards but we do think that the board

should have representation from those who are actually
preparing financial statements and also from the academic
community.

PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

When you say that no more

than fifty per cent be practicing CPAs, this doesn’t imply,
I presume, that the other members either should or should

not be non-practicing CPAs?
Let me put my question another way:

Is it a

requirement of your scheme that all members be CPAs?
MR. KELLER:

No. These men from industry may

be CPAs.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

MR. KELLER:

But they need not be.

They need not be.

PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

You envisage a full-time

chairman, and approximately eighteen voluntary members.
How would the NAA feel about a body which had more than

one full-time paid member, but might still consist

substantially of part-time volunteer members?
MR. KELLER:

I think you're speaking now of

staff.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:
MR. KELLER:

over the body.

No.

Our idea was one chief executive

Yes, under him you may have a director

of research-PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

But what about a body which

had a full-time chairman and two full-time vice chairmen?
MR. KELLER:

I can only answer that by saying we
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didn’t get into it.

PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

But you wouldn’t see any

strong objection to it?
MR. KELLER:

Not if you had the broad representation

in the body; I wouldn't think so.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

for Mr. Keller?

Does anybody else have a question

(There were none.)

We’re very grateful to you, Mr. Keller, thank you.
MR. KELLER:

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Next on the list is the Accounting

Policies Committee of the Independent Gas Association of
America.

Mr. Allen, we would greatly appreciate having your

views on the record.

MR. C. M. ALLEN:

Mr. Chairman, as I told you at

the lunch break, I did not come prepared to make an oral

presentation today.

On the other hand, for the benefit of those here
who may not have had an opportunity to be aware of our

written statement, I offered to summarize it and, of course,

be available for any questions.

Mr. Luke Patrick is here

to assist in fielding any questions.

Our committee agrees with APB Statement No. 4,

issued in October, 1970, that responsibility for the reliability
of an enterprise's financial statement rests with its management.

In recognizing this ethical and legal responsibility,
financial management must have an active part in the establishment

and development of accounting principles, and financial
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reporting policies and practices.
Our committee believes that membership of the
APB, or whatever name might be given to it, should contain

equal representation from the accounting profession and from

business financial management; and some lesser number of
members selected from other groups, such as financial analysts
and academicians.

In addition, in changing the makeup of APB
membership , the committee also believes that serious

consideration should be given to making the APB function

a full-time activity.
The APB's total membership, in order to be
effective, should be established with not more than twenty
and not less than twelve members.

Pronouncements or

opinions of the APB should require the affirmative vote
of at least two-thirds of its members.
The term of APB membership should be so established

that it will maintain a continuity of purpose and direction,

with new replacement members coming in at suitable intervals
of time on a staggered basis.
The financing of the program should be undertaken

on some equitable basis by the independent accounting firms.

This manner of funding it would assure uniformity in
spreading the cost of this act
ivity over the entire business
community through the accounting fees paid by business

concerns.
The research facilities of the AICPA and similar
research resources of business financial management and
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other groups should be made available to the APB.

The newly-

constituted APB, from the time research studies are commenced,

should seek the advice and participation of all parties on

such studies; it should also conduct information conferences
and public hearings on the subject matter.

It should expose

drafts when appropriate, disseminate information concerning
pertinent views expressed by respondents, and provide for

rebuttal-type responses to such views.

In summary, the committee believes that business
financial management is in a unique position of accountability

to its stockholders, to the general investment public, to the

financial community, to governmental agencies and to others
for the accounting principles relied upon in keeping its

accounts and records.
Accordingly, it carries with it a right and an
obligation to play a major role in the establishment of

such principles and reporting practices.
I think that summarizes our position.

I’m sorry

if I took too long to read it.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:
question.

Not in the slightest.

I have one

Mr. Keller, representing the National Association

of Accountants, indicated that his team wanted substantial
representation from business financial management, but he

specifically wanted the body to be under the basic sponsorship
of the American Institute.

I notice that you indicated that

the financing should be by independent accounting firms, but
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I didn’t find in your paper any specific comment as to
whether you believe that the sponsorship should be under

Could you clarify that for me?

the American Institute.
MR. ALLEN:

I think the feeling of our committee

is that the business community could make recommendations

for board membership.

Likewise, the accounting profession

could select members from the profession.

Obviously, we don’t have answers to all of the
questions that might come up.

But it is felt that the

business community should have an equal part with the
accounting profession in the makeup of the board.
MR. LEVINE:

I’d like to hitch-hike on that

if I may, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Allen, did you consider the

compatibility and feasibility of the first two suggestions

in relationship to the full-time activity of a fairly
expansive board?
Do you think there would be any problem in

providing these people on that basis?
MR. ALLEN:

Undoubtedly you would find some

problems from time to time in any event.

But it strikes

me that there are people within the accounting profession,
and within the business community, who have a dedicated

interest in this effort.

I believe you could find highly

qualified men to fill the positions.

MR. LEVINE:

Do you anticipate that they would

be moving into this position on a temporary basis, on a
leave of absence, or how would that work?
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MR. ALLEN:
directly.

Our committee didn't face that problem

It was considered basically that they would serve

a three to five year term, possibly subject to reappointment;

they would be a full-time board; they would be funded through
some means by the public accounting firms; they would be paid,
perhaps by remaining on the payroll of the companies they come

from.

I don't think this would materially depart from the

independence question we have today.

PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

I'm still somewhat dissatisfied

with your answer to the question that the Chairman put.

I

think it's worth pressing, because it will arise again in

connection with the position the FEI will take later this
afternoon.

If this newly-constituted board, consisting partly

of CPAs and partly of non-CPAs is not to be sponsored by the

AICPA, then it had better be sponsored by somebody else--it
can’t hang in mid-air.

It has to be responsible to somebody.

Arthur Andersen made the point in connection with a different

kind of board, which they were rejecting, and said ”...a
group so constituted would not be responsible to any organization

or entity, and we believe that an approach of that type would not
be effective."

In the context in which they made that statement,

I think that was a sound statement.
In the present context, if you accept this view that
the board has to be responsible to somebody, not just to the

community at large or the business world, who would your board

be responsible to?
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MR. ALLEN:

I will give you my own opinion.

I

believe the board could very well report to or be a basic part of
the AICPA and have it function under the auspices of that

organization.

I think it might be a very workable situation.

I think our main concern is that management have
an equal part in the establishment of accounting principles

and reporting standards.

I must admit I had a question I wanted to ask of
Mr. Kapnick, but didn't get an opportunity to do so.

Mr.

Kapnick made the statement, "We are responsible to the public

for proper reporting."

My question to Mr. Kapnick was:

Is

he talking "we" the public accounting profession, or does
he agree that that includes business management?

I don't

know his reaction.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Is Mr. Kapnick still here?

(Mr. Kapnick was no longer present.)
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Thank you, Mr. Allen, very much;

we appreciate it.
Does anybody have a question for Mr. Allen?
MR. OLSON:

may.

I'd like to ask one question, if I

Mr. Allen, I'm still a bit confused about participation

in this body by members of industry.

I can understand the

desire to have the viewpoints, the input and the expertise

which is available through that source.

But unlike the

accounting profession, which virtually has one organization
representing it, I am under the impression that there are

hundreds of organizations representing the various segments
of industry.
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If the desire to have members on this body stems

from a desire to be represented, who, in fact, speaks for
Who can say they speak for industry?

industry?

This is

a large segment of our society.
And if it isn't a matter of representation, if
it's merely a matter of input, could that not be accomplished

through other means and other machinery, such as an advisory
group to the rule-making body?
MR. ALLEN:

As some of you may know I’m very

actively involved with FEI.

That would be one means and one

source, perhaps, of input membershipwise.

There are other

organizations, obviously, the financial analysts, the banking
community, the investment community, that would conceivably

be similar sources for business representation on such a board.
MR. OLSON:

I gather that you're basically concerned

with representation from industry, which is somewhat parallel

to talking about representation from the large public accounting

firms.

Is that correct?
MR. ALLEN:

That's substantially correct.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

We're very grateful to you, Mr.

Allen, thanks again, and thanks to Mr. Patrick, also.
Next on the agenda is Mr. George Gibbs, Professor

of Accounting at Claremont Men's College in Claremont,
California.

Mr. Gibbs.

PROFESSOR GEORGE GIBBS:
about self-regulation.

We've mentioned a little bit

I put in eight years on the State Board

of Accountancy in the State of California, and I helped to
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remove two CPA licenses after due process and hearings.
So it seems to me sort of interesting that we
worry about self-regulation when we already have self

regulation to remove a CPA certificate.

We have plenty

of self-regulation.
I have a few written remarks; I'll try to

summarize them.

I would like to call to your attention

that we’ve already discussed today one answer to the
question, "What is meant by the term accounting principles?"
There are two parts to this, and I hope we adopt the

suggestion made by Professor Solomons in a letter to me.
He said that the basic things be called fundamentals and the

other things be called procedures.

So we have fundamentals and we have procedures, and
between the two we hope to set some standards; that comes
from a letter Professor Solomons wrote.

I’m not speaking

for him particularly, except he put it in writing.

I do think that we have to consider these fundamentals
a little.

These are things that you cannot quantify--

disclosure, materiality, consistency, comparability,

conservatism, determination of income.

There have been

several efforts at trying to put them in shape without
success.

I took up all five of the questions of the committee
and I’ll get on very quickly.

My friend, Mr. McMonnies from

Scotland, wrote an article entitled, "Accountants Are an

Unprincipled Lot":

True or False?

(Laughter)
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He reviewed three studies of the Accountants
International Study Group, which nobody bothered to edit,
I’m sure, because he found that consistently it was referred
to as a standard, a convention, a principle, a requirement,

a criterion, a tenet and an attribute.
Now, what are we talking about?

No wonder the

public is confused when we continue to repeat, as we have
done for so many years, "generally accepted accounting
principles."
Also, we never cleared up the idea of generally

What groups in the financial community are these?

accepted.

That's already been mentioned, but I'll mention it again.

what groups are they generally accepted?

By

My contention is

that they cannot be made generally accepted by edict.

I don't

care who edicts it; the President of the United States can't
make it generally accepted, if it isn't generally accepted.

Obviously, if the practice of accounting is to be
changed, then the wording of the auditor's report letter should

be changed.

Probably there should be several versions, and I

haven't heard that mentioned today, not just one pat statement

that you can teach a parrot to say.

It should really tell the reader more than it does
now as to the opinion of the auditor, and how and why he
arrived at it.
A recent booklet, "The Auditor's Report...Its

Meaning and Significance,

"

prepared by bankers, says that
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no bank officer should make a loan without studying the
booklet.

And then it refers to Accounting Research

Study Number 7 by Mr. Grady which lists 121 items called

principles.
I just told you all the uses of the terms; there
cannot be 121 fundamentals, if we agree with Mr. Solomon's

definition of fundamentals.
Question two, responsibility for establishing the
board--we've discussed that quite a lot today,
and I agree
it should be nongovernmental.

there.

I have just one thing to add,

It would appear to me that if the revised board did

a bang-up job, it would remove some of the tedious duties from

Government agencies; individual standards could be referred
by other organizations and Government agencies.
Of course, it’s obvious some Government agencies
would need to supplement basic standards with rules,
and
I suppose we had better use the word rules.

I have only one additional comment on the
composition of the board.

I just went a little further,

like the Supreme Court, and said it should not be more than

nine men chosen for life tenure, serving full-time with an
adequate salary.

I didn’t guess what the salary should be.

And then I suggested the majority represent the
medium and small practitioners rather than being dominated
by the larger firms.

I admit I'm prejudiced because I have

an office and I'm the sole practitioner.

Then I suggested that board activity be directed

from a city other than New York--and this may be prejudiced,
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too--to avoid undue influence of the financial world.
Of course, the cost of board activity should be
borne by the members of the profession.

I think that alternative procedures should be permitted,
provided that the significance and results of the choice of the
particular alternative are disclosed.
The basis must be straightened out and we must stop
being illogical.

Rule 58.1 of the California State Board of

Accountancy is a good example of being illogical.

It says

term accounting principles is construed to
include not only accounting principles and practices, but also
the methods of applying them.

How can intelligent men have

rules like this; how can A include A plus B plus C?

It is

logically impossible, and yet I'm stuck with it because it's
Rule 58.1.
Having recently commented on drafts of six proposed

pronouncements of the present Board, I'm convinced the operation
could be improved.

In one case I recommended the deletion of

forty-six repetitions of the phrase, "Generally accepted

accounting principles."

I counted them--forty-six times that

same phrase appeared and it didn't mean a thing, because it
was circular reasoning.

You don't say to yourself,
"I hereby develop a

principle because it's generally accepted."

You haven't

even got to the principle yet.

Now what about research?

Being that some of us

here today are semanticists,
I suggest perhaps it should be
called "search."

What are you doing a "research" for?

Let's
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do the search; we haven't done that, yet.

(Laughter)

I have often thought of this, and it should be search if

it's the first time a subject is really being studied.

I have a comment on interpretations.

A very

recent ruling by somebody said that any written procedures
promulgated by the Board will call for interpretation.

However, it seems improper to me to suddenly state that

interpretations written by two staff men bring about a

situation wherein it can be stated, "members (AICPA) should
be aware that they may be called upon to Justify departures
from the interpretation."

Now we do need investigation before any action
is taken toward adoption of the procedure.

The staff

should investigate the problem and report to the Board.

This report should include references from many sources,

including the results of the more systematic searchers.
I tried to break this up into three parts, both in the
United States and in other countries.
I would like to conclude by saying that it is

hoped that the new Accounting Standards Board--it’s a good

phrase--if it acts promptly, will restore the confidence
of bankers, Government officials, labor, businessmen,

investors, analysts and the general public in the reports
made by certified public accountants.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Thank you very much.

I take it that you would prefer

to get through this semantic haze with at least a change in
the name to something like the Accounting Standards Board?
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PROFESSOR GIBBS:

I think that’s

I just added that.

the best thing I’ve heard today (Laughter)--Accounting

Standards Board.

I just had the word "board" and added

"accounting standards."

I didn’t invent it; it came out of

the meeting today.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

What should the members of this

board be paid if they're full-time?

What should be the range

of the salaries?

PROFESSOR GIBBS:

I admitted that Professor Dickey

and I were not in that bracket. But if we’re applicants for the

job, we’re not talking about the same scale.

I have heard all

your discussion, Frank; I’ve been here all day.

I didn’t realize until today that we considered that
the Accounting Principles Board was to such a degree subsidiary

to the SEC.

I didn’t remember the formulations of Congress on

the SEC until you read them today.

And I haven’t studied the

SEC as much as other people have.

If that’s true, I think your point is well-taken
that we might have difficulty in paying $75,000 to $100,000.

I appointed them for life tenure because I didn’t
think about the age.

But, if you're up to the age of fifty

to fifty-five, as you’ve already mentioned, a ten-year term
would bring them to the end of their active career.

I said

life tenure because I thought that then they’d really be

independent.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Just a short question:

Suppose,

for example, that you have a salary range of $35,000 to $40,000
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a year.

Would you be able to get people on that board for

life tenure or a shorter term, who are the type of person
now on the Accounting Principles Board?
PROFESSOR GIBBS:

I think you’ve got to pay more

and I think it would be a problem, because a lot of

competent people have been giving free time to this Board.
They are the leaders of the profession, and they’ve been

doing it.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

If you have a salary range of

about $100,000, and, as you suggested this morning, a
board of about nine people, that's a basic cost of $900,000.
Add to that the usual cost of supportive staff and the
overhead that goes with salaried people, which is usually

50 per cent of their salaries, and you’re up to about

$1½ million.
Is that amount of money raisable from the private

accounting profession?

And would you consider it better

spent on these nine men, or would it be better to spend that
much money on better research, higher salaries for the
researchers and stronger staff?
PROFESSOR GIBBS:

I think it should be spent on

full-time men, because they're the ones who are bearing
the decision-making process and responsibility.

I've

learned something else today--that their results could be

appealed to the SEC; I didn't realize that before.

They

have to be responsible.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:
today?

You don’t consider them responsible

1.07

From what we've heard today, the

PROFESSOR GIBBS:

Board meets three days every six weeks or so;

heard how things are going.

and we've

They’re responsible, but we’ve

heard that they aren’t effective; they were unable to work
consistently on things that were urgently needed, because

they weren’t meeting.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

With matters as detailed, complex

and difficult as some of the opinions of the Accounting

Principles Board, could they be accomplished in a few days?

Certain things require gestation time, thinking time, reflection,
redebate, and so forth, before they are adopted.
Do you think you could get as good a job done if
you locked people in a room and told them to come up with a

principle or an opinion?

Or would it be better to give them

a little time to reflect upon the comments and criticisms from
industry and others?
PROFESSOR GIBBS:

answer.

There are really two parts to the

I think some items could be decided fairly quickly

because there's been so much done in some fields in previous

years.

Others, I grant you, would require time.

I don’t

know, when they go off for five weeks and then meet again,
how much time they spend in that intervening period thinking
about these things.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

I might add that we have received

input from some of the members of the Accounting Principles Board.
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Some of the Board members represent that they spend 90 per
cent of their entire working time on Board matters; others

maybe 75 per cent; and in one or two instances 100 per
c ent.

PROFESSOR GIBBS:

Maybe money doesn't have anything

to do with it if you can get all these volunteers.

But a

sole practitioner couldn't afford to give a year; he

probably wouldn't be chosen, anyway.

Even a firm with ten partners would find it a
burden.

If a firm had ten partners and, say, sixty employees

and one of their partners was chosen to give a year,

certainly his year’s compensation may not be as big as
Arthur Andersen’s,but it isn’t spread over nearly the
number of partners.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

There are differences, as you know.

One chairman of the Accounting Principles Board, who served

for a period of five years, was a partner of a very small
San Francisco firm; with substantially less than ten partners.

PROFESSOR GIBBS:

Granted.

But if he took full-time

for five years, or 90 per cent of his time, then he put an
awful burden on his other partners, did he not?

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Yes

Does anybody in the audience have a question for
Mr. Gibbs,
who has come all the way from California to give

us of his wisdom?
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

I don’t have a question, but

just want to set the record straight.

I did not use principles

or fundamentals in my letter to Professor Gibbs.
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PROFESSOR GIBBS:

Excuse me.

"standards;" I made a mistake.

You used the word

I don’t know where the word

"fundamentals" came from at the moment.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

I would like to read this

paragraph, although the purpose of this meeting is not for

members of this committee to reveal their position.

In my

letter to Professor Gibbs, I said that, "I am myself somewhat

favorably disposed to the change in the name of the Accounting
Principles Board, to something like the Financial Accounting
Standards Board."

I went on to say, that since we already

talk about standards of air safety,
engineering standards,
building standards and the like, I see no reason why the word

should be reserved for use in connection with auditing.

I

myself would have no qualms about extending its use to accounting
as well.

I haven't seen any reason since I wrote that letter

to change my position.

PROFESSOR GIBBS:
Professor Solomons:

I might make one comment on that,

the fact that in auditing we have general

standards, standards of field work and standards of reporting.
It appears to be that we have achieved a higher degree of
understanding with reference to auditing standards than we

have in accounting.
Someone mentioned today that a revised board should
take over both the auditing and the accounting functions.

If

they did, and we adopted the word standards for one, we would
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adopt it for both.

I think that probably you are right;

the word standards doesn’t have so many philosophical

connotations.

Thank you very much.
Thank you, Professor Gibbs.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

MISS MULCAHY:

I am Research Director of the

Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

We’re honored to have you

here with us, today.
MISS MULCAHY:

I really haven’t anything to say

except to offer a word of consolation, if you’re considering
a change in the name to incorporate accounting standards.

The English Institute of Chartered Accountants
has a committee called the Accounting Standards Steering
Committee, which issues pronouncements in that country.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

We’re very much interested in

the work of the English Committee.

Our next witness is Mr. Thomas Hogan of the firm
of Haskins & Sells.

MR. THOMAS B. HOGAN:

The managing partner of my

firm, Mr. Michael Chetkovich had hoped to be here.

Un

fortunately he's out of the country, so I'm pinch-hitting
for him.
What I am about to say is both the view of my

firm and his personal view.
Our view is that the Accounting Principles Board

despite the difficult
ies under which it had to operate, has
done an excellent job of establishing standards for financial

reporting during the past twelve years.

While some segments
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of the business community may disagree with certain of the

conclusions reached by the Boards there can be no doubt as
to the dedication and the integrity of each member of the

Board.
The difficulties under which the Board has had to

operate have stemmed largely from the fact that it has had to

react to events occurring in the business community, rather

than being able to consider the whole question of accounting
principles in an orderly fashion.
The problem is further compounded by the fact that

each member of the Board has substantial outside responsibilities

to the firm of which he is a partner, to the university with
which he is affiliated, or to the industrial concern by which

he is employed.

No matter how dedicated he might be, or no

matter how well-intentioned, he has had, by force of

circumstances, to spend only a part of his time on the work
of the Accounting Principles Board.
The Board has also been hampered, in our judgment,

by the absence of detailed and penetrating research studies
in many of the areas in which it has been called upon to

express an opinion.

These probelms are not apt to go away in the future.

On the contrary, they will increase.

The complexities of

business life, the growth of multinational companies, and
imaginative innovations in business transactions which we

witnessed during the 1960s will undoubtedly continue in the future.
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Our proposal is intended to make the task of devel

oping standards for financial reporting more efficient and to

alleviate some of the difficulties under which the present
Accounting Principles Board operates.

In our view, the

development of these standards falls into two separate
functions:

(1) the development of broad, general principles;

and (2) the application of those principles to particular

circumstances .
If I may borrow your illustration of this
morning, Mr. Chairman, the recent considerations by the

Board on how to account for certain types of investments

illustrates the point I'm trying to make.

The Board was

faced with the problem of how to carry investments; should

they be carried at cost, at their present values, or on
some other basis?
The Board concluded as a general principle that
a corporation having significant influence over the operations

of another company should account for its investment using
the equity method of accounting.

This was a broad statement

of principle.
The Board, having decided on this general principle,

went forward to apply this principle in particular
circumstances.

It established some arbitrary rules as to

when a corporation had the ability to exercise significant
influence.

The Board described the methods by which the

accounting should be reflected in the financial statements,
spoke of the types of intercorporate transactions that should
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be eliminated, and established procedures for disclosure in
All of these latter considerations merely provided

footnotes.

the rules of application of the general principle.

Haskins & Sells proposes the creation of two
separate groups, working in parallel.

The first group, which

we have called, for want of a better name, the Commission,

would be charged with the responsibility of developing broad

principles of accounting.

It would be a relatively small group--large enough
to be representative, but small enough to be effective.

The

members of the Commission would be required to sever their

present professional or business connections and spend fulltime working on the affairs of the Commission.

The second group, which we have called the Committee,

would be part-time volunteers appointed by the American
Institute in the same manner, and by the same selection
processes as are now used with respect to both the Accounting

Principles Board and other committees of the Institute.
This Committee would be charged with the responsibility
of formulating the rules for applying the general principles
established by the Commission.

In establishing these detailed

rules for recording and disclosure, the Committee would be
required to conform to the principles enunciated by the
Commission.

The Committee would also have the right and the

authority to interpret the general principles as to individual

industries, classes of transactions; and, on occasion, would be
available to respond to questions raised with respect to an
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individual transaction or to a type of transaction.

In order to ensure that the rules and interpreta
tions issued by the Committee were in conformity with the

opinions of the Commission, our proposal comprehends that
any pronouncement by the Committee would be subject to

review and concurrence by the Commission.
If members of the business community felt that

a pronouncement by the Committee was not in accordance with
the principle enunciated by the Commission, they would have
the right to appeal directly to the Commission.

If the

business community felt that an accounting principle

previously enunciated was no longer applicable, it would
also have the right to appeal to the Commission.

Similarly,

if the business community felt, because of changed circum

stances, that a prior pronouncement of the Committee was

out of date, it would have the right to request the Commission
to direct the Committee to reconsider the matter.

Underlying all of the pronouncements of the

Commission and the Committee must be extensive research, both
empirical and analytical.

The research effort must be

directed to developing fundamentals to fulfill the objectives

of financial statements, as well as the analysis of problems,

including extensive testing of proposed principles and

applications.

We recommend that the research effort be

supervised by a full-time director of research who would

report directly to the Commission.
Another element of our proposal comprehends that

a Foundation would be created under auspices of the American
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Institute of Certified Public Accountants.

The Foundation

would be governed by Trustees initially appointed by the
Institute, but thereafter self-perpetuating, so that as a
Trustee's term expired, or after he died, retired or resigned,
his fellow Trustees would appoint his successor.

The Trustees

would be non-salaried and drawn from all segments of the
community having an interest in financial statements, including
practicing accountants, preparers of financial statements,
users of those statements, and representatives of the academic

world.

The Trustees would appoint members of the Commission
and establish both their salaries and their conditions of
employment.

Our thought would be that the salary level would

be commensurate with that which the Commissioner might expect
to earn elsewhere.

In order to provide a sufficient period of

time for him to be useful and effective, we would think that

his term of appointment should be for a period of not less than
seven years.
We estimate that the annual cost of operating the

Foundation would be somewhere in the neighborhood of $2 to

$3 million.

We would hope that a significant proportion of

these costs would be borne by individual members of the

accounting profession, especially the larger firms, and that
other members of the business community would volunteer to

absorb some part of the costs of operating the Foundation.
To the extent that these contributions were not

116

forthcoming, the cost would be borne by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants.

The partners

of Haskins & Sells would commit themselves to contribute

$1 million during the first five years of the Foundation’s
existence.
We at Haskins & Sells are dedicated to the
proposition that accounting principles and their applications

must be established speedily and efficiently.

The first

chairman of the Accounting Principles Boards the late

Weldon Powell, was one of our partners.
We always have had close historical ties with
the work of the Accounting Principles Board and have
supported it in the past.

We are committed to supporting

the Board or whatever form of organization emerges from

the considerations of this Study Group.

What we have

tried to do is to suggest an organizational arrangement which

makes the work of establishing standards of financial

reporting more relevant, more timely and more effective.
Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Mr. Hogan,
I would have to

observe that the dedication of your firm to the task at
hand is certainly amply indicated by this extraordinary

commitment you have made publicly today, and I am impressed

by it.

I am even more impressed by your statement that

although recommending this very careful structure upon which
you have commented, your firm would support whatever comes
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out of this study.

I think that that is a most generous,

statesmanlike comment and I would like to have the record

reflect it.
MR. HOGAN:

That's very kind; thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

I'm sure that all my colleagues on

the Committee feel the same way about it.
MR. HOGAN:

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

The history of the Accounting

Principles Board, as I read it as a lawyer, has been one of
a serious and strong effort to arrive at a system of basic

principles.

Back in the days when Weldon Powell was chairman,

proposed principles were carefully put together by highly
competent men, but these simply did not satisfy the members

of the Board at that time.
The effort was continued over a period of several
years with still no results.

At that point it became obvious

that there were a number of very serious matters with which
the Board had to deal.

The Board simply had to tackle some

of those areas where alternatives existed, and proceeded to
do so starting in about 1962 and continuing to the present.
I am a little bit concerned about how the structure
you suggested would operate.

It would seem, if first things

come first, that you would have to put together the Board of

Trustees; and they would then have to select the Commissioners.
The Commissioners then would have to develop a structure of

basic principles; a job which the most distinguished professors
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and others have attempted unsuccessfully over a period of

Only then could the Committee commence to do its

years.

work.

If it started to do its work before that, there

would be no principles on which to found its work.
I am concerned that this effort to narrow the
alternatives, which everyone tells us must go forward,

would come to a grinding halt while we went through what
might be a substantial period of time in order to have

these Commissioners do this task which so far has eluded
the best minds of the profession.

How do you regard that

problem?

MR. HOGAN:

I think, Mr. Chairman, two things:

First, during this transitional period from the time the

Foundation came into being and became an active organization,
we would comprehend that the present Accounting Principles

Board, which now has a fairly lengthy agenda, would
continue to function.

As the Foundation came into being,

with its Trustees and with its Commission, the Accounting

Principles Board would phase out of the principle-making

function and phase into the application of those principles

to specific circumstances.

You would have a normal

transitional period.
How long the transitional period takes depends
upon how quickly the Trustees are appointed, how quickly

they form the Commission, and the learning period of the
Commission.
I think that the Commission itself would not have

a great learning period.

We would expect that the Trustees
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in their wisdom would pick the seven best accounting minds in
the country, and put them in a locked room, somewhere. (Laughter)
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Mr. Hogan, you will recall the

testimony of Mr. Kapnick of Arthur Andersen, whose experience
led him to conclude that basic principles are so interwoven

with the matter of application, that it would be exceptionally

difficult to divorce them and put into one body the task of
formulating the basic principles and into a separate body the
task of developing the standards of application.

He said it

would be desirable, organizationally, for the same body to have

both responsibilities.
Are you of the view that these must be separate

organizations?

MR. HOGAN:
they should be.

I think in the natural course of events

An accounting principle is an overall, guiding

rule which governs a whole series of transactions.

They can

be set by a group which has considered what the principle
ought to be.
When you come down to applying that general principle

to a certain kind of a transaction, a certain kind of industry,

or to a certain set of circumstances, that could be done by a
separate group.
The Commission would deal with the theories of

accounting and disclosure; but they wouldn’t be incommunicado.
If you don’t mind my mixing a metaphor, they wouldn't be
contemplating their navel in some ivory tower (Laughter), but

they would at least be considering the theory of accounting
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and the theory of disclosure.

They would then turn to people who are in the
business every day and say, "Now under this kind of a
principle, how would this be handled in this particular

circumstance."

You would have an exchange of information

between the Commission and the Committee.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

I recall that Mr. Trueblood, who

is now working in this area, pointed to Opinion No. 18 as
an example of a principle that could be stated in perhaps

a paragraph or two.

He said the rest of that opinion is

application.

Judging by the experience which we have listened
to over the period of our deliberations, a great deal of

time and effort has been spent on the problem of the
application of accounting principles.
I am, therefore, a little bit puzzled by the fact
that you would have these Commissioners, whose job it is to
develop broad principles, on a full-time, paid basis.

Their

salaries would be commensurate with what they world receive

on the outside, perhaps $100,000 a year.
MR. HOGAN:

That was the number I had in mind as

being a fair target.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

(Continuing)--However, the

application function, which, if I judge correctly, has
consumed by all odds the greater amount of the Board's

time, you put in the hands of part-time volunteers.
Don't we have the cart before the horse if the
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time-consuming job is making sure that opinions will work in

practice.

To make sure that it’s effective, shouldn't that

task, if anything, be in the hands of the people who are

full-time, and the matter of the two paragraphs of principles
be in the hands of a part-time group?

What’s your comment on that?
MR. HOGAN:

My reaction, Mr. Chairman is twofold.

I

think the deliberations of the Accounting Principles Board have

been time-consuming because they’ve been getting involved with
both principles and applications.

If you can separate them,

you can say in effect, "First we’ll establish general accounting
principles within the Commission.

Then you fellows in the

Committee, using that ground rule decide how to apply it."

Secondly, I think I want principles to be set outside
the battlefield.

When you start to apply those principles, I

want it done by people who are engaged, day-by-day, in preparing

financial statements, in reading them, and in certifying to
their fairness.
I don’t want someone in an ivory tower deciding

how something should be done.

I want that to be done by

someone who’s on the battlefield every day.

I can liken it to the Ten Commandments.

The Ten

Commandments don't take up very much space, but the explanation

of those Ten Commandments have taken a great number of books.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

On the other hand, I would comment

that the question of the application of the Ten Commandments is
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rather important, also.

It’s pretty easy to lay down a

commandment; the application takes a lot of effort.

MR. HOGAN:

Oh, yes! . It would take a lot of

effort and time--

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

In the accounting field, is it

possible for some group to lay down this commandment, this
great principle, without having to intimately concern itself

with whether or not it can be applied effectively?

MR. HOGAN:

I think that the Commission, having

arrived at a conclusion with respect to a principle, would
then expose that proposed principle to the financial community

through public hearings, such as this.
Before arriving at that conclusion, they might
very well have talked to members of the Committee who would

be on the day-by-day firing line.

As to the application of

the principle, I think that the Committee could apply that
general principle to particular circumstances by enlisting

the aid of experts in that particular area.
You would decide on some general principle for

handling pension accounting.

The Committee would then

enlist people who knew how to handle pension accounting

and get their views on how it should be disclosed in a
financial statement and how it should be reported in the

financial statement in accordance with general principles.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

If the Commission in charge of

setting basic principles is going to hold hearings and
have complete input, the input it gets will focus on whether
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the principles are workable.

How can that Commission divorce

itself from practicability?
MR. HOGAN:

I would have enough confidence in the

Commission to say that they could sort out real problems from
the individual likes and dislikes.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

One last question:

You have

indicated the importance of research and the significance of
getting the best possible research.

You indicated, as I recall,

that a research director would report to the Commission.
A number of witnesses today have told us that empirical
research is the most important form of research.

goes to the question of application.

To me, this

Where is the Committee on

application going to get its research?
MR. HOGAN:

From the same group.

All I'm suggesting

is that the director of the research arm report to the
Commission.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Suppose the Committee on application

wants to have research done and the research director says,

"Sorry,
I don't take directions from you; you're going to
have, to go through several other people to try to get some
time."

MR. HOGAN:

If that unlikely event happened, the

Trustees of the Foundation would have some influence over the

decision.

MR. OLSON:
up a little earlier.

I'd like to pursue the question that came

Would you like to hazard a guess as to

how many principles we might wind up with some day?
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MR. HOGAN:
a guess, Mr. Olson.

I don't know that I’d want to hazard
I think there would be more than Ten

Commandments, though. (Laughter)
MR. OLSON:

Not as high as a hundred, though?

MR. HOGAN:

It could presumably run up as high

as a hundred.
MR. OLSON:

The reason I raise the point is that,

as Chairman Wheat said, this probably would not be a time
consuming task.

I gather that what you have in mind is

that the Commission would spend a good deal of its time

hearing appeals.

Is that correct?

MR. HOGAN:

I think the Commission might very

well spend a great deal of its time on appeals, in two
senses of that word.

interpretations.

Maybe appeal is the wrong word-

The Committee will, from time to time,

be issuing interpretations as to these general principles.

MR. OLSON:

The Commission?

MR. HOGAN:

The Committee.

The Committee will

be issuing interpretations of the principles enunciated by
the Commission.

I can visualize a set of circumstances

arising in which the interpretation put cut by the Committee

doesn't quite fit the new circumstance and the Commission
will ask the Committee to review the interpretation; also,

principles enunciated four or five years earlier may no

longer be appropriate, in which case the Commission will
have to issue a new principle.

MR. OLSON:

Do I assume correctly that the

Commission would also hear appeals or inquiries from anyone
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in the financial community, or would it be particularly from
the Committee?

MR. HOGAN:

No, I think the appeal would go to the

Commission directly from the responsible member of the financial
What they did with it would depend upon the nature

community.

of the appeal.

Whether they referred it directly to the

Committee or heard it themselves, would depend on the nature of
the problem; how widespread it was; what kind of appeal it was.

MR. OLSON:

In a sense, this Commission is sort of

an appeal body, with very strong emphasis on acting as an

appeal body.

Is that a correct assumption?

MR. HOGAN:

they have.

It would be one of the two functions

The establishment of accounting principles would

be their primary function.

Their secondary function would

be to make sure that these principles, in application, pass
what I call the smell test; that they fit in the financial

community. (Laughter)
MR. OLSON:

Except that the establishing of the

principles would not be a tremendously time-consuming task.
Or do you think it would be?
MR. HOGAN:

I think it would, Mr. Olson.

For example,

the question of income in a franchising operation, and how that

relates to the general principle of income recognition, would

be a time-consuming thing.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

rather than a principle?

But isn’t that application
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MR. HOGAN:

I think it would be an application.

But I can visualize a circumstance in which the Committee,

having decided on how it wanted to handle income in the
franchising fields could not issue the interpretation until

it had been approved by the Commission.

So the Commission

would have to determine that the Committee’s interpretation
met the general rule of income recognition arrived at by
the Commission.

MR. PRYOR:

These two bodies, to a degree,

would have to be working in parallel.
per share as an example.

Let’s take earnings

I don’t know how much principle

there is in that opinion but there’s a lot of application.

Wouldn’t this almost have to go hand-in-hand with the

Commission's work?
MR. HOGAN:

I don't know how much principle is

involved either, Mr. Pryor, but I think you're right.

I

believe that the Committee and the Commission would work

not only in close cooperation, but that the views of one

group would be communicated to and cleared by the other group.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

You don't seem to want to

describe the Committee as, in fact, a committee of the
Commission.

MR. HOGAN:
reasons.

No, I think not, for two separate

What we're trying to do fundamentally, by the

creation of this Foundation, is to give preparers of
financial statements, users of them, the academic world and

practicing accountants an active voice in the establishment of

principles.
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That's why we have recommended the Foundation with

its Board of Trustees.
We then recommend that we turn over to the Commission,

a group of seven independent people removed from the business

community, the job of enunciating principles.

But the

establishment of the application of those principles in particular

circumstances ought to be in the hands of a separate,
representative group, answerable to the Commission, but

independent of it.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

In your oral statement you

said somewhat more than you said in your written statement

about the connection between the Foundation and the AICPA.
I didn't find anything in the written statement which

described what support the foundation had.

When you were speaking, I

thought I heard you say it would have some distinct relation to
the Institute.
MR. HOGAN:

Our notion was that to the extent that

the contributions to the Foundation were not forthcoming from
the public accounting sector and from the business community

at large, the American Institute would underwrite any deficit.
They’d insure that the money was there every year.

The

Institute would have the power of appointing the first group
to the Foundation, presumably by the President with the advice

and consent of the Board of Directors.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

So that the Foundation would

be self-perpetuating.

MR. HOGAN:

They would elect their own successors,

again to provide the apparent independence that we think may
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be essential to the business community.
And also, frankly, to give the business community

a very active voice in the establishment of both the ground
rules under which statements are prepared and the disclosures
which are required.
What else would the Trustees do--

MR. PRYOR:

appoint the Commission?
Make sure they behave themselves and

MR. HOGAN:

work; that they are responsive to the needs of the community.
MR. BIEGLER:

clear in my mind.

Mr. Hogan, I'd like to get one point

The Committee which would deal with

applications and procedures, would, in effect, be subservient
to the Commission.

Does this suggest that the Commission would

have to approve or would have to have the right to veto the
Committee’s pronouncements?

MR. HOGAN:

Yes, very clearly;the theory being

the Committee's interpretation of a principle would have

to be consistent with the principle.

Otherwise you would

have two separate sets of ground rules.

MR. BIEGLER:

Do you see any difficulties in

attracting and holding the kind, of men you want on the
Committee if, in effect, their decisions and conclusions are
not final?

This would effectively make the Committee an

unpaid, part-time staff of the Commission.

Do you see any

problem there?

MR. HOGAN:

No, I think you’re downgrading them

far too much, perhaps for purposes of illustration.

If

the Trustees of the Foundation pick seven men or Commissioners
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who are highly regarded and well respected by the community,

I don’t see any problem in having a Committee, in your words,
subservient to that Commission, interpreting on a day-by-day

basis the pronouncements of that Commission.
MR. LEVINE:

Mr. Hogan, do you envision any possibility

that there might be an impasse between the Committee and the
Commission at some time?

Suppose, for example, the Committee

concludes that there’s Just no logical way to apply a certain
principle and throws up its hands in disgust.

What will happen

then?

MR. HOGAN:

I think the likelihood of that happening

is remote, because you would have on both the Commission and
the Committee men of intelligence and goodwill.

I can’t

believe that the Commission could enunciate a principle so
improper that the Committee would refuse to interpret it.

Conversely, I can't believe that the Committee would refuse

to interpret a well-conceived principle.

MR. LEVINE:

Yet the very fact that the Commission

has to approve the interpretation could conceivably lead to

a difference of viewpoints.

Although subservient in that

respect, the Committee is not subservient in its formation.
It seems to me that there could be an impasse.
MR. HOGAN:

If an impasse developed--and I have

difficulty, I must confess, believing that it could occur--I
think there would be two courses of conduct available.

would be to refer the problem to the Trustees.

One

The Trustees
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of the Foundation, in my definition, are leaders of the
business community, responsible people who would have a

considerable amount of influence over the views of the
Commission.

By the same token, if that didn’t work, you always
have the one safety valve that exists today; somewhere along
the line the problem will wind up on the desk of the SEC.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Does anyone in the audience

have a question for Mr. Hogan?

(There were none.)

Thank you again, Mr. Hogan.

We greatly

appreciate the generosity of your comments.

I think we ought to take a five-minute stretch.

(A brief recess was taken.)
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

The next witness is J. 0. Edwards,

of the Financial Executives Institute.

MR. J. 0. EDWARDS:

Mr. Edwards.

I'm not sure I like that word

"witness"!

Needless to say we are quite pleased to be here,
and want to thank you for the opportunity to represent the

Financial Executives Institute in these deliberations of

your Committee on the establishment of accounting principles.
I have been told to assume that you have had an

opportunity to read the FEI statement.

Therefore, my formal

remarks will be limited to a summation of the key points in
the statement.

But there's another important reason, I think, for

not straying too far from the text, and that is that our

policy statement necessarily represents a mix of viewpoints
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of business executives.

I would like to make certain that

what comes through to you today is a balanced representation
of the views of our membership.
While we in business might each have some different

views about what we’d like to see come out of your study, I
believe it is safe to say that we are in total agreement on
two points; firsts that the matters you are attempting to

grapple with are extremely complex, and of enormous importance

to both business and the accounting profession.

They are

deserving of all of the constructive assistance that we and
others can provide.

Second, we’re hopeful that your deliberations will
clarify any ambiguity that may have existed in the past about
the role that each of the parties of interest should play in
the accounting principles mechanism, so that we can get on with

whatever we have to do to assure an even higher quality, more
objectivity, and more credible financial reporting.
If you’ve had an opportunity to read the summary
of supplemental comments relating to the FEI statement,
you

have about as good a flavor of the positions of individual FEI
members towards the subject of your study as I could hope to
give you.

If you haven’t read these, perhaps you’ll find a
chance to do so.
As I mentioned, I will attempt to capsule the FEI

position and will answer any questions you may wish to ask.
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Firsts FEI believes that management has a respon

sibility for all forms of public reporting of financial
information.

This responsibility runs not only to the accuracy

of the material, but also to the underlying principles,
conventions or standards of reporting.

Second, this responsibility cannot be escaped.
It requires an active participation by business in the

formulation of these underlying rules.

As we see it, the

responsibility of business and the public accounting

profession are co-equal, as each must have an abiding

conviction of the fairness of the financial presentation.
And this conviction must be held when a management

reports the results of its company's operations to the
owners.

Both the reporting management and the certifying

accountant must have this conviction.

It extends to the whole framework of corporate
reporting in industry.

Here again management and the public

accounting profession, we think, must have equal conviction
in the soundness of the principles.

Third, this joint responsibility can more
effectively be discharged in the private sector through a

voluntary mechanism than it can by pleadings and hearing

before a Government agency.
Fourth, this voluntary mechanism, or if you

wish board, body, council, commission or whatever, should

have equal representation from the two groups having primary
responsibility for financial presentations:
the public accounting profession.

business and
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Fifths other interested groups,
such as the academic
community,
analysts and other users, should be represented but
should not, in the aggregate, have a dominant role, since theirs

is a position of advocacy rather than one of responsibility.

They can bring much needed and valuable viewpoints to the
process.

Sixths the members of the body--or at least most of

them--should be part-time in order to assure participation by
outstanding leaders of all representative groups.

They should

not be detached from the arena in which day-to-day accounting

problems arise, and in which solutions must be implemented on
a practical basis.
Proper utilization of support services such as

research and full-time staff, as has been suggested here
repeatedly today, can obviate the need for full-time participation.

Seventh, a satisfactory system of financing this body
can be worked out with business bearing its fair share of the

load.

I don’t believe I can top at this point Tom’s commitment,

but I think that we in FEI believe that business can fulfill its

obligation.
Eighth, early involvement of all who can contribute

to problem-solving should be the modus operandi.

Potential

problems should be identified early, and solutions developed
before the problems get out-of-hand.

Ninth, there should be an appeals procedure, with
interpretive pronouncements for unusual situations or

circumstances.

We're not talking about a court or a senate.
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Finally, the cornerstone of all actions and all
pronouncements should be research, both empirical and

conceptual, with case study evaluation of the alternative

effects of various actions under consideration.
Full utilization should be made of research

agencies of the various associations that are active in
the field.

The body should take the lead role in

coordinating and planning the research activities of these

agencies so as to assure maximum utilization of existing
resources.

If your Study Group recommends some of the
changes that we have suggested, and hopefully should the
AICPA in turn embrace those recommendations, we are

confident that this would do much to improve support for the
ongoing development of accounting concepts, improve their
acceptability, and yes, if you will, even improve their

quality.
That’s all I propose to say.

I would be pleased

to answer any questions.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Thank you very much, Mr. Edwards.

I suppose the question that has been raised today

most frequently, and on which there seems to be substantial
disagreement, is whether this body in the private sector

should be under the auspices of the AICPA, as has been
recommended strongly by several of the witnesses, or whether

it should be placed under the auspices of several groups.
The principal comment along that line in the

Arthur Andersen paper has already been quoted; "...a group
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so constituted would not be responsible to any organization or

entity and we believe that an approach of that type would not
be effective.”

I wonder if you could expand a little bit on the
reasons you would advance as to how one could avoid the kinds
of problems and difficulties that occur when you have divided

responsibility, divided auspices,
rather than a single line of

responsibility.
MR, EDWARDS:

That question was not unexpected.

In our text we deliberately avoided being too specific
on this point because it was the one matter on which it was

most difficult to arrive at an FEI consensus.

There was almost

an even split on the question, with perhaps a slight majority

believing that it can and should be under the auspices of AICPA,
Something less than a majority, say forty-five per

cent, feel it just isn't practical to expect the broadening
and other steps necessary for improvement to be undertaken by

AICPA.
There is a consistent thread running through the

minority position, I think, that says that should AICPA

decide to do these things that we think necessary to arrive

at a better consensus, to get a broader representation, then
the minority would be content to see it remain under the AICPA.

If AICPA doesn’t buy the changes, members of FEI feel

that there should be this superbody or volunteer consortium.
We recognize the tough questions you raised about authority,

financing, turnover, recycling of appointments and the like.
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But, we think there are enough precedents in the public
sector for such a voluntary consortium.

It would have its

backup through the overview of the Securities and Exchange

Commission, just as the AICPA does today.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

As you know, there is another

rather significant issue which has been raised today:
the basic question of whether or not this body should be

representational.

Some take the same position you do--

that the body should be representational.

Others have an

equally strong view that it should not be representational;
that it should be composed of the very best qualified men

clearly not representing any particular viewpoint.

It should

be independent and experienced in as broad an area as

possible.

Several people this morning, particularly

expressed that view.
Among the documents we have in our records is a

speech by Mr. Leonard Spacek who was then, I think, managing

partner of Arthur Andersen.

He spoke before The Conference

Board on the outlook for agreement on accounting principles.

This speech raises a question which I'd like to ask you.
Mr. Spacek talked about this representation issue.
He says, "If representation were really essential, the
profession would be confronted with the requirement for

representation from labor, from investors, from investment

analysts, from regulatory commissions, and from other
interests that are vitally affected by accounting practices.
...If all segments of the public claimed representation or
courts because they were affected by the decisions handed
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down, a good share of each segment would be required to man the
courts.

But laws which are the criteria of decision making

make such representation unnecessary.

Proper criteria for the

Accounting Principles Board would have the same result.

The

acceptance on the Board of members who have vested interests

in every decision may well detract from its objectivity."
There are really two aspects to the question that I

would pose to you.

First, if the Board is to be representational,

where do you stop?

How do you assure yourself that you have

responded to all of the demands of various interests that might

If you did, you would have something

want to be represented?

so unwieldy from the standpoint of diverse interests, that it
wouldn't really function.

The other aspect is that many people have a strong
feeling that independence and objectivity are the criteria
upon which members should be selected.

You have a problem with

that if you select people who have vested interests in a
particular viewpoint or a particular business.
How do you solve that problem?
MR. EDWARDS:

To take up the question of total,

across-the-board, representation, I think what you're asking

is where to stop.
We are saying that there is a priority order of

interest among those who have responsibility for reporting on
the performance of the business.
I think both management and the certifying CPA have
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that responsibility,
and I think it's about equal.

I

think it's shared in such a way that neither can say

it's the responsibility of the other.
I don't think users have the same kind of
responsibility.

They have an interest, and a right to

know.

It's a matter of judgment as to where you draw
the line.

We would feel that the responsibility of those

who have a right to know and have an interest in these--

I think the term we tend to use is conventions--is quite

different from the responsibility that management and the

certifying accountant have.

I don't have a pat answer as to how many of
these advocacy or user groups are needed to get a fair

cross-section,
but I don't think it should predominate.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

How do you respond to the

problem of objectivity?

MR. EDWARDS:

Is that the same as independence?

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:
MR. EDWARDS:
over today, I guess.

Yes.

That's been given a fairly good going

I was impressed with the comment that

independence was a state of mind.

Independence depends on

the integrity^ ability, strength, and ethics of the

individual involved.

That doesn’t say, on the other hand,

that appearance of independence and appearance of objectivity

are not important.

I think they are.

The question of objectivity of industry representation
tends to be one of degree--the same as the objectivity of the
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practicing CPA.

We don't believe there's any real conflict

of interest when men of background and experience in business
contribute to the resolution of controversial accounting
questions.

There may be on specific issues; or in specific

companies.

If there are, I don't know why the particular

individual couldn't abstain from participating.

Perhaps during the deliberations of this body, there

will be a problem with a conflict of interest.

If that was to

prevent the group from having the knowledge and the in-depth
understanding of business inputs through this process, I think

it would be too bad.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Let me add one other question.

I think it's fair to say that we're all immensely
concerned with the matter of appropriate, substantial input

from business interests.

It's absolutely crucial to the

workability of whatever is done.

And, of course, the responsibility

which you have alluded to, is critical.

It has been suggested today that it would be desirable

to have people from business and other disciplines serve on
subcommittees of the APB rather than limiting them to members of
the Board or CPAs in private practice.

With one or two exceptions,

this has been the case.
The ultimate question of objectivity might be solved

by having an Accounting Principles Board comprised solely of
independent CPAs.

They, under the Securities Laws, have the

special function of checking financial statements to determine
that the public interest is being served.
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That suggestion has been made, and I wonder

how you react to that?

MR. EDWARDS:

As to part of the suggestion, I

think that FEI would react quite positively.

If

subcommittees are developing or identifying a particular

problem and trying to do something about it,
anyone who

can say something about the problem should be involved.

This would include business or other groups.

We

think that if this is done at an early stage, more practical
solutions will emerge.

But we would not consider this a substitute for
participation at the policy level.

This goes back to

something that has come up several times today--the role
FEI thinks business should have.
FEI really thinks that the role should be more

paramount in this matter of concepts and objectives, than in
the area of applications.
A question was posed to Mr. Trueblood about how
long opinions should be.

He said the one on equity accounting

might have been done in one paragraph.

I think this is a very interesting idea--the use

of concepts, principles, standards.

I believe we would

like to see, ultimately, a distinction between broad

principles and detailed interpretations.
I think that's a good idea, and is probably the

direction in which we need to move.

The whole question of

research bears quite clearly on this matter, because the

quality of the research will, to a large measure, determine
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how well the principles can be applied in actual practice.

In effect, research would come up to the principle

setting level; principles would go out for application; and
then there would be feedback.

We think this idea is probably

good, but will have to be done a few times before we really

know the difference between principles and applications.
I want to reiterate that the main interest of FEI
would be in concepts--fair value versus historical cost, for

example.

I think this is where we feel there needs to be more

involvement on the part of business members.
MR. PRYOR:
to ask at this point.

I have two or three questions I'd like
Who would appoint the non-AICPA members

of this board?
MR. EDWARDS:

AICPA would make the appointments.

But we would think that they would be greatly influenced and

would want to look to groups such as FEI, NAA and AAA for the

candidates to represent business and the academic community.

In order to make that system work, the appointing
level in the AICPA, whether it be the President or the Council,

would have to be responsive to whomever the other associations

thought were logical candidates for these posts.

MR. PRYOR:

Who would designate the chairman, and

might the chairman be a full-time individual?

MR. EDWARDS:

Frankly, we didn't poll this question.

think, however, that the chairman--and I think our members
would agree--could be a full-time individual.

And if AICPA

I
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designates the members, it would be logical for them

also to designate the chairman.

MR. PRYOR:

One other thing:

Maybe I missed this

in reading your paper, but I don't recall whether you
indicated a majority vote or a two-thirds vote.

MR. EDWARDS:

We didn't cover that.

In some

earlier committee discussion, it was our feeling that a
two-thirds majority, or a two-thirds vote should be required.

MR. PRYOR:

In effect that would give the issuer

group forty per cent of the total.

They would have a veto

power over the decisions of the body.
I guess that's right.

MR. EDWARDS:
MR. PRYOR:

Then my last question is--

MR. EDWARDS:
MR. PRYOR:

So would the certifying group.

Do you feel that opinions of such a

board would carry more or less confidence with the users

of financial statements?

MR. EDWARDS:

I think that in time they would

carry more confidence, more acceptance with the users, assuming

that we make this idea of objectivity and independence work.
We think it can work.

Users would know that the ingredient

of practical constraints was in the decision-making process.
You'd be in a better position to form your own

judgment about that.
MR. BIEGLER:
question:

Mr. Edwards, I'd like to raise a

When Mr. Kapnick was speaking to us he said that

the accounting profession was responsible for determination

of sound accounting.

The suggestion was that this
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responsibility was the private preserve of the accounting
profession.

According to your proposal, as I see it, you’re

raising a very fundamental issue in suggesting equal
representation from the accounting profession and industry.
This contradicts Mr. Kapnick's concept of a private preserve.

There is another consideration.

Since the APB has

the right to establish accounting principles because the SEC
has given it that right, I wonder if the SEC would have

difficulty in giving a similar right to a body which had a

different composition:

in other words, one with equal representa

tion from both the public accounting profession and industry.
Obviously, neither you nor I can answer that, but it might be
interesting to speculate about it.

MR. OLSON:

Mine is along the same line.

I don't

wish to be argumentative about it, but fundamental to the
whole concept of an attest function, is the assumption that

those who are being reported on could not expect to be

objective about themselves.

If that’s a proper line of reasoning,

it would be somewhat difficult to conclude that those who were

being reported on were being objective in the setting of the
standards with which they had to comply.
You indicated earlier that participation in a more

formalized advisory capacity--and I'm thinking here of an
advisory council to the Accounting Principles Board--would not

be as acceptable to the FEI, as participating in the final

144

decision-making.
I recognize that that might not be quite as
acceptable.

But how serious a problem would it be if there

was more formal machinery whereby the various groups did
participate in an advisory capacity?

MR. EDWARDS:

You have asked two questions.

On the question of objectivity, I don't think
this comes up when you’re sitting on a panel trying to set

principles on which to report.

It occurs when you apply

those principles to a particular company's operations.

As I said, there are certain concepts or principles

that would be so overwhelming in their impact on a
particular company, that the question of objectivity could be

real.
Here again we're talking about independence,
and
there are differences in degree.

Independence and the

appearance of independence are quite important; but there
are other considerations.

We must make certain that we have

a viable, workable system of reporting for industry.

Independence is one of the ingredients and an
important one, but there are other things against which we

must balance it.
Your second question is a little different than the

point we talked about earlier.

I really haven't given the

advisory council idea that much thought.

I think some of the

points covered by Tom Hogan in his remarks border on that

kind of an arrangement.

of working that out.

There might very well be some way

If however, this group was simply

145

acting in an advisory role on such important questions as fair
value versus historical cost accounting, I don’t believe it

would be acceptable to FEI.
They're just too important.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Your suggestion, which is very

interestingraises a question in my mind.

Let’s say for

example, Mr. Edwards, that a certified public accountant and
his client are involved in some substantial accounting disputes.
The company believes that it should have several million dollars
classified as deferred costs, and the accountant thinks other

wise.

Further, the company has engaged in a lot of thirdparty leasing; it thinks that it's perfectly legitimate to
proceed with those transactions and classify them as sales.

The accounting firm is concerned and does not believe they
should be classified as sales.

The company also has a pension plan which it would

like to see as flexible as possible, so they can make sure
that it doesn't have too much of an impact on income in a

bad year.

It has convertibles outstanding and doesn't like

to show diluted earnings per share.

These are theoretical

problems.

I am a little troubled as to the objectivity of the
financial vice president of that firm, were he to be on the
Accounting Principles Board, on any matters of significance in
areas of accounting principles.

Wouldn't he have a conflict
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of the type that you mentioned?
MR. EDWARDS:

I must say.

That’s a most unusual company,

(Laughter)

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

It’s very likely that a number

of the people in this room have companies with similar

problems.
MR. EDWARDS:

I didn’t mean to say that companies

don’t have the problems you've mentioned.

But I don’t

believe you’re going to find many companies with all of

those problems.

If you did, and if the FEI or the NAA

were to recommend a representative from that company, I
think this might be one case in which AICPA would say,
"We don’t buy that one."

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Are there any questions from the

audience?
MR. EDWARDS:

I have one other point to make, if

I may, before we close.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:
MR. EDWARDS:

Please do.

I think we would like to see your

committee--whatever comes out of it--push business to do
whatever you see business’ role to be.

I would urge your committee to define business'
role.

If you don’t agree that they should have an equal

role in setting the ground rules, then let us know why.
And also, let us know what you think we should do to

contribute and be constructive in this field.

If you think

it’s a matter of independence, we would hope you say so.
If you think it’s a question of not having the
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contacts or the ability to deal with problems, I think you
should tell us so we can understand our role.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

It is in the constructive spirit

of those comments that we will be guided.
MR. EDWARDS:

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

I might add that one of the main

roles played by FEI was to publish one of the most constructive

and prestigeous research studies done in the field of accounting
in the past decade.

The subject was segment reporting.

The FEI

bears full responsibility for the study and has the full credit.

The next speaker is Professor Robert Dickey of the
University of Illinois.

We thank him for coming all this way.

PROFESSOR ROBERT DICKEY:

Thank you for this

opportunity to speak.
I do not represent any organization.

I believe,

however, that some of the changes I propose are desired by
a large number of accountants.

As a matter of fact, several

of the preceding speakers have already advocated some of the
same things that I am going to advocate.

However, there is no sign that the American Institute
of CPAs is going to change its long-established policies; and

further, I have some different supporting arguments for some

of these same recommendations.

This presentation is directed to two
pertinent questions of the five listed by this Study Group.

One, should the primary responsibility for establishing

accounting standards reside in a governmental or a nongovernmental
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body?

And two, what should be the makeup of a nongovernmental

standards board?

I believe that the wise policy followed by the
Securities Exchange Commission of allowing a nongovernmental

Accounting Principles Board to issue opinions should be
In spite of some shortcomings, this arrangement

continued.

seems to be much better in the eyes of many accountants
and businessmen than the detailed regulation of accounting
which governmental agencies tend to follow, as in the

railroad and public utility field.
Further, I believe that this nongovernmental

Accounting Principles Board should not be completely under
the control of one organization,
which is the situation we

have today.

The present APB operates more or less as a

committee of the American Institute.

The report of the American Accounting Association's
Committee on Establishment of an Accounting Commission,
published in the July 1971 issue of the Accounting Review,

described the possibility of a governmental agency,
such
as the SEC, taking over the job of the APB as, "...a move
which most people, including the SEC itself, seem to want

to avoid."
It should be recognized that if a governmental

agency were to take over the work of the APB, it would face

most of the difficulties of the present APB.

It is some

times said that members of the Institute's Accounting
Principles Board have been handicapped in agreeing on
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standards by pressure from important clients, and that a
governmental bureau would not have this pressure.

Although a governmental agency might not have these

particular pressures, many persons feel that it might be subject

to even greater pressures that would not be in the public interest.
Consideration should also be given to the

generalization that it is easier to give a specific power to a
governmental agency than it is to take away such power once it
has been exercised.

I propose that the control and support of the Accounting
Principles Board should be shared by the American Institute of

CPAs and three other long-established national accounting
the American Accounting Association, the Financial

societies:

Executives Institute, and the National Association of Accountants.

Each of these suggested organizations has conducted
programs of research in important areas of accounting for many
years.

I believe that this proposal would have the following

advantages:
First, the rules of the present Accounting Principles

Board require that each member be a member of the American

Institute of CPAs, and this means that he must be a certified
public accountant.

Although there is much to be said for the

CPA examination as a test of accounting knowledge, I think it

is unfortunate that every member of the Board must be a CPA.
There is a strong feeling on the part of many, not
often publicly stated, against the doctrine that only CPAs are

150

well-qualified to legislate on accounting matters.
The requirements for the CPA certificate have

varied widely, over the years, among the fifty-four

jurisdictions in the United States.

Even today, in spite

of the general movement among the States for many years

past to raise the educational requirements and to reduce
the experience requirements, there is still a substantial

variation among the States on each of these.
For many years more than ninety per cent of all
the candidates throughout the country taking the CPA

examination have had some kind of college degree, a number

of them having a master’s degree.

Nevertheless, in the

year 1971, according to the record, there are still fourteen
States where the educational requirement for a CPA is no

higher than a high school diploma.
I wish to mention that I have been a certified

public accountant since 1942, and a rather active member
of the American Institute of CPAs since 1948.
of these affiliations.

I am proud

Nothing that I am saying here today

is intended to be derogatory of the certified public

accountant or of the American Institute.

The point is simply that the possession of a CPA

certificate does not imply as uniform a background as
might superficially appear.
There presumably are a number of financial vice

presidents and controllers of large and intermediate size
corporations, with experience over a wide range of accountin
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and related business activities, who were barred by law from
taking the CPA examination years ago because their State
required one or two years of public accounting experience,

with no substitute experience accepted.
Attention is called to the fact that a recent study
showed that a little less than one-third of the chief financial

officers of the largest corporations in the country possess a
CPA certificate.
Notice the very strange contrast that we have

here.

Approximately two-thirds of the more than 400 chief financial

officers of our largest corporations,men who presumably have
demonstrated on-the-job, actual performance

are ineligible

to serve on the Accounting Principles Board.
On the other hand, every last one of the 80,000
members of the American Institute of CPAs technically is
eligible for service on the Board.

This type of policy is not designed to win friends

and influence people for the Accounting Principles Board.

Another point is closely related to the one I've
just made.

I believe there should be an increase in the

number of accountants from industry serving on this Board.

Even when the Accounting Principles Board had twenty-one members
instead of the eighteen today, the number of accountants in industry
did not exceed three.

At present, with eighteen members, only

one of them is from industry.

There are two professors of accounting; one professional
security analyst, and the other fourteen members are in public
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accounting practice.

As usuals the big eight public

accounting firms have one member each, with six from other

firms.

It has been said repeatedly that a company's
published financial statements are representations of
the company's management, rather than the independentpublic accountant,

This being the case, it would seem

logical that the accountants who are closest to the management,
and in many cases are themselves part of the management of

business enterprises, should have a stronger voice in the
establishment of accounting principles than they do at
present.

Mr. Leonard Savoie, Executive Vice President of
the American Institute, has said, and this is a pretty

strong statement, "Corporate financial management contains
a vast pool of knowledge on accounting and financial

reporting matters which must be made available to the Board
if it is to establish principles wisely.

Management must be

involved in determining accounting principles, to provide
assurance to all that the Board is not acting arbitrarily,
without regard to real practical problems."

I feel that the most logical way in which to

accomplish this would be to increase the number of men on
the Board, and appoint to it high-ranking accountants with

a strong background in broad business management experience.

The issuance of an official pronouncement of an

accounting principle by such well-known national organizations
as the American Accounting Association, the Financial

153

Executives Institute, or the National Association of Accountants

presumably would constitute substantial authoritative support
within the meaning of the special Bulletin of the Institute of

October 1964, which was titled "Disclosure of Departures from
Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board."

If such pronouncement was in conflict with some APB
opinion, this would tend to encourage the use of different

accounting procedures in the same circumstances.
It seems fairly likely that the issuance of just a
few such opinions would lower the status and usefulness of the

APB, and tend to push the Securities and Exchange Commission
toward taking over the writing of the rules.

In my written presentation to the Study Group, I
showed that there were some signs that at least two

organizations might, in the future, issue accounting
pronouncements on their own.

If one accounting organization

makes public pronouncements on accounting matters, this may

increase the likelihood that others will follow suit, in part

to give the members of that organization

"a voice that will

be heard," in the words of Julius Underwood, current President

of the National Association of Accountants.
It seems preferable to make an attempt, before it

is too late, to have one Accounting Principles Board, supported

by the four major national accounting organizations which can
speak for the accounting profession as a whole.
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One of the proposals made by Mr. Trueblood in
his speech at the American Accounting Association convention
in 1969 was to increase the amount spent on research for
the Accounting Principles Board to at least $5 million a

year.

This is approximately ten times the amount that
was spent during the past fiscal year ending August 31,
1971, which in turn was substantially above the $142,000

spent in the APB's first year of operation, fiscal 1961.

Officials of the American Institute of CPAs
indicated in 1968 that the expanded research needed in

accounting would soon be too costly for the Institute

itself, even with the help of the Accounting Research
Association.

They thought that it may become necessary

to go to the larger foundations or to the Government for

the vast sums of money that will be needed in the years

ahead.
I believe that the chances of getting substantial
sums from the above sources and from business concerns
would be improved if most of the research in accounting was

centered in one accounting research foundation, sponsored
jointly by the four accounting associations named above.

It would be worthwhile, in this direction, to

examine carefully the organizational operation of the
Accounting Research Foundation established in 1967 jointly

by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia and
the Australian Society of Accountants

and also the Canadian
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Tax Foundation, now in its twenty-sixth year of operations.
The Canadian Tax Foundation is sponsored jointly

by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants and
the Canadian Bar Association, but it is not supported financially

by these organizations as such.

Its revenue currently comes

from about 4,700 individual members--accountants, lawyers,

professors, businessmen--and some 400 companies holding

corporate memberships.
It should also be noted that the Accounting Standards

Steering Committee, mentioned early today, established in 1970
by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales,
in association with the Scottish and Irish Institutes, has now

in this year, 1971, issued the first in its series of
statements of standard accounting practice.

These will be

similar to the opinions of our American Institute.
Now for some possible disadvantages of these multi

association boards.

It is said that when Mike DeSalle was

Governor of Ohio some years ago, he had a little sign on his
desk which read, "I do not know the secret of success but I

can tell you the formula for failure--try to please everybody.”

I believe that no principles board, no matter how

appointed nor how constituted, is going to please everybody.
We might take a more modest and more realistic goal such as
that expressed by Justice Benjamin Cardoza in a complicated

tax case years ago when he said, ”The assessor's task is to
find the least erroneous answer to an unanswerable problem.”
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It is recognized that the establishment of a

multi-association board would not be easy, and it would
take some time to implement.

I believe that there is a

reasonable probability that the unfavorable aspects can

be minimized.
Time permits the mention of only a few of these

problems.

It has been said that war is too important for

the generals; education is too important for the educators;
and in the last few years some critics

have been saying

that accounting is too important to be left to the

accountants.

They have been urging membership on the

Accounting Principles Board for non-accountants, and from

groups that use accounting reports, such as financial
analysts and bankers; this was advocated this morning.
I believe that the representatives of these non

accounting groups should be invited to express their views
on exposure drafts and opinions; they might be asked to

serve if they’re experts in certain fields; they might be
asked to serve on the task forces and subcommittees of the
Accounting Principles Board.

But only persons trained,

experienced and demonstrably competent in accounting itself
should be on the board which actually votes on these

proposed opinions on accounting.
The establishment of this proposed body would not
rule out Mr. Trueblood’s proposed five or seven-man, fulltime and fully compensated board, which also has been
advocated today by several other groups, if I understand

correctly, Arthur Andersen and Haskins & Sells.
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Such a board would simplify the question of just how

many members each association would appoint, as the representa
tives of the four associations could meet and decide on the
hiring of the best accountants available, without consideration

of firm or society affiliation, or other background.

It seems, however, that it would be more in keeping
with the spirit of the coalition organization, which I am
advocating, representing a diversity of accounting backgrounds,

to have a volunteer board no smaller than the size of the

present Accounting Principles Board.
It might well be headed by a full-time, paid chairman,

supported by a strong staff of assistants, larger than at
present.

This would lighten somewhat the burden of the

volunteer members, and thus make membership on the Accounting
Principles Board more attractive to highly competent individuals

who feel they cannot devote an extremely high percentage of
their time to work on the Board.

In closing, let us recognize that the Accounting
Principles Board of the American Institute of CPAs is a very

powerful body in the world of finance.

Its rulings have an

important, though frequently delayed effect on the reported
earnings of corporations, large and small, and eventually on
stock market prices.

In issuing opinions, when all the material has been
studied and all the witnesses from many sources have had their
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day, in other words, when the moment of decision comes,

let’s remember, the voting is done by only eighteen

individuals, each one of whom must be a certified public

accountant; must be a member of the American Institute of
CPAs, and all of whom have been chosen by the group which

controls the electoral machinery of the American Institute

of CPAs.

This is real power, and it’s in the hands of a
very small group of men.

On February 19 of this year at

the Conference Board session on the prospects for agreement-

on accounting principles, Mr. Herbert C. Knortz, Vice

President and Controller of International Telephone and
Telegraph Company, said in a speech that the AICPA was

"...a comparatively small private club."
Now some of us might think this is rather strange

language to use to describe the largest organization of
accountants in the world, with over 80,000 members and a
substantial net growth in membership year after year.
Nevertheless, we should recognize that this is the view

point of some who are outside the American Institute of CPAs.

In essence, I am suggesting that this great power
of the Accounting Principles Board be broadened--that the

power base be broadened somewhat--and thus be less vulnerable
to criticism.

This could be done by including some additional

elements of the accounting profession itself.

It is

believed that this change would also improve the usefulness

of the opinions of the Board.
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Some of these suggested changes could be accomplished
within the framework of the present APB.

The Institute could

drop its requirement that all members of the Accounting

Principles Board be CPAs and members of AICPA.

It could name to the Board certain individuals who
are chosen formally or informally, perhaps, by the other
accounting associations that I have named.

It seems appropriate

to give thought to the warning of Winston Churchill's great

ancestor, the Duke of Marlborough, who said, "Those who resist

improvements because they represent change may later be forced

to accept changes that are not improvements.”
Thank you for the privilege of speaking.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Thank you, Professor Dickey, you've

given us some notable quotations.

There was a Duke of

Cambridge, back in those days, who may have stimulated the
Duke of Marlborough.

The Duke of Cambridge was alleged to have

said, and I quote, "Any change at any time by anyone for any
purpose is to be deplored.”
PROFESSOR DICKEY:

(Laughter)
He was a real progressive, I

gather!
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Does anyone on the panel have

questions for Professor Dickey?

I think the Accounting

Principles Board would be particularly happy with your quotation

from Justice Cardoza.

I think they sometimes feel that way

about their task--the least erroneous answer to an unanswerable
problem.
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CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Are you really sure that’s from

the Duke of Marlborough?

You mean the last one about

PROFESSOR DICKEY:
change?

Yes, I have the recollection that this was

quoted in a book review in The New York Times in January

of 1940.

The reason I remember it is because the book

review was written not by a professor of history or some

other well-known writer, but by a successful president of
a well-known corporation.

He was not very well-known to the

public at the time, but in the next few months he became

very well-known throughout the United States because he

rather unexpectedly won the Republican nomination for
President.

His name was Wendel Wilke.

He wrote the book

review and he quoted the statement from the Duke of

Marlborough with great emphasis.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Anyone from the audience?

PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

The board that Professor

Dickey would name would not consist entirely of CPAs.

Do

you have any idea of the kind of mix that you might have

on it?

In my paper I quoted Messrs.

PROFESSOR DICKEY:

Barbatelli and Keller of NAA.

Mr. Keller gave a slightly

different mix in his testimony today.

I don't think that

the exact numbers are too important.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:
PROFESSOR DICKEY:

bottom.

Where is this?

This is page 21, toward the
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Mr. Barbatelli, at the Federal Government Accountants
Association convention in June 1971, criticized the present
APB as being too heavily weighted with public practitioners.
He suggested that the eighteen-member Board--and I wouldn't

hold out for eighteen members exactly--should be composed of

nine members from public accounting, six from business and three
from the academic world.

You may have noticed that Mr. Wayne

Keller had a slightly different lineup this afternoon.

He said

not more than fifty per cent would be practicing CPAs, not less
than twenty-five per cent from commerce and industry, and the

remainder from academia and finance.

This fifty per cent

outside of the practicing CPAs would not have to have the CPA

certificate.
I wouldn't argue as to the exact number, whether the
total board should be eighteen or twenty, and the exact percentage.

I think the CPAs perhaps should have fifty per cent.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

The points of courses is that

apart from the enforcement of APB Opinions by the SEC,
enforcement depends on machinery within the Institute.

Do you

see any difficulty in enforcing pronouncements made by a body

which had non-CPAs on it?
PROFESSOR DICKEY:

If the ruling body of the American

Institute of CPAs accepts this, presumably their members wills

unless it's a very close fight.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Dickey.

This is a danger.

Thank you very much, Professor
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I think because we’re a bit late we'll move on.
Mr. Ralph Kent of Arthur Young & Company is next.

We are

pleased to have you here.

MR. RALPH KENT:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman,

Members of the Panel.

Arthur Young & Company has submitted a position
paper; I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the
Study Group to briefly summarize our views and to respond

to your queries.
Insofar as the auspices for determining accounting

principles are concerned, we believe that the Institute
should continue to perform the principles-setting function.

We think AICPA is equipped to provide a foundation of
authority; we believe it's equipped to provide a requisite
supply of competence.

That doesn't mean that we necessarily urge the

perpetuation of the status quo, nor do we believe that the
performance cannot be improved.
On the matter of who should serve, we believe the

preponderance of members should be CPAs in public practice.

In saying that, we suggest that the viewpoints of others
can and should be obtained through the process of briefs,

public hearings, inclusion as members of subcommittees
assigned to study special subjects, and in other ways.

Insofar as the term of service is concerned, we find

no fault with the present setup of a maximum of two, threeyear terms, or a seven and one-half-year maximum, whichever
way it’s defined.
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We detect no rationale for a formal appeal procedure.

We think the analogy that should prevail is with the legislative

function and not with the judicial function.

We believe that the SEC does operate as an effective
restraint which may very well serve the purpose of the appeal
function.

We would be concerned if there was an appeal function

undermining the work and authority of the Accounting Principles

Board.
Insofar as operating procedures are concerned, it’s

been said that opinions are too detailed at times, and possibly
they are.

We believe that the APB has the ability to decide

this matter for itself.

It may well be that certain opinions

should be more detailed than others.

Others might be quite

brief.

On the matter of increasing volume of output, obviously
this is a result to be desired.

We think that this can be

accomplished in a number of ways.
One of the steps, obviously--and I'm sure it's
been mentioned by every speaker here today--is that we increase

the number and quality of staff assistants.

I'll comment

separately on research.
We believe the present two-thirds voting requirement
makes good sense and should not be changed to a majority.

We would seriously urge that as much time as possible
be given before opinions must be implemented.

We believe the

Board at the present time unnecessarily irritates the business

164

community by deciding things and making them effective

almost immediately.

We think the world might go on if

some of the implementation dates were delayed somewhat.

On the matter of interpretation, we feel that an
opinion should not be altered by the interpretation process.

We do not believe that it was the intent to issue two
classes of authorized pronouncements, one by the opinion

process and another through interpretations.

We are a

little troubled by recent changes in the wording that goes

with the interpretations.

Insofar as the accounting profession is concerned,
we think the present financing arrangement makes sense.
It can be added to as reasonably necessary.

This anticipates

that APB representatives from accounting firms and from

other occupations are paid by their employers.

We think,

in addition, that the concept of direct financial support

by accounting firms has merit.
We believe it is possible and practicable to look

to other organizations, not for direct financial support,
but more for assistance in the preparation of position

papers, research, et al.

We believe that the effectiveness of research can

be improved.

Various studies of this have been made in the

past and submitted to the APB and the AICPA Board of Director

One of the suggestions made in the past, which we're merely

repeating, is the policy of giving pros and cons in research
studies without the author necessarily faking a position.
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We think it would clearly be desirable to go into the
prospective proposed changes more in detail.

We feel that we

haven't really tapped all available sources of research in the

effective way that we should and need to:

accounting firms can

perform research; members of the staff of the Institute can
perform research; and particularly, the academic community can
be tapped much more effectively, on a time committed basis.

I will be glad to answer any questions.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Thank you very much, Ralph.

The question that’s uppermost in my mind was raised

today by Mr. Trueblood and was seconded vehemently by Mr.
Catlett.

Is it conceivable that the Accounting Principles

Board--or whatever we call it--operating essentially as a
volunteer body, meeting for three days every month and a half,
can possibly deal with the number of important questions presently

on its agenda, and at the same time deal with the fires that
must be handled quickly?

Can it also develop with care and make

some progress on this business of gathering a body of fundamentals
everyone seems to want?

Can all of this be done by a volunteer, part-time

group, or do you really need a group of people working fulltime?
MR. KENT:

All of you have had a chance to observe

full-time groups--the Supreme Court and many others.

I don’t

know of any group that stays on top of its work assignment,
so we start from that perspective.
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I do believe that the APB as presently constituted

with increased staff and a paid chairman could be much more
effective in staying on top of its job.

I think better

organization of the research function can substantially
ease the task of the Board, which now bogs down in writing

its own opinions, and doing some of its own research.
This isn't a perfect world, Mr. Chairman.

There’s

no way that any group can stay totally on top of such an
assignment.

1 believe the Board as presently constituted

with additional research, additional staff assistance, a
paid chairman, can satisfactorily stay on top of the job.
The existence of a paid chairman would make a

big difference because he would then be thinking about the

job full-time.

He presumably would be someone with a

practice background; he would be able to anticipate

problems and do a better job of observing these sparks in
the woods and the fires which are about to ignite.

He can

start the spade work to prepare the Board to deal with those

things.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

A number of people, both those who

are accountants in public practice and those who are not,

have advised us that it is extremely difficult in this day and
age and at this stage of evolution, to justify the matter of

having automatic seats for each member of the Big Eight firms.

We have had people comment to us on the importance

of objectivity and independence,

Something about the

automatic seat troubles them as to that particular objective.
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Could the Board continue to function adequately on a
volunteer basis if the Big Eight no longer had automatic seats?

MR. KENT:

I'd like to add number nine, number ten,

number eleven, and number twelve, also, Mr. Chairman.
think it stops at the so-called Big Eight.

I don't

The facts of life

are that the larger firms, wherever you draw that line, are more

deeply involved with public financial reporting requirements.
I think the world of experience that comes to people in those
firms is valuable to the APB.

Obviously, the Board would survive

if six out of the twelve top firms were on it, but that isn't our

question.

Our question is what should we do to make our process

more meaningful?

I do believe that when you begin to draw away

from the larger firms and the world of experience they have,

you're beginning to erode the pool of competence that is available
and is needed by the Board.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

You do not regard this as a critical

matter of principle; it is a matter of what is the most efficient,

bringing the greatest depth of knowledge to bear.

Is that what

you're saying?
MR. KENT:

Yes, I think we're looking for the most

competent people, and I think we're going to find the most
competent people in the organizations that have the greatest

amount of experience.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

One last question.

On the subject

of the two-thirds vote which you mentioned, a number of people
have made the comment that this requirement invariably, or in
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many instances, results in an extraordinary amount of

compromise, which not only dilutes the product and makes

it more complex and difficult to understand, but produces

something which is not satisfactory to anybody.

Therefore, a number of people have strongly

urged us to deal with this two-thirds vote.

They note

that other bodies-~the SEC, the legislatures, the courts—

handle controversial matters on a majority vote basis.
What is your reaction to that viewpoint?

MR. KENT:

Admittedly,
compromises are required in

reaching even a majority vote on a difficult and complex
question.

I think there is greater security, greater

consistency of well-rooted thought if you require two-thirds.

I think when you’re dealing with controversial matters it
probably isn't sound to say that they should be determined
on the basis of a vote of seven to six, or nine to eight.

I personally like, and our firm likes the twothirds vote and don't think it has been a handicap.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Gentlemen?

PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

This is a repetition of what

the Chairman has been asking, and I know it’s quite late in
the day for repetition.
I'd like to come from a different angle on this

question of representation.
written statement, Mr. Kent:

There is this sentence in your
"...we think it unlikely that

the accounting firms would uniformly and effectively support

statements of a body on which they were not represented."
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You make that statement in a paragraph in which you are

rebutting the people who want quite a small boards possibly
six members.

Now if the Big Eight are to be guaranteed membership
on the board at all times, then this Study Group could hardly
recommend a board smaller than the present one.

Suppose we

decide that a board of twelve men would be more effective,

then there couldn't be eight members from the Big Eight all

the time without their dominating it to quite an excessive

degree.
How would your firm feel about an arrangement whereby

you are more or less guaranteed that every second go-around,

so to speak, your firm had a member on the board; but didn't
have a member on the board every year.

Would that kind of representation be satisfactory to

secure your support?
MR. KENT:

I think the support we're talking about in

our presentation relates to the fact that the APB is sponsored
by the American Institute, which subjects its members to the

various restraints and controls of the professional body.

To go to the question as to whether our firm would
feel happy to have a seat every other time, I think if you were

able to find people more qualified to serve, and could
demonstrate their competence to serve, we would have no basis
for complaint.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Anyone from the audience?
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(There were none.)

Thank you very much.

MR. KENT:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

The last gentleman on our

program today is Mr. David Norr, a member of the Accounting
Principles Boards a CPA, and also an experienced financial

analyst.

Mr. Norr, we appreciate your willingness to talk

to us.

MR. DAVID NORR:

I appreciate the opportunity

to make some observations.

I think the Board should have the best brains
among CPAs.

An analyst need not be on the Board.

Service

on the APB is demanding; it's a full-time job; it is not a

part-time Job as some have suggested.

I would strongly

oppose forty per cent management representation; I would
strongly oppose twenty-five per cent management representation;

I would strongly oppose equal representation of management
and accountants.
The veto possibility is frightening.

If anything like that were to be done, I would

question the progress made in narrowing areas of difference.

The business community, from my experience, makes its voice
heard now, loudly, clearly,
directly and indirectly.
I have developed a healthy respect for the

knowledge of accounting practitioners ,
especially from the

major firms.
and non-CPAs.

And I doubt the efficacy of economists, lawyers

I think they have limited expertise.
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My suggestion for improvement is through research,
a massive stepup in the work.

Firsts help finance it.

Besides

the accounting profession’s help, we need increases in analysts’
dues, contributions from banks, publicly owned companies and

stock exchanges.

Regrettably, some of these fields--including my own-have limited views of their responsibilities.

Secondly, what kind of research?

More accountants

taking time from staff duties, and more professors to be hired

to do studies.

More staff should be employed to do this work

full-time; conceptual work and empirical work.

Staff should be increased.

Each committee of the

Board, I think, should have one full-time staff member.

Board

members who feel the need could get full-time staff help.

J. 0. Edwards issued a call on the role of business,

and I would like to take advantage of it and call on the FEI,
the NAA, the trade associations, industry by industry, to set up

accounting standards; industry by industry to inventory their

accounting principles.

Then, stimulated by the office of the

Chief Accountant of the SEC, we could quickly settle some of

these areas of difference.
Closely related, I suggest the start

of self-policing by the business community of its members’ reports.

This morning, George Catlett referred to the cumbersome
mechanism of the APB.

A good case study might be the problem of

foreign translations which suddenly arose in mid-August.

I

think it most important to handle this in the annual reports of
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1971.

We must work under forced draft on several of these

problems.
Would a small, full-time, independently financed

group reach prompt answers?

Perhaps so.

Perhaps with the existing system all Board members
and their very substantial support staff could renounce all

other duties in their firms; and perhaps for some this is

exactly what is now done.
It means more meetings and more time on. Board and
Board-related activities.

This is vital.

payment I think is less consequential.

The source of

The Board and its

activities, I feel, are a full-time job.

Will a majority vote be helpful?
is something to be studied more.

That, I think,

Quite possibly the answer

is yes.

In summary, my solution is more fire-power through
the AICPA.

It means more men on accounting research; more

dollars on research; more time from staff; more staff; more
time from Board members; more time from task forces and

professors and others, all providing input to the Institute.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Mr. Norr, when Mr. Edwards was

speaking to us we discussed the possibility that task forces

of the Board, sometimes called subcommittees, working on
particular projects include financial executives and accountants

from industry who have a particular expertise in that area.

What is your reaction to this?
MR. NORR:

Fine!

If they are bright and knowledge

able in their area, it would be good, helpful input.

I think
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they nay have asked an analyst to be part of the recentlyformed real estate committee.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Professor Solomons has noted the

suggestion that a board of eighteen or twenty, with their

supporting staffs is a rather large and possibly unwieldy group
when it has to consider complex matters.

A board of maybe five

persons is arguably too small, and maybe there is a compromise
area of eleven or twelve.

Would you have any strong feeling about a board of

a slightly smaller size?
MR. NORR:

I really don’t.

I don’t think I have

any clear view as to which way it should fall.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Do you have any views on the subject

of the automatic seat for each member of the Big Eight?

MR. NORR:

experience.

I’m impressed by their knowledge and

It makes considerable sense.

MR. LEVINE:

I’d like to ask a question that’s

related to that one, Mr. Norr.
I would ask that you pause to reflect upon your

answer.

Since you as a member of the Board could be considered

to be from one of the non-pressurized groups, would you have any
feelings about independence, in fact as well as in appearance,
of public accounting members?

MR. NORR:

There can be pressures on me, too.

have not been concerned about a lack of independence.

I

The men

seem independent, dedicated and call the shots as they see them.
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But I could not object if the commission were to decide that
the board should be independently financed with men severing

their ties to firms.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

You draw a very striking

distinction between the independence of the practitioner and
the incapacity for independence which you attribute to

representatives of management.

It’s one of the most striking

things that’s been said here today.

I don’t really have a question on it, except to press
you to tell us on what this is based.

MR. NORR:

Experience.

(Laughter)

Perhaps we can

cite, for example, Mr. Hornbostel's speech before the American
Petroleum Institute meeting in Miami.
I don’t see, in the business community, the seeking

out of abuses; the willingness, let us say, to expand SEC funds
to search out the problems.

Yet in the FEI talk, it is suggested

that the APB should not go after problems.

I think it important

for the APB to also go after problems.

So that, among other talks and statements, is what
led me to my conclusion.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

I suppose beyond that there is, at

least in theory, the proposition that the independent practicing
accountant has a professional job to do which is partially
statutory.

He's supposed to be a surrogate, in a sense.

He is

to make certain that the financial statements of a corporation

submitted to stockholders and proposed stockholders under the 1933
and 1934 Securities Acts, represent fair and full disclosure.
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There is no such obligation under the law, at least, on the
businessman, except to the extent that a businessman and

businesses have to face severe penalties if their disclosures

are incorrect or false.
It was deemed appropriate at the time these Acts

were established, to have this additional safeguard.

that proposition reflect itself in reality:

Does

does the

independent practicing CPA tend to look upon matters of

financial reporting with a greater degree of objectivity than

do the chief financial executives of business corporations?

MR. NORR:

This is possible, and of course the

Board member who is from industry now behaves in the most
responsible professional fashion.
Perhaps some of the fault may lie with a financial

community that produces pressure for improvement in earnings
as representative of progress, so that all--including accountants,
management and analysts--seek out those systems that will

produce the best improvements and the best showing.
MR. OLSON:

Do you have any feelings as to what

specifically has contributed to these abuses?

Do you lay

them primarily at the door of industry, or do you place

equal blame on the practicing public accountant?
MR. NORR:

All of us seem to be involved in the

problem of abuses and their proliferation.

One could perhaps

philosophize and say that it’s all of society.

And as I

said, perhaps it's the mechanism of earnings per share;
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improved values that make all want to do better.

Somehow

this system has produced, I think, the pressure for less
conservatism in our statements.

MR. PRYOR:

Don't you think that part of the

problem is the pressure on the part of investors and

management for more prompt performance?

The whole of

society has become more equity oriented than it was twenty

years ago.
MR. NORR:

Yes, we're all involved.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:
have a question?

Does anybody in the audience

Mr. Edwards!

MR. EDWARDS:

You said that you would be very

unhappy with forty per cent representation from business;

and you'd be just as unhappy with twenty-five per cent

representation.

You stopped there.

Do I assume you'd be

more comfortable with zero representation?

If this is the

case, would you please elaborate on why you think that

business representation should not be counted on to act
responsibly.
My second question is this:

You say you're

frightened at the idea of a bloc vote of industry

representation.

Do you seriously believe that industry

representatives could get together and vote as a bloc; is
it possible to have that kind of a dream?

MR. NORR:

In answer to the first, my experience

says one in eighteen is quite good; perhaps it could go, as

it was before, to two representatives from industry.
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As to the second part, I think there is too much of a

feeling that management should pick the principles it wishes.
It came through in some of today's papers and statements.

I

think there is an important need for checks and balances.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

You've all been extremely patient.

We conclude this first day of the hearing with

renewed appreciation to all of you for sticking with us and
giving us the benefit of your wisdom, your thoughts and

suggestions.

We will reconvene again tomorrow morning at

ten o’clock.

Good night.

(The meeting closed at six-ten o’clock.)
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THURSDAY MORNING SESSION
November 4, 1971
The Thursday morning session of the Study on

Establishment of Accounting Principles convened at ten
o’clock on November 4, 1971, Mr. Wheat presiding.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Ladies and Gentlemen, welcome

to the second day of our seance.

(Laughter)

no need for any remarks on my part.

There is

As I said yesterday,

we all know why we’re here and we continue to be most
grateful to all of you for participating with us.

We’ll follow the practice we did yesterday of

affording the audience an opportunity to ask questions of
the gentlemen who are giving oral comments, unless any of
the gentlemen would prefer not to have that done.

Before the day is over we will have a chance to
open ourselves up to comments, suggestions, or questions

from the floor, to which we would be most receptive.
At the outset of our program this morning, we

have the privilege of having with us four gentlemen from

the Machinery and Allied Products Institute:

Mr. Derr,

Mr. Schirmer, Mr. Steward and Mr. Wearly.

MR. CHARLES DERR:

As we presently appear I am

more nearly a ringmaster than a witness.
I am Senior Vice President of the Machinery and
Allied Products Institute.

We are a national organization of

capital goods and allied industrial equipment manufacturers.
The Institute very much appreciates the opportunity of
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appearing before this committee.

The Institute, and particularly

its executive committee--its board of directors, as it were--has

long been especially interested in the work of the Accounting

Principles Board and its parent body, the American Institute of

Certified Public Accountants.
On October 25, 1970, in a letter to the Executive
Vice President of AICPA, we suggested that the AICPA consider

the possibility of appointing a senior business executive to the
APB.

We have referred to this in our written statement, and will

elaborate upon it in the course of our testimony this morning.

Our testimony is to be presented, in order, by
Mr. Walter Schirmer, Chief Executive of the Clark Equipment

Company, and Mr. William Wearly, Chairman and Chief Executive
of Ingersoll-Rand Company.
I should add that Mr. Frank Foster, Chairman of

Sperry Rand Corporation, desired to be with us but could not.

However, he prepared a statement addressed to Mr. Wheat, and
with the Chairman's permission, I would ask for leave to include

it in the printed record of the hearing.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:
MR. DERR:

We'd appreciate it.

Thank you.

If time remains, and again with the permission of

the Chairman, at the conclusion of our testimony by these two
gentlemen, Mr. Charles Stewart would appreciate the opportunity

of addressing a question or two on the general philosophy of the
Accounting Principles Board.
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One more word and I shall desist.

Mr. Schirmer,

our first witness, intends to discuss generally our

suggestions on the advisory committee, along with a number
of other matters on his mind.

Mr. Nearly intends to illustrate and to
exemplify to this distinguished committee the need for

input from top management to APB deliberations , by

discussing the potentialities for his business and for
industry generally of a matter now under active consideration

by the Accounting Principles Board.
MR, WALTER E. SCHIRMER:

With that, Mr. Schirmer.
Thank you very much,

Charley.
Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Commission:

I'm going to be very brief, speaking only to

certain points in the statement which MAPI has produced.
It has always been my philosophy that business is not run
by numbers alone; that there are elements of judgment and
decision completely unrelated to the figures which the
accounting profession produces.

I believe that in some of the things which are

under consideration by the Accounting Principles Board, that
advice and counsel, or at least the opportunity to discuss
these problems at their inception, is of considerable importance,

After an exposure draft has been made, it is almost too late
to provide any basic comments of this type, as the comments

are directed mainly to the specifics of the exposure draft.
I also believe that the Accounting Principles Board

should have the advice of what you might call the industrial
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advisory committee, in order to solve problems which industry

itself may offer and which do not arise as a result of government

bodies or the professional people themselves.

I believe also that the Accounting Principles Board
should adopt or develop basic accounting principles and
It is very difficult from the industrialist’s

standards.

point of view to have to worry about the detailed rules and

opinions which are provided in some of these draft exposures,
and which are immediately scrutinized, I believe, by those who

would like to avoid them through possible loopholes.

This

produces a second round with more detailed rules and regulations,

and still further opportunity for lawyers as well as accountants

to see how they can be avoided.
I think that we should all accept the fact that the

great majority of business is honest and tries to do a good

job of disclosure,

and that most of these opinions are for

the purpose of trying to fence in and prevent the unscrupulous.
I think there are other ways of dealing with those who would

like to make exceptions to generally accepted accounting

principles.

I have two other points which I will mention very

briefly--the investment credit; the Board has produced an
exposure draft recommending a way of handling this credit.

I

believe the principle of the credit, the reason that Congress

probably will adopt it, is to provide a stimulus for business,
and a stimulus for capital expenditures.

That stimulus will
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be a deferred stimulus, if we follow the APB proposal.

This

seems to be completely contrary to the purpose of the credit.
If it is,
in effect, a tax reduction, it ought to be taken

in the year when the tax is being paid.
Another example is product-line reporting, upon

which Mr. Wearly will comment from a slightly different

I comment on it from the standpoint of the

standpoint.

difficulty involved in doing this for an integrated

corporation.

A specific example is my own company.

We

manufacture fork-lift trucks, construction machinery,

trailers, all of which receive certain automotive
components from our automotive division.

It would be completely arbitrary, in my opinion,
to develop product-line reporting for these individual
products.

Our automotive division sells about 50 per cent

of its output to outside customers.

How do we classify

the machinery and equipment which they use, as to capital
employed in the business?

How do we allocate certain

overhead, certain general administrative overhead, between
these divisions?
We have tried to develop specific earning statements

and we think that we would hesitate very much to spend the

amount of money and effort to develop this.
We also have some nineteen overseas companies each
with different methods of accounting.

When we try to combine

them with our methods, we run into exceptional difficulties.
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The final point is the question of including in
financial statements the 20 per cent or more joint ventures

that you may have.

This is very difficulty because of the

differences in accounting and the differences in fiscal periods.
We would probably have to have our accountants go overseas and

develop a whole new set of books that might not be compatible

with the local requirements in those countries.
We think that in certain cases, where there is a

minimum of influence on the basic corporation, that you ought
to be excused from that kind of accounting.

Thank you very

much.
MR. DERR:

Mr. Wearly, you're next.

MR. WILLIAM L. WEARLY:

Mr. Chairman, Gentlemen:

I have given you a copy of my proposed testimony,
and in the interests of time I would like to briefly cover

certain parts of it and dwell more on other parts, particularly

those parts at the end of the paper.
As a starting pointy I would like to remind you that

I am quoting from the October 4 issue of Industry Week, that
as of right now

"...nine out of ten home radios used in the

United States are produced in foreign countries.

One out of

six new cars is produced in a foreign country, and this ratio
is rapidly changing; seven out of ten sweaters, nineteen out

of twenty motorcycles... . "
I won't read any further.
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I'll identify my company briefly, just to give you
an idea of what I mean in the way of world competition.
Ingersoll-Rand will have total sales of approximately $800
million this year, of which $300 million is outside the

United States, and $200 million of it is exported from the
United States.
I'm going to deal with the principle of separate

accounting for product lines.
why this is necessary.

It is not clearly stated

I believe regardless of the

necessity that it does, in fact, cause disclosure of
confidential information which is important to the future

well-being of the company. It would be very damaging to have
this type of information get in the hands of worldwide
competitors, or for that matter any competitor.

This is not materially different than requiring
a company to disclose its product research and development

programs as they are being formulated.

I think you will

agree that if an individual employee or an outsider were
involved in disclosure of a research program, or of a
marketing strategy program, he would be subject to discharge
and a suit for damages.

I will try to demonstrate that the proposed

disclosures might become even more damaging and broader in
scope.

I will deal for a few moments with things that are

particular to the Ingersoll-Rand Company.
Our business segments, product-lines, are by intent
designed to have certain relationships to each other.

Mr.
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Schirmer made the same comment about Clark Equipment Company.
Our so-called segments involve some 27 product divisions,
and 300 or 400 different lines.

We charge our management--and I

want to emphasize this--we charge our management with creating

and putting together our divisions in such a way as to optimize,
again I repeat, to optimize customer service, impact, engineering,
technological proficiency and deployment of fixed assets for the

most efficient production.

This is management’s stock in trade.

If we succeed, we have a highly profitable growth; conversely,
stagnation may indicate failure to develop proper relationships.

Thus we do not feel that our various businesses, units
or segments can have the same vitality if operated in separated;
unrelated units.

If they do, there is little purpose in putting

them together.

Clearly, there should be no inference made that
segments could or should perform the same if operated independently.

Therefore, what is a valid reason for an investor to have this

information?

He cannot invest in a segment.

Is it to permit him

to invest in a new business venture to compete with only the
favorable segment?

The management of Ingersoll-Rand would like to know

many things about our competitors; we try to find out these
things; we don’t know them for sure.

These disclosures, as I

see it; would lead to a list of things--I’m not going to enumerate
them--but it’s things such as unit production of various product

lines, the growth rate by product-lines over a period of years,
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profitability and cost trends, and so forth.

We believe the proposed APB opinion would

effectively lead to disclosure of this type of information.
And I remind you that a little bit of disclosure ultimately
leads to greater disclosure.

Pretty soon the whole

picture is disclosed, as I see it, to not only domestic

competitors, but to worldwide competitors.
I doubt if you have had experience with what I
call the "experience curve."

I'd like to ask you to take

some time and look at Chart A at the back of my paper.
Chart A is a price pattern.

rather a normal pattern.
means.

Price Pattern X is

Let me show you what the ordinate

We have accumulated volume over time.

We don’t

plot it in time, but rather we plot it in cumulative units
On the vertical ordinate we have unit prices.

of volume.

So the price volume,
in constant dollars, of most

products follows this over the years; and over increasing

volumes the price actually reduces.

Now Price Pattern Y

shows a company that held the price too high, and at some
point in time found its competitors chewing it up.

They

tried to lower their price, but went out of business because
they couldn't turn the company around in time.
Price Pattern Z is also very common, in that the

company does hold too high prices for a period of units or
years, then they lower the price and again they become

competitive.
Now if you turn to Chart B you will see the typical

Price Pattern B plotted on top of a cost--a unit cost per.

187

Typically, these unit costs, when plotted, are a straight line.

They are a straight line having a slope somewhere between 70
per cent and 90 per cent.

This is a typical pattern.

On Chart C you can see the price pattern when they

introduced the product at low cost; after a number of units were
built they began to come down; finally the price was ahead of
the cost and showed profitability, and the price followed the

cost curve down over a period of units or years.

On Chart

I am actually showing you an Ingersoll-

Rand product which is, needless to say, not disclosed.
cost curve is the actual cost curve for this product.

This
If you

will look down in the right-hand corner you will see an X on
the cost curve marked "I".

"I” represents the actual cost

achieved at the end of the year, December 1970, for this product.
If you will move up, the price curve shows where our
price was, actually, at the end of the year 1970.

I have further

projected where I think our cost experience curve will go in

1975.

That's what is called "I 75” on this curve, on down a

number of units.
Now I have competitors A & B.

I think competitor A's

cost experience is where we have shown it on this curve.
don't know that, but I think that.

I

B is where he thinks he

rests.

Now let me show you what I can do.

If I know for

sure that A is the correct number for competitor A^ I can
drop my price down to below A's level, and certainly discourage
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him from making any further investments in this business.
He will probably gradually retire from the business.

If I knew for sure where B was, I could drop
down there and project myself in a low profit position

for four or five years, until I got out to my next cost
experience point and be profitable; have my units out
and have most of the competition effectively stifled.

I suggest to you gentlemen this is precisely

what the Japanese are doing to us in America today.
you look at Chart E.

Will

Chart E is from MITI, the Japanese

Government agency,
and it shows the cost price experience

curve on monochrome television receivers.
I need not tell you what has happened.

The

American television industry is out of business.
The next one shows only the price curves, because

I could not get the cost curve on the Japanese steel
industry.

I remind you that steel and television are highly

visible industries.

They stand on their own.

They don’t

need disclosure because the disclosure already exists, in
this industry.

That's all I have to say.

MR. CHARLES W. STEWART:

Would it be permissible

for me to take a couple of minutes?

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

MR. STEWART:

Please do.

I think that it’s perfectly clear

that what we were trying to do here was not only address

ourselves to some of the matters that are before you, but
also to illustrate the kind of interchange that we recommend
the Accounting Principles Board undertake through regular
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consultation with chief executives of companies.

These men

should be a combination of those who have not come up the

financial route, with a sprinkling of men who have come up
the financial route.
We think also that such consultation should take

place at an early stage in the conceptual period of a new
opinion or directive.

We do not say this in any way to demean

the role of the financial officer of a company.

You have him

represented on the Accounting Principles Board, and as an aside

I think this committee might want to take a look as to whether
the representation is adequate in terms of numbers.

We think

perhaps it should be enlarged somewhat.

With due respect to the financial officer,it is
our judgment, and has been our prior recommendation and we

reiterate it here and illustrate it here, that you would benefit

by the exchange with chief executive officers of the type who
are with us today.

They are not necessarily volunteering for

the job, but we are glad to try to give you a picture of what

we have in mind.
I’d like to say just a few words about philosophy
beyond the question of organization.

I think, really, that

your agenda is too limited in terms of your scope of

assignment.

You really ought to be looking at the thrust,

the philosophy of the Accounting Principles Board activity

in addition to the organization of that activity.
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I was struck, for example, in reading a little
pamphlet that the AICPA issues called The Accounting

Principles Boards with the last two paragraphs,
which read
as follows:

"The information produced by accounting

is used by different groups for different purposes-credit grantors, investment advisors, stockholders,
regulatory agencies, and by management.
performing

In

its work, the Accounting Principles

Board keeps all these diverse interests in mind

but its primary concern must be for the investing
public and credit grantors.
"By adopting this position in the

development of accounting principles, the APB
contributes to preservation of confidence in the
free enterprise economy--and thus serves the

long-term interest of business as well as the

public."
I have two comments.

First of all, it seems to me

that the flat statement that the primary concern of the
Accounting Principles Board must be for the investing public

and credit grantors is not wholly appropriate and reasonable.

Obviously, as suggested earlier in one of these two paragraphs,
the Accounting Principles Board must and should keep all the

various diverse interests in mind.
On the other hand, financial reporting is not reporting

in the air.

It is financial information which in turn in many

instances reveals, as Mr. Wearly has demonstrated,, directly or
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indirectly corporate facts which are not necessarily financial

in character.
It is our judgment that the Accounting Principles

Board has indeed been following the criterion to which I have
just referred.

We believe that business management considerations

should be larger than they appear , to be from the conduct of the

Accounting Principles Board as we see it, and from the statement
which it attributes to itself in terms of its motives.

Now again with regard to philosophy,it seems clear
that the Accounting Principles Board concerns itself with two

important motivations--not exclusively--but certainly it is
giving high priority to these two motivations.
One is the matter of further disclosure; the other

is the matter of comparability in terms of being able to compare

one company, or one group of companies, with another company or
group of companies.

This again goes back to some extent to

what these gentlemen have said.
In this connection we have one general observation
to make.

It seems to us that there is some evidence that the

Accounting Principles Board on these two points is operating

either deliberately or Inadvertently on the theory that it

should anticipate what the Securities and Exchange Commission

might do in the foreseeable future.

This, presumably, in order

to keep rule-setting under the aegis of a private institution
as distinguished from a public regulatory body.
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A private institution, at times, has some
responsibility to hold the line.

If it believes that a

trend in government regulatory matters is not the
appropriate answer, it should resist, rather than merely

attempting to anticipate government action.
To cite as an example, look at the history of
the development of the concept of uniform cost accounting

standards.

This has now proceeded to the point where a

board is actually developing those standards.

The AICPA

started out as resisting this concept in kind of a qualified
manner, and then progressively softened on the issue.

Now--

and I don’t think the word is entirely inappropriate--it
is almost in the position of a collaborator.

This is not to say that AICPA or the Board should
not maintain its independent professional integrity and

status, but I do believe that it’s going down a fairly
dangerous road.

And I think with respect to those two

objectives of disclosure and comparability, that some rule
or reason must be applied.

Some of the total top management

objectives must be taken into consideration in connection
with the activity of the Board.

Organizationally, we have a further recommendation.
I'm a little fuzzy about the organization of AICPA in total;

I know that there's a Council; I know that there's a Board
of Directors, and I know that there's an Accounting Principles

Board.

Recently we watched an interesting exercise when there

was a difference of opinion, apparently, between the tax
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division and the Accounting Principles Board.

It was resolved

by the President, who appointed an advisory committee, and

then the Board of Directors issued a statement, this one being
addressed to the problem of conformity of tax and book
accounting.

This was a rather unique approach, and it raises the
question in our minds as to whether or not an appeal procedure,
beyond the APB, might be worthy of your consideration.

It is interesting, incidentally, to look at the

rationalization in the statement of the Board of Directors

with respect to conformity between tax and book accounting.
One of the important points made in the rationalization was
that certain things are done for tax reasons, in terms of

national public policy objectives.

These have nothing to do

with accounting, in a theoretical or practical sense, and there
fore, it would make no sense to act to enforce conformity between
tax and book accounting.

I would suggest that if you apply that same reasoning

to the investment tax credit, which clearly has an objective
that goes beyond anything approaching an accounting question,
you might come out with a totally different answer than is in

the present proposal of the disclosure report.

In brief, we're suggesting--and we do this quite

humbly, at least I do, because I'm not an accountant--that you
enlarge the scope of your inquiries; that you examine the
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philosophical aspects of the work of the Board; that you

look at its prime motivations or prime goals or thrusts;

that you look at the question of whether or not there should
be

some guideline

or deadline

or cutoff with

respect to

some of those individual thrusts.
We made our suggestions regarding organization,
principally the creation of a kind of

advisory committee,
perhaps enlargement of financial officer

representation from industry on your board, perhaps an
appeal procedure.
But the thing that concerns us most of all is

not organization.

It is the direction in which the

Accounting Principles Board is moving, and particularly with

regard to those two key objectives of disclosure and
comparability.
I think there's one other thing to keep in mind,
and that is that a security analyst has an insatiable

appetite for information, whether it's relevant, misleading,

or whatever it is.

You'll never satisfy it, and the impact

on top management in an effort to satisfy it to a maximum

degree, we feel might be quite serious.

Speaking for MAPI, and for the gentlemen who
have helped with the illustration of an approach that I

would like to see you consider, we greatly appreciate the
opportunity to be here.

I have gone beyond your time

limits; my sincere apologies.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

We are greatly honored to have a

group of distinguished chief executives like yourselves take the
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time and trouble to come and talk with us.

made are very significant.

The comments you've

I'm sure that the gentlemen who are

sitting with me have these interests in mind, but it's well to

be reminded of them.
I would like to comment on your statement, Mr.

Stewart, on the question of philosophy and objectives of

As you know, for historical and other

financial statements.

reasons, the American Institute decided to put together two

committees to work simultaneously on these problems.

The

Trueblood Committee has as its chief task the business of
trying to determine the objectives of financial reporting, and

in particular just exactly for whom are financial statements

intended.
I would hope, and urge you, to make your presentation

to that committee at the appropriate time.

They could benefit

from the things that you are commenting about.
MR. DERR:

If I may say so, Mr. Chairman, we're

actively working on it.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Our objective, as you know, and

our assigned task is more limited.

And although inevitably

we need to be apprised of the particular areas of criticism
of the work of the Accounting Principles Board, as well as
any other comments on that work, we are not in a position to
delve with great depth into the details of the opinions or

proposed opinions of the Board itself.

That project would

take us several years, and would be far beyond my competence
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as a layman.

I have had some experience of another sort

with the matters about which Mr. Wearly talked.

was on the Commission we had this problem.

When I

And I am sure

that all of you gentlemen recognize the various counter
vailing pressures which operate in this field, including

the very real concerns of business, which you have so

eloquently commented upon.

I think it might be well for the record just

to reflect for a moment on the fact that when rather severe
demands for product-line reporting were being made in

powerful Congressional committees and by powerful agencies
of the Government, the Securities and Exchange Commission
elected to hold up on this project until a study could be
made under the auspices of the Financial Executives Institute.

We were impressed by the progress of that study and it rapidly
became apparent that the author, Professor Mautz, was a man

of great competence and diligence.
about his task.

He proceeded swiftly

He was, to my way of thinking, very much

aware of some of these difficulties which Mr. Schirmer

mentioned:

allocations of costs, and so forth.
His report and recommendations so commended them

selves to the Commission that when it acted in this area,
it did so greatly influenced by the work that had been done

under the auspices of this private organization.

It is, in my judgment, the best example of the type
of cooperation between Government and the private sector
which one looks to find.

The matter has been, and is in kind
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of an experimental stage.

It obviously has to be reexamined

and looked at carefully.

There are increasing demands for expansion on what

has already been proposed and embodied in the rules.

It’s

highly significant that the matters upon which Mr. Wearly

commented be, taken into account.

I’m certain that if you look

at the record of the Securities and Exchange Commission in this

area, you will find a caution which should commend itself to you.
And of course, I think personally that it’s encumbent

upon the Commission.

After all, the accounting profession has

awaited the action of the SEC in this area.
But certainly it is encumbent upon the accounting

profession to examine with great care whether or not it is

feasible for the auditor to perform an attest function with
reference to these figures which become very important in the
minds of some investors.

I think that you would find, as we

have, that there are increasing numbers of investor-oriented
groups which consider this information very important.
It is important, of course, that this be done with

great care, and I am sure that it will be.

I would like to make one comment by way of a question

and comment together.

This is a point that Mr. Stewart made

about the philosophy of APB activity.

We should--he is entirely

correct--be concerned about that and be alert to it.

As you know, it has been recommended to us that
opinions of the Board have not adequately, in the judgment of
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the critic,
set forth the purpose of the particular

opinion; what it is designed to accomplish from the
standpoint of the public investor, and what alternatives

were rejected.
The question which this raises is whether or not

these opinions on financial accounting, as opposed to
management accounting, are really for the primary purpose

of maintaining the information and confidence level of the

investing public.
As I judged your remarks, your principal concern

with that objective is that adequate attention is not being

given to the harmful effect the opinion might have on the

corporation.

In other words, the question is one of making sure
that this is being considered.

I wanted to be sure that

that’s correct.
I have an example with which I'm working at the

moment.

Corporate management is very much concerned about

its reputation and the difficulties it will have with the
stockholders and others if it cannot maintain a sizable

quantity of deferred costs on the asset side of the balance
sheet.

And management doesn't want any qualification in

the auditor's report as to recoverability of those costs.

It's a question, in this instance, of management’s

concern for its reputation, with a lesser regard for the
problem of the person who may invest in that company based

upon undisclosed deferred costs.
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The areas of accounting standards which apply here
are designed to protect the public investor.

I wanted to be

sure that it wasn’t your feeling that that particular aspect

of management, which one encounters from time to time, should

be taken into account as opposed to the interests of the public

investor.
MR. STEWART:

The implication of your question is

perfectly appropriate.

Under no circumstances do I suggest

that a coverup be tolerated.

On the other hand, I do feel

that there’s quite a difference between what might be called

a selfish coverup and the revelation of information which does

not involve any impropriety on the part of management, but does
have some serious management impacts.

If you break down product-lines in a way that reveals

where a particular product is manufactured, a union is then in
a position to pinpoint the profit center that is doing the best

job.

I do not think that is in the interest of accounting; I

do not think it is in the interest of management; I do not
think it is in the interest of stockholders, and it does not
involve anything approaching an impropriety such as you

suggested.
I do not wish to imply what is implicit in your
question.

Could I comment just for a-CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Excuse me just a moment.

Just to

be sure that I understand what you are saying--it is not the

precise interests of management that you’re concerned with.
It’s the interest of stockholders in a broad sense.

It will
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be injurious, in your judgment,
for certain things to
be revealed; injurious to the stockholders of the company.

That interest has to be taken into account along with the
interest

in full disclosure.

You want to ensure that the

broad interests of investors are taken into account.

Isn’t

that a correct statement?

MR. STEWART:

It's a correct statement except that

you end up with the word "investor", which is not an
inaccurate terminus to your point, but really doesn't put

the proper emphasis on what I'm saying.
I'm not speaking of management as an individual

interested in what his profit performance as

an individual

is going to be next year, except to the extent that our

system happens to reward that.

I'm not interested in the

selfish protection of individual members of management;
when I refer to management I'm referring to the responsibilities

of management to the corporation,
to the stockholders, and I

think to the system that we live with.
There is no difference of opinion between the
manner in which you have stated these propositions, as long

as proper weighting is given.

If you read the statement of

the AICPA, it is clear that a heavier weighting is being
applied to two areas--credit grantors and investing public--

than is applied to the company in terms of its proper
functioning.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

The question that I'm raising is

the correctness of that statement as it stands.

The reason

I raise the question is because it seems to me that, properly
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interpreted, management's role is to do the best job it can
for the stockholders--not for the management.

If that’s true, management should be concerned about

the interests of stockholders in accounting and financial
accounting matters.

It is obviously apparent that those

charged with developing standards for financial accounting—
and I'm limiting myself, now, to financial accounting--must

take into account all these aspects that you gentlemen have
been reciting to us this morning.

But I do not comprehend that meaning that there are
interests of a significant nature to be protected apart from

the interests of the stockholders.
to what those interests might be.
about credit grantors.

I'm a little puzzled as
I'm not terribly concerned

I put this to you in order to elicit

your reaction, because I have the strong feeling that the
major banks can take care of themselves (Laughter).

They get

from you all kinds of information, not necessarily appropriate
for public distribution nor would anyone deem that appropriate,

necessarily.

The public, however, is not in a position to demand
those things from you and to secure them.

And accordingly,

the interests of the public in financial reporting and

accounting seems to me to be a relatively paramount interest.
No one is going to look out for the public unless the accounting
profession, and ultimately the Government, hopefully to a

greater degree, watch out for this matter.
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Our whole system is based upon the investments of

more than thirty million Americans.

I just want to make

sure that the concern I have is adequately reflected, at
the same time that your concerns are given their appropriate
weight.

MR. STEWART:

Really, we’re not very far apart.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

MR. STEWART:
terms.

I'm glad to hear it.

We're stating something in different

When I say you need to look at management's

considerations, management, obviously, even to the question
of susceptibility to suit, has a responsibility to the

corporation as an entity; to stockholders.

It is in that

context that I am referring to it.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

I don't think we're far apart

at all.

MR. STEWART:

We're not far apart, but I want to

be absolutely sure that I am not leaving the record unclear

as to the point which I'm trying to make:

and that is that

there are management considerations in the interests of
stockholders , present and potential, which should be given

a proper weighting in the development of the opinions of

the Board.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

I am in one hundred per cent

agreement with you.
MR. STEWART:

I would like to say one thing about

your opening remark regarding the scope of your assignment.
Of course, it is for you to judge that scope.
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I believe that it is almost impossible to make

intelligent judgments regarding organization by itself; that
you do have to take into consideration these other factors to

which I have referred.

I am also a little bit mystified about the overlap
There’s a third now

between the two groups to which you refer.
active on the matter of segmented reporting.

Obviously, if you want to play on words, it appears
that AICPA is segmenting its effort by having these three groups

operating somewhat autonomously, but I hope not in terms of

playback among the three groups.

I suggest, as I already have

mentioned, that you can’t separate organization from substance;
you can’t separate organization from philosophy, because they
have a bearing on how you organize.

The committee that you referred to, or the study
group, which I believe Mr. Trueblood is responsible for, deals

with the question of financial reporting.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Another group is--

Forgive me, I think that the Trueblood

Committee is dealing on a much broader scale than that; it's
financial reporting and all other kinds of financial statements,

for various types of users —
MR. STEWART:

I see; I abbreviated it too much.

There is another committee which has the assignment

to come up with something on segmented reporting, a much-CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

I believe that that is a committee

of the Accounting Principles Board.
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MR. STEWART:

That's all right.

My point is

that the last committee mentioned is dealing with a very
important aspect of financial reporting, and apparently

has a mandate to come forward with a proposal before the

very broad study--which I believe is contemplated to be
a two-year study--is completed.

So that to the extent that the larger scope study
brings light upon the subject of financial reporting in
other matters,
we could argue that it would be premature for

the Accounting Principles Board or the AICPA to address
itself to such an important segment that has been assigned
to the other committee.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

I recognize the thrust of your

argument, and it has been well-stated.

You will recall

my questions yesterday to the gentleman from Haskins &

Sells.

They were addressed to this same problem; can you

wait to make progress until there is a final decision on

some of these

broad fundamentals.

His testimony yesterday,

if you will recall, was no; you must proceed while you

phase in.

I suppose you might say that that is a practical
judgment by the gentleman?
MR. STEWART:

Incidentally, I would anticipate

that that would be the practical or pragmatic answer; the
only question is whether you are really making progress,

or merely making decisions.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

(Laughter)

That’s a debatable question.
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I would like to ask one more question before turning it
back to the committee.

The proposal you have made of a senior

advisory committee to the Board is an extremely interesting one.
I wonder if you could take just a moment to tell us

whether or not you have viewed that matter from the standpoint
of its specifics.

Have you considered how many persons should

be on such a committee; how they should be selected; would it
be designed to be representative of all aspects of publicly-

held business, or only a selection of top executives who have
an interest in these matters and are therefore willing to spend

the time?

Under whose auspices would they be selected, and

would they contemplate any given amount of time?
MR. STEWART:

We spelled out some of that in a letter

which is attached to our statement, but I welcome the opportunity

to abbreviate what we have in mind.
It's been our experience that very large committees

do not function well.

Our thinking has gone this far, and

assuming some receptivity to the notion of its general terms,
it should be a relatively small group, five, six, or something

in that range.
I believe I mentioned previously that I would mix
those who had financial background and had reached chief
executive status,and those who have not.

I believe that in

our letter we indicated that the advisory group should be

representative, consistent with its size, of segments of

business in the United States.

In this way you would not get
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the point of view of only, let us say, heavy goods manufacture.

I think these men have to be chief executive officers

or men who have advanced from that level to long-range
planners.

I would distinguish clearly from the chief

financial officer.
I would assume that it would be selected by the

President of AICPA or by some appointed individual; I would

obviously avoid--because we have a stake in the public
interest just as the Accounting Principles Board and the

accounting profession do -- I would

committee.

avoid loading the

And I think that a further stipulation would be

that these men would be brought in at an early stage on

conceptual matters, as distinguished from a disclosure report.
We do a great deal of work with Government, and our

experience has been, for example, that when something is
printed in the Federal Register under the Administrative
Procedure Act, there's quite a bit of ice on that particular

proposal.

I have a hunch that a similar experience occurs

within the operation of AICPA.
That's about where our thinking has gone.

I think

that there is a growing recognition in business today that,
to a large extent, it ' s business' own fault because there isn't
a proper communication between the accounting profession and
top management.

We do not recommend that you fill that gap by

placing chief executive officers on the Accounting Principles
Board.

I think your present system of using industry
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representation in terms of financial officers--although that

might be enlarged--is appropriate.
I think that you mentioned time.

time.

This will take

But business has to learn, if it hasn’t already, that

if it’s going to get input it has to take time.

And I think you

would find competent,interested, broad-gauged chief executives

who would welcome an invitation.

They should be rotated probably

in order that you have exposure to various segments of the

economy.
As I say, we deliberately structured our presentation
today along the lines that we did in order to illustrate the

heart of our suggestion.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Thank you very much, Mr. Stewart.

Anyone on the committee?
MR. PRYOR:

I have one question I’d like to ask and

one comment I'd like to make.

Did you seriously suggest that

corporate disclosure was the basic reason that imports from

foreign countries have become as large in this country as they
have?
MR. SCHIRMER:

I guess you’re aiming that at Mr.

Wearly.
MR. WEARLY:

The reason why I said that is because

their thrust has been at visible industries.

I can't disclaim

the fact that low labor rates give them a big advantage; but

I would point out that we can compete today in the world in
many, many products because we have a productivity advantage.
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They have great difficulty in finding out what I'll

call the thousands of hidden products that lie in the

industrial world.

But steel is visible.

All they have to

do is analyze steel reports, and they know how much tonnage
is produced in the different classes of steel; they know
what the labor rates are; and they could plan and did plan

roughly ten years ago to invade the world steel market.

They did it first by tieing up raw materials;
they tied up technology, and then they went to work.
Television became a visible industry.

It didn’t require

segmented reporting; it was already out in the open.

They

did that.
Now, as you know, in the invisible industries, if
I may call them that, the Japanese have not been particularly

successful.

This is a factor; not the only one.

MR. PRYOR:

I don’t want to debate the question,

but the basic economic realities of size, profit opportunity,
and return on investment far outweigh corporate disclosure

as a factor in producing the effect that you describe.

One

other point--

MR. STEWART:

May I supplement that statement,

because I think you may.be overlooking something.

One of

the great mistakes that we made in the United States for
many years was to assume that we know more than our foreign

friends about a lot of things.

Technology in many areas, even in the so-called
high technology areas, has caught up, and in some respects

has gone beyond.

And Mr. Wearly was not implying that import
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competition which has already taken place, is primarily

attributable to information in the form of disclosure.
not implying that.

He’s

He is saying, however, and if you will

analyze some of the dumpling applications that have been made
by the Treasury Department, that where the foreign competitor,
as able and as shrewd as the Japanese, can break down a product
line into the most profitable sizes and types of goods, it will

move accordingly.

He is being anticipatory to some degree.

But it so happens that I know of situations in which

breakouts have enabled foreign competitors to be very selective
about the products they hammer at.

Miniature bearings is one;

it happens in that particular instance that there is a sufficient

number of exclusive manufacturers of miniature bearings so there

wasn't any breakout problem.
But you get into the other types of bearings and the

selectivity technique, for example--and I’m just using it as
an example--of the Japanese is very clear.

The same thing has

happened in certain types of machinery.
There isn’t any difference between you and Mr. Wearly
on the point.

Is that not true, Bill?

MR. WEARLY:

They have only so much capital to deploy.

If they deploy their capital in the most favorable spot, they
can be vicious in their results, because they don’t make any

mistakes.
We go around making, let’s say, fifty per cent of

our decisions wrong, just because of the lack of disclosure of
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the real market.
You can't believe how many wrong industrial decisions
are made because we don't have the facts when we start.

The

Japanese made a remarkable number of right guesses, because
they have the facts.

If we give them more facts, I think

That will enable them to exploit

they will be more right.

their low labor rates and their good productivity to knock us

off on products one by one.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Are there any questions from

the audience?

MR. WEARLY:

I would like to make one more comment.

I think we all believe in proper, conservative reporting.

I think what some people seem to get away with is abominable.
As a company that is fairly conservative, we don't like to see

wild accounting practices used, because it puts us in an
unfavorable light with others.

I don't think any of us will

be advocating that.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

I appreciate that.

PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:
thing?

Could I just comment on one

I've been restraining myself somewhat because it seems

to me that if I were asked to sum up what the witnesses have
said about disclosure and comparability, they would sum it

up by saying they were against it; it's as simple as that.
MR. STEWART:

That's quite erroneous.

PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

Well, that will give you an

opportunity, Mr. Stewart, of making a more positive statement
on what you think the philosophy of the APB should be.

You
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told us, on the whole, what you thought it should not be.
Could you make a more positive statement on what you think it
should be?

MR. STEWART:

My central point, with which the Chairman

and I have reached an agreement, is that the philosophy should
properly weight. By philosophy I mean your operating theory,
management considerations which are in turn related to the

interests of the corporation, and the interests of the stock

holders, present and prospective.
You misread me completely if you thought that I was
suggesting that we're against disclosure and that we're against

comparability.

We are suggesting that--and I'll spell this out

in the written supplement so that there will be no ambiguity-there is a reasonable line beyond which you perhaps should not
go in terms of the degree and the depth of disclosure, and in

terms of your notion of achieving comparability.

I'll give you

an example which is not necessarily attributable to the APB, but

it is an example of what I'm talking about.
We have proposed changes in Regulation S-X of the
Securities and Exchange Commission.

In a number of places you

will see that if the proposal sticks, the reporting company is

required to report in the alternative.
accounting items.

This applies to several

Compute one way; compute another way.

My personal judgment is that this is going to produce
very little more than confusion among the investing public,
which you have a responsibility to protect.
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I would suggest that that is the kind of thing that
goes beyond the line of reasonableness.

I think that the Accounting Principles Board has
accelerated its activity, and there's nothing inappropriate

about that per se; it is moving more aggressively; it is
active in more areas than before.

that is wrong.

It is not for me to say

But I do feel that there isn't any action,

be it governmental or otherwise, that can be workable or

sensible, unless it has balance.
How much disclosure in a particular case is necessary

to accomplish your objective?

To what degree are you, by taking a certain action,
really improving the comparability, and to what extent do
the stockholders or the investing public really have anything

more than they had before?

There is no difference of opinion between you and

me with respect to the fact that there should be proper
disclosure and that there should be a reasonable goal of

comparability.

We’re talking about degree; we’re talking

about balance, and we’re talking about using just plain old
common sense.

So your summary of our position is wholly in error.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

should probably move along.

Thank you, gentlemen.

I think we

We apprec
iate the time you’ve

taken with us.

MR. STEWART:

We appreciate this opportunity.
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CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Next on the agenda is Mr. LeRoy Layton,

Managing Partner of Main Lafrentz & Company.

Mr. Layton was the

last previous chairman of the Accounting Principles Board.

MR. LEROY LAYTON:

Mr. Chairman,I appreciate this

opportunity to present my views on the subject before you.
I will attempt to offer fewer solutions than I might

be expected to.

But the main purpose of this presentation is

to afford a better understanding of present problems and thus
aid your Study Group in arriving at sound and lasting solutions.

The main thrust- of the presentation that you have

before you is in Appendix A of our position paper.

It is a paper

that was presented several weeks ago at a Northwestern University

conference.

It is entitled "A Critical Analysis of the Present

Institutional Framework For Formulating Financial Reporting
Standards.”
It includes, among other related matters, a candid

review of the Accounting Principles Board's role in history;
its strengths, its weaknesses, and its relations with other
groups.

It is felt that this information is relevant, and there

is much to be learned from the present system; its struggles to

cope with changing conditions, as well as its problems, and in

some areas its failures in so doing.
The Appendix is 30 pages long and would take far more

than the allotted time to cover.

The area on the changing

conditions that it did cope with is presented because I believe
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that any organization that comes out of this study must also

have the capability to change with changing times.

Conditions

existing today will not be the same as those that will exist

ten years from now.

I thought a review of the APB's current problems
was important, because from my standpoint, as a member of

the Board for seven and one-half years and as chairman
for almost three of those years, we covered most of these areas;
Board manpower; voting rule; the quality of opinions; the need
for quick decisions; the need for an early warning system, and

the appearance of independence.
I won't cover all these in my oral presentation;
but will try to hit a few of the highlights.

First, as to loss or erosion of confidence in

financial reporting.

This has been one of the main concerns,

certainly, of all of us.

The Accounting Principles Board has

attempted to make sure this does not happen.

I believe, how

ever, that the primary cause of the erosion of public confidence
in financial reporting stems from the action of a very few

managements and independent auditors.

I stress auditors here

rather than accounting principles, because I think this is
part of the problem--the auditors' inability or unwillingness

to cope with these situations.
In this area let me be a little more specific.

I

won't waste time on the management portion of this; but will

discuss my own profession.

their performances.

I think CPA firms must improve
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Firsts I think most are already spending large sums

in recruiting, training, developing and supervising professional
staff.

These programs apparently need to be more effective.

Each firm should consider having key decisions and work papers
reviewed by or under the control of an independent partner,
prior to the issuance of reports.
Accounting gimmicks--innovative accounting approaches

apparently within the confines of generally accepted accounting

principles, but of questionable soundness, should be reported

to the AICPA as part of an early warning system, rather than

being used, as I believe they have in some cases, to enhance
client relations.
Let me add that more effective auditing could do much
to control accounting gimmicks, even with today’s accounting
alternatives.

If the Utopia of accounting principles is ever reached,
I think effective auditing will be needed to control a whole

new set of accounting gimmicks.

When I say effective auditing

I mean the use of sound judgment, and the guts and the willing

ness to lose clients on occasion.

Now as to the independence of the Board,

I firmly

believe that the independence issue is a false one and has little

to do with either the loss of public confidence in reporting,
or the Board’s inability to operate more satisfactorily.

The eighteen-month struggle with business combinations,
and its final conclusions have subjected the Board to the
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criticism that it was too responsive to the wishes of

Some elements of management, however, have

management.

been equally critical that the Board was not sufficiently

responsive to its expressed viewpoints.
In my personal experience, I flatly reject both

criticisms as being completely groundless.

I appreciate that the appearance of independence
or the appearance of lack of independence is a different
matter than actual independence.

However, I recommend

strongly against making any changes solely for the sake of

appearances.

I feel quite strongly about the Board’s voting
rule, although I may be in the minority.

The necessity for

a two-thirds majority vote to issue an opinion or a statement
has taken its toll on both the quality of opinions and the

efficiency of the Board’s operations.

On a number of occasions, periods of constructive
analysis and consideration of the input of others were

followed by voting which left the Board short of a two-thirds
majority.

There was then no other course but to redebate the

issues and seek compromise solutions.

It is my estimate that

the rehashing and compromising on Opinions 16 and 17 added at
least six months to the time schedule, and caused a 180 degree
shift in the purchase-pooling conclusion.
If lack of confidence in the organizational structure

or performance of the present Board or a similar type board is
such that it cannot be endowed or entrusted with a simple
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majority vote, then I would favor whatever changes are necessary

to create an organization that could be so entrusted.
And I am hitting only the highlights.

As to the small,full-time,paid board, I am concerned

that proponents of this solution may not have given it as much
depth study as I believe it must have.
the responsibility of your Study Group.

This, of course, is now
My chief areas of

concern are five.
It is assumed by those who propose it that better,

sounder opinions will flow from a small board.

This may be

so but is this a safe assumption, and if so, why?
Second, no matter how sound future opinions may be

or how efficiently the new organization performs, or how it is
constituted--whether it is interdisciplinary or AICPA sponsored--

its actions will affect many, and it will be subjected to
criticism and severe pressures.

Under the circumstances, real

acceptance of a small board in the private sector can last

longer or evaporate sooner than a broader-based board.

That’s

the second question I think must be answered, if you move in

that direction.

If at a later date a degree of disenchantment develops

in a smaller board, will the source of its operating funds
continue or will they dry up?

Today the major portion of

operating costs represents donated time and out-of-pocket
expenses borne by the Board members and their firms.
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In my opinion, a larger firm would be extremely

reluctant to withdraw from a larger board similar to the
one that exists today.

To do so would put it at a competitive

disadvantage in serving its clients.

That may be a wrong

reason but I think that's a practical situation as it exists

today.

Much has been made of the off-again, on-again
inefficiency of the present, part-time Board, and the

greater added efficiency that a full-time board would have in
being able to continuously consider a single matter.

Actually, neither type board can give continuous

thought to any one subject.

Both must pause for gestation

periods, while other views are being sought, while public
hearings are being tabulated and digested, while decisions

are being drafted on opinions after exposure.

On balance,

though, I do believe a small board would spend less time on

deliberation than would a large board.
My last concern is the manner of selecting members

for a small board.

This must be given very careful consideration

to avoid any suspicion of "packing the court."
My seven and one-half years on the Board convince

me that the experiences and nature of individual members and

their firms have molded them so that their voting pattern was

predictable, to some extent.

Some were basically conservative,

and by this I mean less susceptible to consider change.

were more liberal or progressive, and far. more willing to
consider new approaches.

Others
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The last general problem area is research.

I've

spent a full page on my ideas there, and also included

recommendations made by the APB to AICPA.
I won't repeat them here, but the problem of realizing

more support for research must be solved.

It will represent the

same challenge regardless of the structure of the board itself.

Now for some personal conclusions.

There is no question

that continued improvement in financial reporting is needed and

will be accomplished, if not by an arm of the private sector
then by some agency or board of the Government.

There is also no question in my mind that the

initiative should stay in private hands.

To accomplish this

there are two basic requisites as I see them:

general acceptance

of the changes that are promulgated; and second, there must be

some method of enforcement.
Presently, the APB strives for general acceptance

through close cooperation with other organizations whose interest

in accounting principles is just as great as theirs.

This effort

includes public hearings.

Second is a structure which provides broad representation
from firms handling the bulk of publicly-held opinion work.

Hopefully, sound opinions will be the product of the Board's
semi-public,legislative-like procedures.
The enforcement factor is at the moment a tenuous

linking of the accounting profession's discipline, which binds
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practicing public accountants to its official pronouncements,

and the insistence of the SEC and stock exchanges on opinion

reports.

At the moment, without legislation of some sort,

I see no substitute for this in the private sector, and,

therefore, believe that the Board should stay under the
control of AICPA.

I have one further observation.

The APB is

currently moving at the fastest pace in its history and
has just issued its fourth opinion in eight months.

It

has at least fourteen projects on its current agenda, in

varying degrees of development.

Also, there are ten research projects scheduled

for publication in the next three years.
I hope that the recommendations of your group
will ensure that this momentum be maintained.

Of course,

while most critics want faster action, there is a limit as
to how fast the preparers of financial statements can safely

absorb intricate changes in accounting principles.

This concludes my oral remarks.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

several questions.

Thank you, Mr. Layton, I have

A recommendation was made yesterday

that it might be desirable for the board to allow a longer

lead time between the publication of its rulings and their
effective date.

What's your reaction to that point?

MR. LAYTON:

The Board has given thought to this

fact; it was always a matter of concern.

If you prescribe

a principle that eliminates an alternative or selects one

221

out of several, you’ve now cast doubt on the one eliminated.
What happens when you come to this conclusion, but allow three
years to make a change?

If something goes wrong in the intervening three years,
and someone was using the principle

that’s been eliminated, he

might be hard-pressed to say why he had not adopted the change
much sooner.
In other words, it could be dangerous not to adopt the

change once it had been put into print.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Mr. Layton, you referred to the

desirability of having the experience and input of the major
firms in public practice.

What is your reaction to the

desirability of maintaining what has been a kind of automatic

seat

for members of the Big Eight accounting firms?

What impact

does this have on the objectivity and status of this body in the
private sector?
MR. LAYTON:

I think this is indefensible.

I was

asked that question after becoming Chairman, and I gave the
same answer.

I said that so long as I’m Chairman, I hope all

eight are on the Board.

Their input in terms of time, money,

and other resources is tremendous; not only a tremendous amount

of time by the individual himself but the time of his advisors

and other staff.

While I was Chairman, from a practical

standpoint, I was pleased to have all eight.

I was told that Cliff Heimbucher was asked the same

question and gave the same answer.

In principle, I don't think
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you can defend it.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

You have heard the strong recom

mendations for strengthening the role of the task forces to

this board so that they have the benefit of more regularized
input from financial officers in business.

These task forces

would have a staff member assigned to them to help projects

along, and would have the benefit of highly experienced public

accountants outside the membership of the board.
Along with that suggestion,
in part, has come the

suggestion to reduce the board to a size which would not be
as small as you have spoken of in your testimony, but to an
intermediate size, say eleven or twelve members.

This final

decision-making body, proponents say, would rely heavily

upon the work of the staff.

What is your reaction to that suggestion?
MR. LAYTON:

already

All right.

There are in existence

special industry committees which are appointed

by the AICPA and operate outside the aegis of the APB.
These special committees are preparing audit guides which

involve both audit and accounting principles considerations.

So what you suggest is already functioning in special
industries.

I don't know why it could not be expanded upon

to give subcommittees of the Board added strength, or to take
the place of special committees of the Board.

I think this

would be practical.

I think that an intermediate size board, with
proper input, could function.

It would have to satisfy the

five questions I have raised regarding a smaller board.
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From my standpoint I would like to see it operate with a simple
majority.

If you pick an even number, a simple majority gives

you an edge of two votes which is maybe a little more acceptable

than a one majority.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Mr. Layton, you have heard the

recommendations of a number of people that the board should be

representational.

In other words, there ought to be a certain

number of seats on this group for accountants in public practice,

and that there should be an equivalent number of seats for

financial executives in industry.

Along with that suggestion has

been a series of suggestions as to who might be appointed to
represent other interests, including lawyers, investment
bankers and others.
Would you comment on that?

MR. LAYTON:

You’re speaking of what I call an

interdisciplinary board.

I’ve had trouble defining its

authorization and its legal backing.

These are necessary for

the enforcement factor, which is one of two things I think it

ought to have.
I can assure you also that you would need a simple

majority, because of the diverse views.

I think you’re bound

to come up with four or five solutions to any one subject.

I do believe you will have to solve its legal
foundation and the measure of its authority before that is
practical at all.

AICPA's control.

Lacking that, I favor continuation of the
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MR. BIEGLER:

Mr. Layton, you expressed concern

about the legal foundation of an interdisciplinary type of
board.

This suggests to me that you’re satisfied with the

legal foundations of the present Board.

Would you like to amplify that?
MR. LAYTON:

I said before that enforcement is a

tenuous linking of the accounting profession's discipline,

our respect for the pronouncements of the Institute.

MR. BIEGLER:

Do you think that the Board's

opinions have any legal backing?
MR. LAYTON:
MR. BIEGLER:

I think they have a practical backing.

I'm trying to distinguish between

your concern over the legal backing of an interdisciplinary
type board and your apparent lack of concern over the legal
backing of the present APB.
MR. LAYTON:

substitute.

I said it's tenuous and I see no

Am I satisfied?

MR. LEVINE:

No, not particularly.

Mr. Layton, being a past Chairman of

the APB, do you have any views about the need for a full-

time chairman?
MR. LAYTON:

Yes, I would favor that.

It came

up while I was Chairman, and the Board voted quite strenuously
for it--I think the vote was something like 14 to 4, or 15
to

in favor of a full-time chairman.

I can assure you that no matter how many hours a
chairman might spend, he can always spend more.
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MR. PRYOR:

Mr. Layton, I would like to summarize
you would be willing

your views as I would understand them:

to have a full-time, full-paid chairman; you would like research

to be somewhat better than it is now.

But by and large, however,

you are satisfied with the system as it now stands.

Is that a

fair summary of your views?
MR. LAYTON:

I was not satisfied with the performance

of the APB while I was Chairman.

However, I was always comforted

by the knowledge that I had done the best I could and I hoped the
Board had done the best it could.

We were constantly looking for

better ways of accomplishing what we were doing.

To say I’m fairly well satisfied is not really putting
it properly.

MR. LEVINE:

To put it a little differently, these are

the only changes you would suggest to make it more effective?
MR. LAYTON:

My position paper more fully discusses

the changes I think necessary.

PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

Mr. Layton, you have placed

considerable importance on a change to majority rule--simple
majority rule.

In your Northwestern paper, you said that the

initiative should stay in private hands.

You went on to say

that this could be accomplished in two ways.

First, there must

be general acceptance of the changes that are promulgated by the

APB.

I find it difficult to square the emphasis placed on

general acceptability

with your advocacy of a simple majority.
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It seems to me that the best way to secure general
acceptance within the Board itself is to require something

more than a simple majority.

MR. LAYTON:

I am sure that when the two-thirds

majority was proposed it was with the belief that twenty-one
men, eighteen men, any number of men would thrash out the

issues until two-thirds were certain that the best solutions

had been obtained.
I think my paper also says that that has been

accomplished in some cases; not in all cases.

If it's not

in my Northwestern paper, it’s in one of the other speeches
I've made.

But in a number of areas, the will of the majority

has, in effect, gone down the drain.

I think the compromises

that came out represented poor solutions and satisfied almost
nobody; neither the dissenters nor the assenters.

Quite frankly, at the time the final vote was
taken on Opinion 16, there were still twelve Board members
who would have preferred purchase accounting rather than

pooling.

You may find that hard to understand, but it's

a fact.

PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

You aren’t concerned that an

opinion pushed through by a simple majority would leave such
a large body of dissidents that the opinion itself would

lack cogency; would lack support outside the Board?

I don’t

mean to push this too hard, but it would seem to me that the
two-thirds rule does, in fact, on the face of it, provide
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some assurance that there is a body of support for the opinion
before it’s promulgated.

MR. LAYTON:

My paper says that if a large board

cannot be entrusted or endowed with a simple majority, then I
would favor a size that would permit a simple majority.

Does

it bother you to say that seven could decide something on a

four-to-three basis?
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

If we had a board as small as

seven, then a simple majority would be much easier.
MR. LAYTON:

I think the voting rule is extremely

important.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

You heard the very strong

representations made to us about the need for more effective

representation of the views of industry and management.
I'm not going to ask you what your opinion is on
that.

But it would be useful to us, I think, to hear from

your experience as Chairman of the Boards how you would
evaluate the inputs that the Board received from the representa

tives of industry.

I don't mean the representatives of industry

who were members of the Board, but the representations made to
you by outside bodies?

MR. LAYTON:

I think their criticism was constructive

and helpful during the period in which we were developing
opinion.

I found it a little difficult to reconcile that with

the lobbying that went on once we had determined our position
and moved on an opinion.
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Upon reflection, I said to myself that perhaps
this is properly part of the process that a quasi

legislative or a semi-legislative body is going to have
to go through.

On balance I would say the efforts on behalf
of industry to make constructive input was just that.

I

think in a number of cases they felt that they had failed

if they didn’t gain all the points they were mentioning.
This, of course, is an impossibility,
because you’re getting
opposite views from different groups.

I don't think our methods of involving other

groups were consistent.

I think in some subcommittees the

flow of information and communications started early, and
were quite effective; in other cases the procedure left
something to be desired.
It was a procedure that we kept working on and

trying to improve.

We held meetings between our planning

group and their steering groups, and worked out improvements

in it.

Even these were not as effective as they should have

been, so we turned to public hearings.
A letter from the Machinery and Allied Products

Institute was one of the factors that led to public hearings.

Certain exposure drafts went to chief executive officers and
chief financial officers of companies.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

Did you detect any tendency

on the part of industry representatives to maintain the
status quo?
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MR. LAYTON:

be yes.

On balance, I would say the answer would

I think in some respects, and with some individuals,

that might be an unfair answer.

But on balance, they preferred

to hold the status quo, or to hold the line as much as possible.
Mr. Layton, in your oral comments you

MR. OLSON:

expressed concern for confidence in public reporting, but said
that the appearance of independence or the independence of Board
members was a less serious issue.

You seemed to indicate that one of the greatest

contributing factors to the erosion of public confidence in

financial reporting was the performance of auditors.

Does that

imply that you consider the machinery for setting accounting

principles a less important factor than the erosion of

performance?
MR. LAYTON:

relieve the other.

By emphasizing one I'm not trying to

Most concentration seems to have been on

principles; that doesn’t need further spotlighting.

I think

that our performance as auditors deserves more attention, and

I tried to be specific in that area.

There are many other

areas that I could have commented upon.
MR. SMITH:

I’d like to ask a question pertaining

to the desire of industry representatives to maintain the
status quo.

Would you also say that was a trait exhibited

by other members of the APB?

MR. LAYTON:

I said that after a period of time I

could judge a man’s tendencies, and I categorized vote patterns
as to those who appeared to be conservative and those who
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appeared to be progressive or liberal.

The conservatives were those who were less willing

to accept change.

I attribute that not to pressures brought

about by a client or any series of clients,
but to the
experiences and nature of the people themselves.

Members of the Accounting Principles Board, I can
assure you, have clients on both sides of every issue.
MR. SMITH:

I'm trying to clarify your answer to

Professor Solomons question:

did industry representatives

appear to exude a quality for retaining the status quo?
Your answer was yes, I believe.

Is that correct?
MR. LAYTON:

A qualified yes.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

I'm not sure, just for

clarification, that Professor Solomons' question had to do
with industry financial executives who were on the Board.
MR. LAYTON:

I assumed he meant input and not

members of the Board.
MR. SMITH:
MR. LAYTON:

Is that a tendency peculiar to industry?
It's a tendency on the part of anyone

whose ox might be gored.

Let me give you an example:

We

wanted to do something on price level accounting, and the

biggest complainant was the Government.

Price level accounting

would really show hidden taxation and many other things that

the Government would have a very difficult time in living
with.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

I might ask just one more question.
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You referred to the Machinery and Allied Products Institute

and its influence upon the Board in holding public hearings,

I think there have been a number of references during these

hearings to the expanded due process considerations of the
Various people have commented upon the absolute necessity

Board.

of proceeding with this development so that all major matters are

exposed and there is complete opportunity for input.

My question is:

In your judgment, is it practical to

expect a volunteer board to keep up with these demands, or must

it, from the standpoint of efficiency, evolve into a five or

seven-man paid board as recommended by Mr. Trueblood?
MR. LAYTON:

Well, the eighteen men today with their

ten or twelve advisors are putting in more than five or seven

man years at the present time.

A five to seven-man board can only put in five or sevenman years in one year.

You will have to back them with far

greater staff than presently is available to the APB.

And maybe

Mr. Trueblood’s cost estimate is more nearly right than Haskins
& Sells.
Also, I ask again how fast do we want to move in this

area?

Do we want to do everything all at once?

Obviously, you

can’t wait until all principles fall beautifully into place.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

You referred to the necessity for

periods during which there would be digestion of drafts, and
there would be careful scrutiny of input, briefs and recom
mendations; that these periods are necessary in order that the
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fullest considerations be given before something is finally

adopted.

I take it that it would be your view that the
larger volunteer group could effectively keep the pace
you deem appropriate, and at the same time conduct the
public hearings and the processes you consider necessary?

MR. LAYTON:

I would think so; I would hope so.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Mr. Layton, we're very grateful

to you; thank you very much.
The next gentleman we have with us is Mr.

Philip Defliese, who is Chairman of the Accounting
Principles Board.

MR. PHILIP L. DEFLIESE:

Defliese.

My name is Philip L.

I'm presently Chairman of the Accounting

Principles Boards and I'm also Managing Partner of Lybrand,

Ross Bros. and Montgomery.

You'll have to forgive me

for not having provided the group with advance copies of my

presentation.

It was my original intention to remain

neutral due to the fact that I am presently Chairman.

But I do believe that in the light of the input

that has been made to this group, I am obligated to state
my position.
I'd like to do two things:

first, to submit to

the group for the record the report dated November 24

1970

made by the Accounting Principles Board to the Board of
Directors of the American Institute of CPAs.

This report

was a survey of the Board’s operations conducted intro-
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spectively, obviously, and contained a number of recommendations

to the Board of Directors of changes to be made in the structure
of the Board and its mode of operations.

I think that you should recognize that this report is

essentially one year stale, but nevertheless it represented the
consensus of the Board at that time.

I don’t believe that I want to go into it in any great

detail; it indicated the thought that there was a need for

improvement in its operations.

It recommended the appointment

of a full-time chairman; it recommended increasing the size of

membership to twenty-one in order to provide representation of
more viewpoints from industry, analysts, investment bankers and

perhaps more practitioners from smaller, national and regional

firms.

It recommended the continuance of the two-thirds vote,
and recommended considerable improvement in the research and

technical support that the Board needed.
I think I’ll leave the rest for the group to read.

There are copies.

As to my own statement, I will furnish the group
with a printed copy later.

I have been out of the country and

have been working hard, so you’ll have to be indulgent with me

in making this direct oral input.
I’m sure you’ll be as indulgent as the Board is in its

public hearings in taking late starters.

We’ve certainly

attempted to give everybody an opportunity to be heard.
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In its 12-year history the Accounting Principles
Board has produced four Statements, 21 Opinions, and a

thousand critics.

Criticism of operations of the Board

comes from many sources.

Too often, perhaps, the criticism

veers from a constructive to a superficial base.

Even

within our own profession we hear some strident cries of a

few who wax vocal whenever their pet theories are rejected-or their viewpoints fail to withstand the two-thirds vote

of the Board.

I am happy today to set the record straight, as
I see it, since, in all hearings of this nature, those not
seeking radical changes rarely come forward.
I think it essential that this Study Group examine

the current status and operations of the APB, and the promise
they hold for the future, rather than to concentrate on the
past.

The APB has had a tumultuous history in its short 12

years; it has dallied, procrastinated, erred, and even
reversed itself.

But, in all of this, it has achieved

maturity through experience.

It would be foolhardy, indeed, to dismantle a

machine that is now coming into its own.

Further improvements

are, of course, necessary and will be made unless the present

forward thrust is seriously interrupted.
Both the responsibilities of the public accounting
profession to the American investing public and the need for

improving financial reporting to fulfill that obligation are
well documented.

Although the American investing public is

235

the best informed, much still needs to be accomplished in the
area of standardizing and restructuring the accounting principles
upon which our capital markets must depend.

In this respect I

am in agreement with much of what has been said at these hearings.

I am convinced, however, that the present APB--or a simple
modification of it--is the best vehicle for the task.

The reason

is simply that the Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board
and the monthly Interpretations now published under its aegis are
generally accepted and followed by business, the SEC, and the

profession.
This is because the Board includes representatives

from all the major accounting firms and most other large firms,
and these practitioners operate with a sense of dedication and

objectivity that cannot be surpassed.

By virtue of their

involvement, their firms in recent years have naturally committed

themselves to adherence.

Despite threats to the contrary, recent

opinions have not been judicially challenged.

Moreover, the SEC has indicated publicly--and proven
in practice--that it will support the opinions and interpretations.

This has not always been the case, but has come about in recent

years only because the Board has demonstrated its ability to cope
with the issues.

For many years the SEC was critical of the

Board's reluctance to move rapidly or even adequately.

In those

years the Commission went so far as to threaten to exercise its

legislative right to set accounting principles.

It must be

remembered that the ultimate authority for establishing accounting
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principles for most publicly held companies does rest
with the SEC.

The Commission has in effect delegated

this authority to the APB, with some strings attached,
and I believe that it is satisfied that the Board is
now moving along rapidly enough to merit that delegation.
Also, the financial executives of this country--

no matter how much they may disagree--consider the opinions
and interpretations as generally accepted and adhere to

them.

They know that the SEC is backing the Board, and

they now have reason to be confident that the opinions will
neither be far out nor incapable of reasonable implementation.
Finally, the publishing of opinions and interpretations

is no longer inordinately delayed.

nterpretations,

The

although they are American Institute publications, frequently
receive the attention of the full Board.

These are issued

on a timely basis, and give prompt assurance that practices

will not diverge.

The procedure assures quick answers to

knotty questions.

In a business environment that is becoming

more complex and innovative daily, this promptness is

essential.

What, then, is the problem?

Some critics,

particularly financial analysts, refer to the accounting

transgressions that occur through the use of allegedly

liberal--vs. conservative--principles.

They do, however,

concede for the most part that the disclosures are such
that they can spot these and adjust.

Some analysts consider

it more important to expand and improve disclosures than to
create rigid conformity.

Of course, this is not good enough
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for the typical investor, and financial reporting needs our
attention even if, in some cases,we must become somewhat arbitrary
in establishing greater uniformity.

In my view, much of the furor about accounting principles
and the Board's alleged failures are, in many instances,the red

herrings of publicity-seeking critics that divert attention from
other and more serious problems, many of which are not directly

related to accounting principles.

Those problems fall within the

purview of the Institute's auditing procedure committee, which

is trying valiantly to catch up.

For example, many of the "horror”

stories of accounting--those involving lawsuits and accusations of
fraud against the auditors by the SEC--are not as much a matter

of accounting principles as a matter of auditing and reporting
These involve independence of auditors, valuations of

standards.

reserves and realizability of assets, material accounting changes
that are not disclosed because they offset, and interpretation

and disclosure of relevant facts regarding transactions.

Many

of these are auditing questions, not questions of accounting
principles.

In some instances, the issue may be one of materiality.
The Board is criticized for not speeding up its study and issuing
an opinion on this subject.

But materiality is more a matter for

the conscience and integrity of the auditor than pure theory, and

no amount of study or opining will alter that.
I feel that however important criticisms of the ethics
of the profession and the enforcement mechanisms of the Institute
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are, they simply have no place in a discussion of the
procedures by which accounting principles should be set.
These are separate issues, and they merit the attention of

those within the Institute who have the responsibility for
dealing with them.

It is said that the APB has failed to fulfill one of
its primary charges:

to develop a statement of basic objectives

and concepts of financial statements upon which all opinions

could rest.

It is generally conceded that the Board is working

hard on the other charge, that of narrowing alternatives.

In the early years of the Board--soon after the
first research studies--the debates on this subject quickly
indicated that there was widespread confusion about the concepts
as they existed vs. what they should be.

The urgently needed

brush-fire opinions got mired in this debate.

question was:

The vexing

On which premise should these opinions rest?

The Business Combinations Opinion was one that bogged down

on this point.

The Board committee that was formed in 1965

to formulate a statement on future concepts ultimately decided
that it first needed to reach agreement on present concepts.
And so it did.
future concepts.

In 1968 another committee was formed to study
The latter, headed by a vocal critic of the

Board's procrastination on this subject, awaited the results

of the first committee’s work and only recently began to work
itself.

But agreement on present concepts did not come easily.

And so far, no one, not even one of the vocal critics, has come

forth with any reasonable, well-integrated approach to future
concepts.
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It seems eminently clear that we need to narrow the

alternatives and firmly establish present concepts before we
move into a futuristic approach to accounting.

While it is

generally recognized that the historical cost basis of accounting

falls short of presenting economic reality, we cannot move into

an unchartered area without considerable esoteric, empirical,

and implementary research.

The underpinnings of our economic

stability cannot be tampered with until the new foundation is
firmly laid.

Our recent attempts to give greater recognition

to market values in accounting for marketable equity security
portfolios is ample evidence of the profound effects such

attempts can have.

In the meantime, the APB should continue its efforts to
further the evolution of accounting principles.

This can be done

within its structure or through timely special efforts such as
the Trueblood Study Group.

The important element is the assurance

of practical implementation before pronouncements are made.
The Board is scored for its long discussions and delay
in issuing opinions.

and redrafts made.

Arguments are repeated and changed; drafts

But anyone who has observed this process

cannot help but acknowledge that no matter how time-consuming it
may be, it ultimately provides the most workable answer.

I have

seen responsible people change their views radically through this
process.

The give-and-take debate among the top technicians of

the country produces a far superior product than that which would

result from a quick vote based on briefs.

Here, again, one
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should be realistic enough to expect intemperate criticism
from some of the dissenters.

When a better result is obtain

able through reasonable debate, then I am all for it.
The Board is assailed at times for operating too

slowly and at other times taken to task for moving on a
"crash basis.”

Again, this "damned if you do and damned if

you don't” attitude is something that must be accepted and
dealt with.

As Truman said, "if you can't stand the heat,

get out of the kitchen.”

When you're charged with decision

making, the heat is an occupational hazard.

Actually, when

time permits, ad hoc committees of other Institute members
are formed to produce a specialized paper or industry guide,

as has been done in the land development and real estate
fields.

The results can be implemented with deliberation.

When events create an urgency to move faster, the interpreta
tion route is taken and the effect immediate, as in the case

of computer leasing.

This procedure is a recent development

in the Board's operations, and many critics have not yet
digested the full significance of it.

It has been said that many of the opinions involve
matters that have faced the profession for many years, and

that the Board, by not dealing with the issues earlier, let
too many things get away from them.

This is true.

But we are living in an imaginative

and innovative business environment where things change very

fast.

Who, for example, could have anticipated some of the

"funny preferreds” of the Sixties?

During that go-go era we

did not have the mechanism of the "official” Interpretations
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of the Institute to which the SEC could refer its questions and
problems, as it now does.

It has also been charged that there is absolutely no
appeal from an APB opinion.

In point of fact, in our country

there is an appeal for everyone from anything.

Rulings of

regulatory agencies, for example, are constantly being
challenged in the courts.

In accounting we have a built-in

appeals mechanism in the SEC.

The SEC, as indicated previously,

has the legislative right and responsibility to set accounting
principles, and it has informally delegated this to the APB.

Thus, appeals from APB opinions can be made directly to the SEC.

This was done officially once, resulting in the issuance of
Accounting Series Release 96, which permitted flow-through
accounting for the investment credit despite APB Opinion No. 2,

which forbade it.

However one might feel about the merits of

that issue, he must concede that the appeal worked.

I know, too,

of other cases where the SEC has issued rulings which departed

from APB opinions because of unusual circumstances, and I feel
that in most of these cases the decisions were Justified.

Furthermore, rulings of the SEC can be taken to the

courts, although this is rarely done.

Nevertheless, the process

is available.
Much is made of the fact that the Board members are
voluntary, part-time people who, because of their responsibilities
to their firms, cannot devote adequate time to the task.
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What is overlooked is that these people, when not attending

Board meetings, are Just as deeply involved in Board matters
as anyone could be.

By virtue of their positions, these

executive practitioners are making decisions hourly on all

aspects of the issues confronting the Board.

This hands-

on experience adds a practical dimension to the theoretical,
and provides insight that assures the workability of

opinions.

Board members who take this broader view of their

efforts readily concede that they are, in reality, full-

time members.
Are the Board members pawns of their clients?

Are

the Big Eight a united fraternity functioning as an arm of

business?

A quick look at the voting records should quickly

dispel any such notions.

Let’s examine the independence question more
closely.

When the size test for pooling was being debated, it

was claimed that the Board "backed down" because of client
pressure.

Of course, clients were outspoken, and they had

every right to be heard.

But in this case, the exposure

draft that called for a size test lacked the necessary twothirds support when it was published.

It was inevitable

that it could not be passed without modifying or eliminating

the size test.

As a result of this experience, the Board's

policy now precludes exposure of a draft before it has the
necessary vote.

This is probably unfortunate because a trial

balloon is sometimes needed.
Some say that the top rule-making authority should

limit itself to formulating broad principles and leave their
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implementation to a lesser group.

One suggestion would require

the senior group to approve pronouncements of the lower group.

This sounds fine--but it won't work.

Under this system, broad

pronouncements would need to be delayed until it became clear

that their implementation was sound; practical, and feasible.
The Board has frequently gone down a wide path only to back

away when it was realized that practice could not follow.

Once

the Board unanimously issued an opinion embodying a very fine

theoretical concept requiring allocation of the proceeds of
convertible debentures between debt and conversion features, only

to rescind it when the Board found that it was impractical and;
in some instances, produced bizarre results.

Since that time

the Board has stressed detailed procedures.

Perhaps the most alarming of all the new proposals is
that calling for a small full-time super-board.

This proposal is

categorically unsound.
First, this super-hoard implies a politics of selection.

The biases of prominent accountants are pronounced and well known.

Will we have a "Nixon Board” or a "Warren Board," or will we have
a "balanced group" so that 4-3 decisions will set the future of
The concept of a small group further implies

financial reporting?

decisions by an elite.

I would rather have a larger group of the

best volunteers--all peers--so I could rely on the safety of
numbers to balance off the strong biases.
Second; the small super-hoard would slow, rather than

speed; resolution.

The small isolated group, withdrawn from the

practice arena and restricted by new administrative rules, would
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have more difficulty than the present Board in obtaining
The result would be a need for expanded

the necessary input.

hearings and virtual dependence upon the submission of briefs
and counterbriefs.

Those being "regulated" by this process

would require more opportunities to be heard.

A look at the

"speed" of our regulatory bodies and our courts should be
convincing.

Third, it is the participation of all segments of

the profession in the present body that provides an in-depth
democratic support.

Fourth, a small courtlike body does not make for
economies of either time or money.

The efforts presently

expended by accounting firms in the rule-making process would

need to be increased in order to monitor the board’s activities,
prepare formalized briefs, request hearings, see what others
are doing, respond to client requests for briefing, etc.

Finally, I would prefer that those formulating

the opinions be deeply involved in day-to-day decision-making.
The crucible of practice is the only test which tempers the
most extreme theorist.

And, in accounting, principles and

practice cannot be separated.

The term "generally accepted

accounting principles" has been deemed to include the methods
of applying them.

This has been discussed before.

I have

also observed over the years the frequent metamorphosis of

the charged-up theoretician into the pragmatic practitioner
through close association with those Board members making

day-to-day decisions.
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I have said earlier that much still needs to be done

to improve the rule-making function.

Here are my recommendations.

A broader research program supporting the present

Board is needed.

The emphasis should be on both empirical and

experimental research designed to satisfy the implementation

demands of new opinions.

Researchers recruited for a period of

from one to two years from the major firms could augment the
Drafting assistants are also needed.

present research group.

This follows closely the recommendations made by the APB to the
Institute’s Board of Directors in late 1970.

A full-time chairman would be able to monitor the
research program more closely, be available for meetings with

interested groups,and generally guide the Board better than
a part-time chairman.

Not that the chairman presently isn’t

almost, in fact, full-time; but some of his APB-related time
is devoted to his firm and its clients; a responsibility he

cannot completely shake off.

This is not suggested to indicate

that there is the need for him to be independent of practice;

rather it is a matter of concentration.

It should be possible

to obtain at least one prominent accountant--at the peak of
his career—to accept a full-time term of three years, with
possible renewal.

Apart from having occupied the top technical

position in his firm for many years, he should be a good

administrator and leader.

This is a tough combination to find;

but I am sure one can be found every three to six years.
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Because the resolution of an accounting problem

requires complete exposition of all its aspects and the

need to consider all viewpoints, I feel strongly that it

is undesirable to limit the number of those charged with

the decision-making obligation.

Some limitations must of

course be set, as it would be impossible to accommodate an
overly broad spectrum of views that could arise on some

issues.

Consequently, I am recommending both a fixed and

a flexible Board membership, with wide representation, one
that will provide for expansion and contraction, as need

dictates.

A frequent criticism from industry is that it is

inadequately represented.

I am sympathetic to this complaint.

I feel the Board should consist of 21 members,
rather than the present 18, as follows:
One full-time chairman.

Thirteen practitioners--selected to
include people from the major national
firms at all times, the lesser national firms
and the regional firms (on a rotating
basis), and one small firm.
Three CPAs occupying responsible accounting
positions in industry.

Two academicians well-known for their
qualifications and interest in accounting
theory.
One financial analyst.

One investment banker or practicing attorney
active in securities registration work
(alternately).

When the Board undertakes an issue that is

concentrated in a particular industry or involves a special

ized area requiring an expertise that may not be found among

247

the regular Board members, the membership should be temporarily

enlarged by the appointment of four ad hoc members:
Two practitioners who are specialists in
the area under study, selected to bring
varying views to the Board.

Two industry accountants drawn from the
affected industry, or who have had similar
industry experience, chosen from the related
industry or ad hoc committee, also to bring
varying views to the Board.

These four members would join the three permanent
members of the Board designated by the chairman to form a

committee of the Board to oversee research, drafting, hearings,
discussions, etc., needed to publish an Opinion.

For this

purpose, the four added members would be considered as voting
members of the Board.
Most Board members should be CPAs, because many of

the discussions and decisions require a profound understanding
of the technical accounting and auditing procedures underlying
the issues.

This might seem to discriminate against some highly

qualified non-CPAs in industry and universities, but since their
qualifications are more difficult to assess, it had better be

played safe.

There is an ample supply of highly qualified CPAs

in industry and in universities, so I consider it better to

maintain this requirement at present.
Obviously, the practitioners chosen should be the
best technicians their firms have to offer, with years of
decision-making under their belts.

Accounting decisions are

frequently predicated upon a keen comprehension of the relevant
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facts and the ability to ferret out those facts.

And

a sharp auditing sense is a prerequisite.
The permanent members of the Board should be
named by a standing committee of the AICPA consisting of

the President of the Institute and the four most recent

past presidents.

This would provide for considerable

continuity in the selection group, making possible an in

depth survey of possible candidates in ample time before

selection.

Nominations should be solicited regularly from

all the appropriate sources, and the candidates for selection

should be investigated and interviewed in order to ascertain

their availability, attitude, and competence for the task.
The ad hoc members should be selected by the

Executive Vice President of the AICPA, with the approval of
the Chairman of the APB and President of the Institute.

The present rule providing for a maximum of two

full three-year terms seems appropriate.

Interim appointments

may sometimes extend a person’s tenure to about eight years,

but this, to me, is the outside limit.

In rare instances,

it may be appropriate to re-elect a highly qualified person
who has had maximum tenure after an absence from the Board
of at least one year.

In light of the recent record of progress, it is
decidedly preferable that the Board continue operating as it

is at present.

The public hearings are developing well and our

procedures are continually improving.

It should be noted that

hearings of some sort or other were begun in 1966.

The
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"official” interpretations aid in improving practice although
they occasionally take too much of the time of the full Board.
Committee delegation should ease this load and expedite issuances.

The present two-thirds rule is a great safety valve,

providing the essential safety in numbers I referred to earlier.
I would not like to see far-reaching changes in accounting made
on the strength of one vote.

On the other hand the two-thirds

rule may strengthen the opposition unduly.

I would recommend a

60 percent approval vote--13-8 for a 21-man body; 15-10 for a

25-man body.

I would insist on similar proportions for votes

on exposure drafts of proposed opinions.

Dissents and qualified assents should not be published

or voters identified.

These serve no useful purpose, and just

provide a forum for tirades that are not only frequently
irrelevant and demeaning, but also definite impediments to

progress.

In summary, I believe that the Accounting Principles
Board is a workable vehicle, that it has proven eminently

progressive, and that it offers the financial community and

the American investing public a good chance for bringing
financial reporting up to a new level of dependability.

I hope,

in this spirit, that my own recommendations are weighed fairly
and that the basic concept of the Board receives the support

it deserves.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Phil, I would like to clarify one point.

You referred to the SEC having delegated the formulation of
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accounting principles to the APB.

I'm a little troubled by

that term; I wonder if it wouldn't be more accurate to say
that the SEC

has been willing to urge the private sector

to take the initiative, with the SEC assuming the role of
reviewer and retaining responsibility for accounting

principles?

MR. DEFLIESE:

I'll accept that qualification.

In fact, I think I said, "delegated informally with strings

attached," perhaps shortening it too much.
MR. PRYOR:

Phil, I think you said that most

members of the group should be CPAs; but the tenor of your
remarks made it sound as though all of the group should be

CPAs.
MR. DEFLIESE:

Generally, I think there might be

an exception; I wouldn't make it a very hard and fast rule.

I think we might occasionally find a non-CPA who was

eminently well-qualified, and we could make an exception.
MR. PRYOR:

Nearly everybody but not mandatory.

MR. DEFLIESE:

That's it.

PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

Board's name?

Do you have any opinion on the

I know this isn't a matter of vast importance,

but some people feel that it may be a stumbling-block.

MR. DEFLIESE:

A rose by any other name is just as

sweet (Laughter), and I haven't gone into that.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

I've heard some dissatisfaction

expressed with the status of Statement No 4.

Why was

Statement No. 4 issued as a Statement and not as an opinion?
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MR. REFRIESE:

To expedite the process of publication.

Most members of the Board take their responsibility with respect

to opinions very seriously, and want to fine-comb the language.
We felt that to go through that process and also to go through
the exposure process, required of opinions, would delay it and

not necessarily improve it to any great extent.

There was a

need to indicate to the public that the Board had reached these
conclusions, and that was a starting-point from where we would

go in the future.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

I had it in mind when I asked

Mr. Layton before about the input from industry, to put the

same question to you.

Did you hear my earlier question?

MR. DEFLIESE:

I believe so.

I think there has been

a tremendous improvement in input from industry; as this whole

process has developed over the last twelve years, the various
industry groups have been organizing themselves to cope with
the problems and have furnished us with greater input as we

have proceeded.
The evolution of the public hearing is part and parcel

of that development.

We started off with informal meetings of

related committees of these various associations.

This moved

into "mini-exposures," symposia, and finally public hearings.
I think we're getting substantially more input now from these

groups than we've ever had and I think there’s a great need for
it.

Does that answer your question?
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PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

I was rather concerned with

quality rather than quantity.
MR. DEFLIESE:

considerably.

I think the quality is improving

Many of the groups--which formerly opposed

any change--have come to recognize that change is needed.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Mr. Defliese, were you here when

the gentlemen from the Machinery and Allied Products Institute

were here?
MR. DEFLIESE:

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

I didn't hear the entire presentation.

One of their concerns was that the

interest of management as well as the public interest, be
considered in the development of accounting principles.

They

said that many potential risks or hazards arise for business
from particular kinds of disclosure, which risks and hazards
also affect the shareholders of that business.

These are

concerns of the chief executives of business; they're related

to competitive pressures with particular emphasis upon the
competitive pressures from Japan.

Does the Board take these matters into account?
MR. DEFLIESE:

Yes. In my opinion,the views of

management are given considerable weight in all respects.

I

think Board members attempt to weigh the public interest and
the private interests.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Is there any real private interest

here, or isn't this a public interest just as well?

MR. DEFLIESE:

Well, of course it is.

In the final

analysis the shareholders represent their own public interest
and they need protection against themselves in some respects.
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CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

interests.

There’s a balancing of all of these

Thank you very much, Mr. Defliese.

We hope you will

all bear with us as we’re running a little bit late.

Next on our schedule is Joseph Cummings of Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Company.
MR. JOSEPH P. CUMMINGS:

I'll try to be as brief as

I can because you do have our paper.
I'm here on behalf of Walter Hanson who could not make
the meeting because of a long-time commitment on the West Coast.

He wanted me to be sure to express to this group his deep

concern with the mission that you are undertaking.
We have written our paper in the light and expectation

of very substantial output from the Trueblood Committee.

We

think that the work of your Study Group and the work of the
Trueblood inquiry are inseparable in many ways.

Therefore, we

have to look forward to perhaps some far-reaching changes in
the ways that financial information is communicated to the
public; and in anticipation of that, the way this board should

be struct
ured to handle those communications.

I certainly don’t mean to prejudge what they decide,
but I’m sure their decision will be something that will get us

away from trying to repair the old Graham-Paige as we are doing
today.

It is most important for the public and all users of

financial statements.

We think there is very definitely going to be a

concentration of public interest in terms of information flow:
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whether they go to forecasting cash flows for the benefit of
lenders, or the benefit of potential investors who are

looking for dividends; whether they go to revaluing assets

in terms of their current fair value; whether they go to
the value of underground reserves upon discovery.

We would like to have you consider the possibility
of replacing, over a period of time, some of the people who

feel now that they should be represented on the Board, with
people from other disciplines who can aid accountants in

evaluating just what financial statements should be doing
for the public.
We’ve looked at all the written proposals and
believe that they fall into two or three basic patterns.

We

reject them for reasons which have been set forth by many

others.

We think that the small, full-time, in-house
board could not stay current.

We don’t think that a full-

time board would sit in a room even four days out of the
week; it would spend time doing much of the same things that

the part-time members do when they're not at meetings or
subcommittee meetings.

We find it difficult to avoid the bias which would
naturally arise in that group and we question the ability to
pay them.

Most important, we question the ability of that

board to get the empirical research which each of the present
Board members can get now from his own organization.
We deplore the lack of any public interest
representation on that group.
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We resist the solution that the job be turned over
to Government for many reasons that have been stated; we think

that would stultify to a great degree the progress which we

hope will be made.
We have also come to the conclusion that if there are
just a few limited spots available in addition to practicing
public accountants, that those spots could be better filled by
representatives of other disciplines who are public interest
oriented and not affiliated with any organization; are not locked

into any policies set by the Board of Directors of their

organization.

We have reached this conclusion despite the

substantial contributions made by industry representatives and

groups like the FEI, API, and MAPI.

These organizations have

set up committees parallel to committees of the APB and who

work with us very diligently in terms of input.

But generally speaking, industry groups are not

decision-making vehicles.
views.

They are too diversified in their

If you took the API representatives,
the independent

producers and the pipeline companies and some of those who are
vitally interested in our accounting for extractive industries

today, and tried to select one man that could represent the
industry, you'd have two or three others who would be vehement

in terms of their not getting a fair shake.
If you take an executive from a lease company and put

him on the Board, you get one point of view.

But I'm afraid

there would be resistance to any change which would substantially
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reduce income.
Board members need substantial input from all of
these groups, but the decision-making and voting should not

be in their province.
We have heard the recommendations for two or three

separate groups, and believe it would be impossible to
implement that kind of structure.

We cannot in our own

minds very clearly divorce concepts, principles, and

applications.

I think Phil covered that point; others have,

too.
I won't dwell on it, but we think there should be

only one body.

The body should be guided by committees, such

as the Trueblood Committee that have broad representation from
many disciplines.

But to give them voting power, or ask them

to coordinate with the decision-making on a week-by-week basis

would be impossible.

We finally come to our proposal, which we think
will permit maximum utilization of the structure we have
today.

We think it should be gradual, and that there should

continue to be eligibility for ten or perhaps twenty major
national and international accounting firms.

We believe this

representation is important for several reasons:

their input;

the ability to communicate with clients and get their reactions
to events as they are being considered; the ability to generate

empirical research; the dedication an organization of this
size can give to the problem.

I would say that any firm of this kind will
certainly comply--we would comply if it became an Institute
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policy.

That isn't my point.

I just think that something would

be lost and unbalanced if at least ten of the major firms were
not constantly there.

The selection process is open.

Someone suggested a

fifteen-man committee to pick five or seven; I think we’d be

inclined to have five or seven men pick fifteen eligibles.
As far as research is concerned, we think that, in

addition to a financial commitment, a firm should commit
individuals as well.

Perhaps firms should have the opportunity

of sending staff people to the Institute for a period of time.

Enough of these men who are skilled in auditing and accounting

principles could be made available.

It could be of great benefit

to them individually,
to their firms, and, I think, to the

Institute and the financial community at large.
Below the voting

body should be a structure of task

force committees comprised of representatives of all phases of
industry that relate to the problem.

Someone mentioned the ad

hoc committees on insurance, banking and other special areas;
these could be expanded.

Similar subcommittees could be working in the inventory

area, on depreciation consolidation, foreign exchange, and all
the other areas which are on our agenda.

most valuable.

That kind of input is

By denying the vote to these special interest

groups,, we are not suggesting that they not be heard, or not
take a very direct part in the whole process.
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We think the two-thirds vote is satisfactory.
would not like to see a simple majority.

We

I think it's

healthy that when a proposition is put to the Board and
receives a ten to eight vote, that it is not considered the

end of our deliberations .

Many bad decisions, I think, would have resulted

from that.

Perhaps many bad decisions result from two-

thirds, because of compromise.
Certainly, if the body was structured as we

propose, with fourteen public accountants and seven
disciplines other than accounting, we would like to see the

vote sufficient among the accountants to be sure that there
is a two-thirds majority in that group.

We think there is

a safeguard in that procedure, and that any opinion or series

of opinions that comes out with a negative vote from the
public interest group would certainly dictate a change in

the organization.
The term of membership is open.

A full-time

chairman and perhaps two or three other full-time people

would accommodate the ability of a financial officer to leave
his company for a period of time in order to become one of

the full-time members of the board.

could do the same thing.

An economist at a bank

An attorney need not necessarily

sever his relations with his firm entirely, but he should
sever his relationship from activity.

Although an attorney

is an admitted advocate, we don't feel that the independence
of the accountants on the board will be impaired.

I've heard this time and again, but there is no
question in my mind that no one goes to Board meetings with
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a fixed position.

Client views are all over the lot.

I can’t

even get a fixed position from my partners, so I don’t see how

I can get it from my clients.

I think that’s the sum and substance of the material
in our paper.

In view of the time I would stop there and be

happy to answer any questions which you have.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Thank you very much Mr. Cummings,

I regret to say that I haven’t had a chance to read your paper
as yet, because, as you know, it reached us rather late.
MR, CUMMINGS:

It was late this week and I apologize

for it.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

of care.

We will read it with the greatest

I’ll just ask one question.

A number of comments have been made about the
Accounting Principles Board reversing itself.
made a passing comment to that effect.

Mr. Defliese

On the other hand, some

have said that the Board should have an ongoing procedure for
reviewing and rediscussing opinions after some relatively short

period of time; and should not be afraid to reverse itself if
its experience indicates that there might be a better way.

What’s your reaction to that?

I’m a little puzzled

by the problem that seems to be raised by those who think it is
bad for the Board to reverse itself.

MR. CUMMINGS:

I don't think it’s all that bad.

If

you think you have a final answer imbedded in cement at any time,
it seems to me that you're misleading yourself.

It’s embarrassing

to reverse, as we have been doing on a couple of occasions,
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decisions that seemed to have been made without all the

testing and research necessary.
Part of the solution to that problem will be

additional empirical research before the decision is made.
I don't agree with the need for an appeals procedure, though,
because it would, in effect, put the question of acceptability
in limbo during the appeals period.

On the other hand I

have no objection whatsoever to some task force from the
Institute, whether working directly with the board or apart
from the board, evaluating the application of opinions and
making suggestions for changing the agenda.

This could be

part of the coordination with others that a full-time chairman
and his planning committee could undertake.

MR. LEVINE:

Have you considered how your full-time

chairman and planning committee might affect or displace the
composition of any of the other members?
MR. CUMMINGS:

If the planning committee included

an accountant, he would have to sever from his firm to take
that position.

If it were an economist, or a lawyer, he would

have to sever his connection in order to become full-time.
We have accommodated that full-time opportunity
solely to give the board some flexibility in using talents

that we think are presently in the private sector.

We want

to broaden it to the public interest .

MR. LEVINE:

Would you say then, that it might reduce

the respective composition as you have outlined it in your
statement?
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No, they would be among the twenty-one.

MR. CUMMINGS:
MR. LEVINE:

They would be among the twenty-one, but

if it was an accountant,
for example, would it reduce representation

from the international or national firms?

MR. CUMMINGS:

No, they would be both.

A man from a

national firm can serve in one of those positions and also be on

the planning committee.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

Clearly the most striking part of

your proposal is for public interest representatives as full
working members of the board.

I take it that you wouldn’t be

satisfied with something like a panel of public interest

representatives which might provide input to the board and
perhaps react in print to opinions of the board, but would not
be full working members.

MR. CUMMINGS:
over what we have today.

I think that would be an improvement
I would say that all these men should

have business and financial background; it has to be something
they're interested in, otherwise they'll go to sleep at the meetings

(Laughter)
The panel would be an acceptable alternative to what

we have today, but I don't think it would be the same as having

direct participation in decision-making.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

Would these public interest

representatives be paid?

MR. CUMMINGS:

Yes. We haven't resolved that problem,

but we said that perhaps the Institute budget could be fattened
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to take care of this ongoing obligation.

They might

associate themselves with some trade association or some
other national group.

But wouldn’t that run afoul

PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

of your other rule about associating with special interest

groups?
MR. CUMMINGS:

We don’t associate the American

Bar Association or the University of Oklahoma with any

(Laughter)

special parochial interest!
MR. PRYOR:

How would you select these public

interest people?
MR. CUMMINGS:

that would be consulted:

There are a number of organizations

American Philosophical Association;

American Political Science Association; Academy of Political

Science; National Institute of Social and Behavioral Science;
The American Sociological Association, and American Economics

Association.

These groups would have to be consulted.

MR. PRYOR:

By whom?

MR. CUMMINGS:

By a committee of the Institute which

would have to screen them and approve them.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Mr. Cummings, when you referred to

the public interest members being paid, you. didn't have in

mind that they would serve full-time?
MR. CUMMINGS:
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

No.

Just be paid something for the

time that they spend, is that right?
MR. CUMMINGS:

Yes, I think they will have to remain

associated with some kind of organization.

Some of them may
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now be associated with corporations, and they would have to

sever that connection in order to qualify under this proposal.

Excuse me.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

The last time we had a

gentleman here we failed to ask if you in the audience had any

questions.

I’ll repair that omission by asking if anyone has a

question for Mr. Cummings.
QUESTION:

Mr. Cummings,
as I understand your remarks,

you would be willing and feel it desirable to utilize

representatives of the business community, their intellect, their
intelligence and their experience in the affairs of the APB.
But you wouldn't give them a vote.
Would you elaborate a little on what would disqualify

them for voting?

MR. CUMMINGS:

It’s a difficult thing to say.

tried to illustrate by using the oil and gas industry.

I
If you

were to give a vote to a man who was a total coster, for example,
the successful well coster is going to be injured.

He will feel

that his position is not being given an adequate hearing.

We have found that the FEI and other groups are adding
great imput to the deliberation effort.

But it’s very difficult

to get a firm position because of the diverse positions on
various issues.

What I’m saying is that the man sitting on the body
who is attached to a corporation is not as free, as independent,

and as objective as he might otherwise be.

I don’t mean in any

way to demean the contribution made by those who have been with

us over the y^^s^but I just have to believe that as a fact.
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QUESTION:

What if he disassociated himself from

his firm?

MR. CUMMINGS:
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Then I would have no problem.
Thank you, Mr. Cummings, very,

very much.
Mr. Norby, we have tried your patience; I'm sure

that we have tried the patience of all of you this morning,
but you’ve been very considerate.

We apologize and thank

you.

We are delighted to have Mr. Norby here. He is

Chief Executive of the Financial Analysts Federation.

With

him is Dr. Frances Stone who is Chairman of the FAF Financial
Accounting Policy Committee.

MR. NORBY:

your deliberations.

Mr. Chairman, we appreciate your adding us to

We had deliberations with your committee

some months ago, and in the last few days, our Financial

Accounting Policy Committee has submitted a position paper.
My purpose today is to elaborate on that statement and
to give your committee some of the views of our senior members.

Our organization, perhaps, illustrates a point Mr. Cummings just

made--it’s hard to get monolithic opinions from voluntary
groups.

Perhaps the conveyance of some impressions of our
members will be valuable to you.

We don’t want to stress too

much any specific mechanics.
First, I would like Dr. Stone to summarize the paper
that has been submitted on behalf of our Financial Accounting

Policy Committee.
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DR. FRANCES STONE:

I am only going to take a very

short time because we have spelled out some of our ideas in this
area, and we have talked with the committee before.
I'd like to emphasize that I think this overall statement

of principles which the Trueblood Committee is charged with is

very important,
and that the combination of the two committees--

both the Trueblood and the Wheat Committees--is an excellent thing.

I feel that we've gone a long way in the last few years,
and I'm a little surprised, now, to find that I've been involved
with this process longer than I thought.

It has seemed to me

that we're doing a great deal of patching.

The analysts, I

think, are aiding and abetting in that process.

I would like to see the SEC a lot more directly involved
with the setting of accounting principles, or guidlines, because
I'd like to see them have the force of law.
That, I think, would be a welcome step forward.

Then

we'd have no problem about going to the courts on this.

I would like to see a full-time, independent, highly
professional board.

time.

I would like to see them serve for a limited

In this way you could select high caliber people with

sufficient experience in the field of accounting to make an

effective contribution.
I think if you would ask them to serve on a very short
term basis--say nothing less than three years--that you would be
able to tap a really large pool of good talent.
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I'm going to suggest that the decisions be made on

a majority vote, because the two-thirds rule is too restrictive.

And I would like to ask for a much quicker reaction to poor
accounting practices.

I think the long period of time some practices have
been used before they've been cited, works to the detriment
of financial users.

I would like to suggest that there be some kind of
tax or dues on all of the members, and all of industry as well,

so that we have sufficient funds for research.

Not only should

the group have its own research staff, but it should call on
all of the other disciplines.

They should have the money and

authority to call on other groups as well.

I’m going to stop right there.

MR. NORBY:

We had a conference a couple of weeks

ago and we took the occasion to discuss this subject with

our Board of Directors.

I wanted to reflect some of their

views, which some of you may have already heard privately.

I think it can be said that our members have
generally expressed conservative views on this whole problem
of establishing accounting principles, which I see can be
divided into two parts.

The first would be who is going to

have the responsibility, and secondly how will they be
organized.

Concerning the question of who will have the
responsibility, I think our members have consistently held
the view that professional accountants should establish
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accounting principles.

There is a particular fear of Government

responsibility for this function, having in mind political
pressures, legal roadblocks to progress, and the slow pace that
usually characterizes Government bureaus when it comes to change.

This is not to say that Government agencies have not
made many contributions to reporting, and that they have not

prodded the private sector to action on accounting matters.

But

we believe that an organization in the private sector will have

greater flexibility and show more responsiveness to the needs of
investors in business.
When we say professional accountants should have the

responsibility, we mean exactly that.

Not only do they have

professional competence, but we feel that they have the independence.

Numerous commentators in the past few months have
suggested that the Financial Analysts Federation or the financial
analysts, should have a role in decisions.

We are complimented

by this but we do not think it appropriate.

By the same token,

we do not believe organizations representing business management
should have a role in decisions, either.

Business is the subject

of accounting measurement, and therefore should not be a
participant in establishing the standards of measurement.
We agree that financial analysts, business management,
and any other parties affected by accounting rules should

participate in the decisions and should have positions of
advocacy.

In this way they can make an effective contribution
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to the development of accounting principles. But they

cannot be both advocates and judges.

I think that the development of public hearings
is a very fine forward step in bringing about the participation
of many organizations and the interchange of ideas.

This is not to say that if you conclude that other

organizations should have a role in decision-making on
accounting principles beyond what we have suggested, that
our organization would not try to cooperate.

We would want

to have a part in representing professional investors.
Linked to the determination of responsibility,

of course, is the problem of enforcement.

The APB and the

Securities and Exchange Commission have a relationship,

developed through custom and practice.

It is this relationship,

derived from the SEC's legal powers, that gives implied force

to APB opinions.
We think this relationship could be strengthened
or made more explicit, as Dr. Stone has implied in her statement.
The principle of the self-regulatory agency as related to the

Securities and Exchange Commission does provide a model, perhaps.

Admittedly , the self-regulatory concept is currently being

questioned in the securities business, but I think the

circumstances of accounting principles are somewhat different.
I would also suggest that the SEC's authority in
accounting matters be primary among Government agencies, so

that other regulatory bodies do not require public companies

to issue statements that are not consistent with general
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principles.

The separate ways of several agencies in the past,

I think, has been a disservice to investors.

Secondly, voluntary membership organizations have
difficult organizational problems.

They are not really

equipped to respond quickly to increasing demands, nor are fast

decisions usually feasible.

We believe the APB in recent years

has made extraordinary progress in the pace of its opinion
issuing, relative to the inherent organizational limitation.

Yet the problems do seem to be multiplying and greater

speed is demanded from all quarters.

Thus, reformation of the

organizational structure is a very important subject.
Our committee has recommended full-time membership of

professional accountants for limited terms.

We recognize that

the present volunteer members of the APB are devoting practically

full-time to the task.

But from an organizational point of view,

the full-time, fully-compensated member would appear to have

two advantages--first, greater continuity of effort; and second,
complete independence.

In saying this we do not mean to imply in any way

that present members have not been faithful to their mission

on the APB.

But independent stature, would give the APB

increased credibility in many quarters, I believe.
As I have indicated, in our organization, as in others,
there is a diversity of viewpoint.

Many of our directors prefer

the present voluntary membership of the APB.

This preference is

based on the idea that voluntary members through their firms,
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will be closer to the current practical problems and their
decisions would gain more acceptance than decisions made by
an independent group which might become, let us say, too

academic.
They believe the establishment of accounting

principles is a pragmatic, quasi-legislative process, and
that it is not necessarily bad if members are close to che
pressures of practical problems.
Mr. Defliese's statement seems to be in that same
general direction.

Within our group, we also have different views as
to the composition of the full-time, independent board.

I

should mention the excellent paper by Mr. Ellis at the recent

Northwestern University Symposium. Mr. Ellis is a member of
our Financial Accounting Policy Committee.

He proposed a

broader group than professional accountants, but nonetheless
would require independence.

No member, he said, would retain

any employer or a vocational tie.

The purpose would be to bring to bear on the total
problem of reporting, a wider range of viewpoints.

I think

in the key requirement for independence, he was not at great
variance from the other viewpoints expressed among our members.
I'd like to state my own view, based on observation

of voluntary organizations over a number of years.
favor full-time, compensated board membership.

I tend to

I believe this

is the only way the APB is going to be able to keep pace in
the next few years.

I believe these board members can be
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selected in a way that will ensure continued responsiveness to
practical problems.
The criticisms of the APB seem to rise in part from

the desire for speedier action.

When we have our problems

identified, we'd all like a quick solution.

However, there are

many parties of interest, and their acceptance of final opinions

rest on their opportunity to present recommendations and listen
to arguments.

This takes time, and it will be difficult to speed up
the process no matter how the APB is organized.

These other

parties of interest are also voluntary organizations , in many
cases.

Accounting is not their primary objective or concern,

although it is very important.
Speaking for the Financial Analysts Federation, we

recognize that we must expand our capability to provide input
to the APB, because it is desirable to settle accounting issues

more rapidly.

Nonetheless,
I have to say that our ability to

provide this input is going to be in the nature of evolutionary

expansion.
Consequently, I believe we reflect the proponderent
opinion of our organization, that we're suspicious of some of
the grand, sweeping reorganizations in the accounting principles

process that have been proposed.

An evolutionary change and

improvement , building on what has already been developed by the
AICPA and other organizations , seems to be a more practical
approach to us.

In that connection I will state that our

committee's position is consistent with that approach.
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Thank you.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Mr. Norby,

Thank you very much, Dr. Stone and

Let me probe for just a minute your comment

about the full-time professional hoard.

A number of people

have commented to us that if you wanted the most qualified,

most experienced, vigorous, professional accountants, it
would be extremely difficult to get them on a full-time
basis.

They would have to leave their firms, and the ladder

of success, if you wish, that they’re on; they would have so
move their families, which is quite a significant thing to

do.

If they were employed as professors and were going to

be away as long as three years, they would have to give up
tenure.

Lawyers frequently move in and out of Government.
It's no great problem.

But it's extremely difficult for an

accountant near the top of his firm to leave for a period of
three years, and have any assurance as to where he's going to
fit when he returns.

It’s a contrast, apparently, between the two professions.

Accordingly, the question has been raised as to whether it would

be desirable to take the risk that, in order to get five or
seven full-time professionals, one would have to take men who
are substantially less experienced and had substantially less

prestige than present APB members.

How do you react to that?
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DR. STONE:

I think that one of the things that could

be done is to make service on the board as prestigeous as service

on the Council of Economic Advisors.

done.

I think that it could be

In this way,
someone who is at the top of his firm could

feel that he could leave that firm; the firm would regard this as
a favorable step

and keep room for him over a three-year period.

It really isn't that long a time to be gone from a
firm.

If a firm has plans for the future, they usually don’t

come to fruition in three years.

They have five-year plans or

ten-year plans.

I think that problem could be coped with.

It’s an

image problem,
I think, more than anything else.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

One of the gentleman who appeared

at these hearings stressed the desirability of substantial

continuity and experience in this process.

Members of the

Board today serve for two terms, gaining experience and judgment

in that process.
He referred to it as possibly the last ten years of

a man’s career, because he was looking to people over fifty.
How do you react to that?

DR. STONE:

Since I’m going to reach that age sooner

or later myself (Laughter), I guess I had better react properly!
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

I was assuming that we'd get the

youthful viewpoint from you!
DR. STONE:

(Laughter)

Actually, I was supposed to be presenting

the radical viewpoint, and Bill the conservative viewpoint.
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Age is really no barrier, one way or the other.
What I am looking for, really, is the maintenance of an open

mind and that is true of any age.

If you get somebody who’s

thirty who has decided that all the decisions have been made
and wants to maintain the status quo, he's of no use.

If you have somebody who's fifty and has lived
through the changes and is extremely flexible, I'm all for
him.

I don't think age really matters.

MR. NORBY:

I would concur that the full-time

position on a board of this type would be quite prestigious

I think it would be possible

in the accounting profession.
to attract the best people.

Length of tenure might be a problem; this is an
organizational and management kind of thing that would have

to have more detailed study.

Possibly one solution or one

compromise might be to make the term longer and have seven

members, each serving seven-year staggered terms.
It was interesting, though, that a lot of our

Board members felt that the shorter term would keep the

member closer to reality, so to speak.
real risk of a longer term,

Whether this is a

I don't know.

I'm a little

doubtful, myself.

MR. PRYOR:

Bill, did you favor a small board?

You

didn't say that in your first testimony, but you just mentioned

seven.
MR. NORBY:

I don't think we have a firm position on

the precise size of the board.

It seems to me that
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the implication of a full-time, fully-compensated board would
probably be a smaller body.
PROFESSOR SOLOMONS:

It’s true to say, isn’t it, that

your Board of Directors was unanimous in recommending a fulltime board?

I was really quite surprised that they would come

out with that view.

MR. NORBY:

I want to make it clear

that our Policy

Committee tended to favor the full-time board, and that is also
my position.

Our Board of Directors strongly favored the

voluntary board.

MR. PRYOR:

How knowledgeable would you say the

Directors are, as a whole, about the whole problem of how

accounting standards ought to be set?

MR. NORBY:

I would say they are not extremely

conversant with the details, but I think that they represent an

impression in the financial community that is worth taking account
of; that's the way I want to put it in the record.

I think you have to be concerned with the net result

of how things appear to people.
MR. SMITH:

Mr. Norby, would you reread the part of

your testimony that discusses industry representation?

There

was a point I didn't get.
MR. NORBY:

Well--

MR. SMITH:

It was where, I think, you were saying

that you didn't favor them and expressed an opinion on this.
MR. NORBY:

I said first of all that various parties
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had suggested that financial analysts have a role, but we
did not think it appropriate.

By the same token we did not

believe organizations representing business management
should have a role in the decision either.

We felt that

business was a study of accounting measurement, and, therefore,

should not be a participant in the establishing of standards

of measurement.
MR. SMITH:

That's the phrase.

You’re not saying

that business should not have a voice in the laws that govern

them.

What is it that makes you think that industry should

not have a voice in setting standards?
MR. NORBY:

Business through accounting and

corporate reporting is giving a report of its stewardship;
it's being held accountable for its performance.

Therefore,

others should establish the measurement of that stewardship.

I would like to say that on this point we would
have virtually unanimous views throughout the Federation.

DR. STONE:
said.

I want to reinforce what Bill has just

I don't think that there is a place on this permanent

group for a business member.

Nor do I think that the FAF

should be represented as a permanent member.

I think we should

give input; I think business should give input, but that the

decisions should be made by the professional group.

MR. NORBY:

Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Wait just a moment, Mr. Norby; let's

ask if anybody from the audience has questions.
Mr. Defliese has a question.
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MR. DEFLIESE:

I’d like to know whether the proposal

for a full-time hoard was dependent upon the availability of
speed in operations,
or was it the appearance of independence?

MR. NORBY:

I would say that the general viewpoint

would lean toward the appearance of independence.

MR. DEFLIESE:

That seems to conflict, then, with the

thought that a person could return to the firm from whence he
came.
MR. NORBY:

Well, if he came back to the firm where

he had a prior relationship, there would be no conflict.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

At this point, despite the fact that

it’s late, and I'm sure you're all hungry, I would like to ask

if there is anybody in the audience that has a question to raise
with us, or has a comment that he wants to make which would be
beneficial to us.

I hope that you would keep it relatively short, but
nevertheless we’re very much interested.

Let’s ask the lady down here who hasn’t spoken, yet.
MISS GERTRUDE MULCAHY:

I'm Gertrude Mulcahy of the

Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

Oh, I beg your pardon!

We heard from

you yesterday.
MISS MULCAHY:

I had

a number of questions that I

wanted to raise, but they have been answered this morning.
There is one thing that has been mentioned quite
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frequently by many of the speakers, and that is the need

for more research to support the work of the APB.

As a foreigner looking at what happens in the

United States, I never cease to be amazed by the amount of
research that seems to be done.

But it seems to be in a spirit

of competition, rather than in the spirit of getting together.
I look at AAA, NAA, and FEI; each one tries to outdo the other.

Maybe I’m wrong.
It seems to me that when your committee looks at

this, you should not ignore the work done by other organizations.
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

QUESTION:

Thank you, Miss Mulcahy.

My name is Luke Patrick.

I want to

commend the committee for doing a fine job during the two days
of looking into this matter.

We've heard a little bit about

independence, but there’s one phase of independence that I

don’t believe is a matter of the record.
In the interest of serving the appearance of due

process being reported here at this hearing, I want to look
into that a little bit and see if maybe some members of the
committee or some of the witnesses might have some clarification
for me on this point.

We think of independence in terms of certification or
attestation, and we’re thinking about an unsavory relationship

or a savory relationship between the independent accountant,
who is going to attest and certify, and the firm whose reports
and business he is going to attest to.

But the Accounting Principles Board is not in the area
of certification or attestation, but in the area of enunciating
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accounting principles by which business reports its transactions.
So what I think we’re really talking about, and the thing that’s

important, here, is a conflict of interest.
It seems to be accepted by most of the speakers that
the independent accountants, by being made independent would not

have a conflict of interest.

I want to point out that independent accountants owe
their very existence to the fees they get from their clients.
There have also been records of numerous multimillion dollar
lawsuits against accountants for their certifications and I’m

sympathetic to their position in this thing.

I’m not critical

of them in any way whatever.
But I say that in the area of enunciating and establishing

accounting principles that independent accountants are not dis
interested.

They do have imbedded interests in the problem; they

do have perhaps even conflicts of interest as between their
interest in the accounting principles established and the interests
of business or the financial community.
My question is, is this something that is given due

consideration by the committee that we’re meeting with here

today, and will it be given due consideration?
CHAIRMAN WHEAT:

I can assure you, Mr. Patrick, that

it will be given due consideration.

We appreciate your statement

and we recognize the significance of what you say.

Is there anyone else?
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Thank you all, again.

I guess we're closed.

We'll have a hearing record if anybody wants to have a

look at it.
(The meeting adjourned at one thirty-five

o'clock.)
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